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Summary
Over the second part of the twentieth century inter-ﬁrm cooperations
have become an increasingly popular phenomenon. These inter-ﬁrm co-
operations often play out in the form of meta-organizations, which are
organizations that are composed of the cooperating organizations. This
thesis oﬀers a new Law and Economics view on meta-organizations,
contrasting meta-organizations with employment-based organizations
in terms of the beneﬁts and obligations involved. By integrating as-
pects from the ﬁelds of Law and Economics and Organization Science,
the thesis contributes to the understanding of meta-organizations and
their governance.
Meta-organizations can be characterized as a hybrid between market
and hierarchy. Because of their hybrid form, meta-organizations are
diﬀerent from employment based organizations. This diﬀerence origi-
nates from their distinct membership compositions, and the associated
rewards and obligations. The distinct nature of the obligations and re-
wards in meta-organizations impedes the applicability of governance
mechanisms that are well established for employment-based organiza-
tions, such as the instruments building on formal authority or corpo-
rate governance. As a consequence, meta-organizations require speciﬁc
governance mechanisms. This thesis presents two examples of such
governance mechanisms. Third party decision making is viewed as an
integral part of the meta-organization, implying that in this context
arbitrators, for example, are a complement rather than a substitute
to ordinary courts. Group selection may be relevant for cooperation
within meta-organizations, with a larger pool of groups fostering co-
operation through self-sorting of parties according to their willingness
to cooperate, but also hindering cooperation due to coordination costs
of ﬁnding a suitable group.
This thesis has built upon insights from both Law and Economics and
viii
Organization Science in order to shed new light on the governance
of meta-organizations. The ﬁndings of this thesis, based on an inte-
grated use of multiple disciplines, show the relevance of broadening the
paradigm within Law and Economics beyond neoclassical economics.
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1 | Introduction
1.1 From Entrepreneurship to Meta-organizations
When Guglielmo Marconi built his ﬁrst radio telegraph in the late
nineteenth century, he performed the necessary research, design, and
manufacturing himself.1 A modern mobile phone, on the contrary, is
often not manufactured by the company that brands and markets it.
Neither does this company generally design all the parts that the phone
includes. Crucial components such as the processor, the battery, or
the display are produced by specialized companies. However, this does
not imply that these components are fully standardized products that
are sold by the producer with equal speciﬁcations to multiple phone
manufacturers. Imagine that the display of mobile phones would be a
standardized component, then many phones in the market would look
very similar since the shape of the display has a dominating impact
1Guglielmo Marconi (25 April 1874, Bologna - 20 July 1937, Rome) is commonly
known as the inventor of radio telegraphy (Jacot and Collier, 1935, 17-23,29-41).
For his pioneering research in the ﬁeld of wireless telegraphy he was awarded, to-
gether with Ferdinand Braun, the Nobel Prize in Physics 1909 (Royal Swedish
Academy of Sciences, 1909). In 1987 Marconi founded the Marconi Wireless Tele-
graph Company (initially, until 1900: Wireless Telegraph & Signal Company) that
was one of the most important manufacturers of wireless communication and broad-
casting technology in the ﬁrst half of the twentieth century. For example, with his
company Marconi transmitted the ﬁrst radio message across the Atlantic Ocean in
1902 and subsequently established the ﬁrst transatlantic wireless telegraphy service
between Europe and America in 1907 (Jacot and Collier, 1935, 102-119).
2on the design of a mobile phone. Also the research that is necessary
to develop the technology incorporated in modern mobile phones is
not carried out solely by the manufacturer of the phone. Very often,
companies jointly conduct research in order to share the associated
costs and risks. Moreover, these companies are organized in indus-
try alliances, such as the Open Mobile Alliance,2 to develop and set
common standards that allow the use of their devices across diﬀerent
networks.
Compared to the pioneer times of Guglielmo Marconi and other great
inventors, companies nowadays need to establish many inter-organi-
zational relationships to produce the complex and high-tech products
that we use in everyday life. Figure 1.1 exempliﬁes this development
by illustrating the number of newly announced joint ventures per year
over the last 50 years. The graph shows a vast increase in the pop-
ularity of joint ventures in the mid 1980s and a second boom in the
late 1990s. In the last decade, the number of newly announced joint
ventures settled on a plateau of 3000 to 5000 per year. Joint ventures
being only one speciﬁc type of inter-organizational relationship, this
example illustrates the elevated importance of these arrangements in
the last thirty years.
These inter-organizational relationships, as the name already suggests,
rarely are pure spot transactions. This is because the exchanged goods
or services are highly speciﬁc and hence generate a mutual dependence
that poses a risk to both parties. To reduce this counter-party risk
2The Open Mobile Alliance was founded in 2002 by device and network
providers, mobile network operators, content providers as well as other informa-
tion technology ﬁrms, to be the standards organization for mobile services. The
organization's system-level goal is to provide technical standards that ensure the
interoperability of mobile devices, networks, and services world wide. The le-
gal form of the Open Mobile Alliance is a British limited company, registered in
the United Kingdom (Source: Bureau van Dijk, ID: GB03488861, via Wharton
Research Data Services). See: Open Mobile Alliance, 'About Open Mobile Al-
liance', 2016. http://openmobilealliance.org/about-oma/ - accessed on April
22, 2016.
3Note: Data source SDC Platinum.
Figure 1.1: Number of yearly announced joint ventures
the parties seek to formalize the relationship and an accompanying
stipulation of governance instruments. A common means for this for-
malization is the syndication of the related ﬁrms in a superordinate
entity or meta-organization, such as a joint venture or a business al-
liance. While these meta-organizations are often set up with the legal
form of a company, their internal structure diﬀers fundamentally from
regular companies. Regular companies are based on employment rela-
tionships whereas these meta-organizations consist of other organiza-
tions, namely various companies.3
3This is not to say that meta-organizations cannot employ employees, which
they can and often do. The governance of these employment relationships is not
diﬀerent in meta-organizations. However, the distinguishing feature of a meta-
organization is that it consists of organizations, which cannot be governed in the
same way as employees. The analysis in this thesis focuses on the relationship
between the meta-organization and its entity-organizations. In the same vein,
employees of a normal company can also be shareholders of their company and
hence an ownership relationship between them might exist. However, the primary
relationship between the organization and the employees is the employment rela-
tionship, which sets normal organizations apart from meta-organizations. Thus,
for the purposes of this research, employees' ownership in employment-based or-
ganizations is omitted. The reader interested in the topic of employees' control
and inﬂuence ought to be referred to Cheﬃns (2000, 555-573). The diﬀerence
between employment-based organizations and meta-organizations is discussed in
greater detail in chapter 2.
4The central research question of this thesis is: How do meta-organizations
diﬀer from employment-based organizations, from a law and economics
point of view, and what diﬀerent governance do they require? In or-
der to answer this question, this thesis addresses various sub-questions.
The ﬁrst sub-question is how meta-organizations compare to employment-
based organizations in terms of their organizational structure. This
question is addressed with an analytical perspective derived from law
and economics, and hence the focus lies on the rewards and obligations
of membership to meta-organizations and employment-based organiza-
tions. The second sub-question is which types of meta-organizations
exist, and how their typical membership structure looks. The next
sub-questions focus on the distinct governance of meta-organizations.
As a third sub-question, this thesis considers whether alternative dis-
pute resolution mechanisms, in the context of meta-organizations, ful-
ﬁll the characteristics of an internal rather than an external governance
mechanism. Finally, this thesis addresses the question whether group-
selection is a suitable governance instrument to establish and maintain
cooperation within meta-organizations.
The diﬀerence between meta-organizations and employment-based or-
ganizations has an important impact on the branches of law that gov-
ern these organizations. While regular companies, or employment-
based organizations, are mainly governed by labor law and corpo-
rate law (Collins, 2003, 10-12; Cheﬃns, 2000, 82-95, 217-221), meta-
organizations are mainly governed by contract law and corporate law
(Kraakman et al., 2009, 16-20; Prime et al., 1997, 62-66). This con-
trast, which is illustrated in Figure 1.2, directly determines which
governance mechanism each form of organization is able to apply,
since most governance mechanisms directly build upon the legal gov-
ernance structure (Shleifer and Vishny, 1997, 750-753). This means
that governance mechanisms which are well established in the sphere
of employment-based organizations might not be adequate for meta-
organizations.
5Figure 1.2: Relevant branches of law
Corporate law, for example, usually provides mandatory rules for the
protection of the interests of dispersed or minority shareholders, such
as speciﬁc board appointment rights (e.g. dedicates seats or over-
weighted votes) and privileged access to information (Kraakman et al.,
2009, 90-92). However, these protective rules are mainly focused on se-
curing the shareholder value and therefore primarily concern the mon-
etary interests of minority shareholders (c.f. Dyck and Zingales, 2004;
Nenova, 2003). While this focus on monetary interests is generally
not a problem for shareholders of an employment-based organization,
it might be problematic in meta-organizational arrangements where
the system-level goals of the comprising parties may go beyond proﬁt
maximization. The meta-organization may also be aimed at executing
a speciﬁc activity, such as research and development in research joint
ventures (c.f. Kraakman et al., 2009, 64; Prime et al., 1997, 98-106).
Not only the applicability of certain corporate law propositions but
also the relevant branch of law that regulates the relationship between
the entities is diﬀerent for employment-based organizations and meta-
organizations. The entities in an employment-based organization are
the employees and hence labor law is the legal foundation for these
relationships (Collins, 2003, 10). In a meta-organization, conversely,
the entities are not employees but are organizations themselves, which
in turn means that their relationship with the meta-organization is
6governed by corporate and contract law.4 Because of these diﬀerent
types of relationships - on the one hand employment relationships and
on the other contractual and ownership relationships - very diﬀerent
rights and obligations for the comprising entities arise. For instance,
an employee has to obey the general authority of his or her employer in
an employment relationship, whereas a contracting member of a meta-
organization only has to fulﬁl its contractual obligations (Cheﬃns,
2000, 82-83). The lack of formalized authority in meta-organizations
renders the use of governance mechanisms impossible that build upon
hierarchy, such as the management's capability to issue directives or to
apply the business judgment rule in employment-based organizations
(c.f. Smith, 2016). Therefore, meta-organizations require other forms
of organizational governance in order to maintain their operability and
to meet their goals.
Governance is crucial for every organization in achieving its goals, be-
cause it regulates how the organization organizes itself and how it
aggregates the individual decisions of its members. To this end, it is
important that a given governance mechanism is aimed at the goals it is
implemented to serve. Moreover, this implementation is based on the
internal relationship structure of the relevant organization. Because
meta-organizations have various features distinct from employment-
based organizations, especially in respect to their organizational goals
and the structure of membership relationships, governance mechanisms
that work well for employment-based organizations might not work for
meta-organizations. In order to suggest suitable governance mecha-
nisms for meta-organizations, it is important to gain a better under-
standing of the inner functioning of this speciﬁc type of organization
(Posner, 2010a). For this purpose it appears useful look into organiza-
tion science for a deﬁnition of an organization and to identify character-
4Joint ventures, for example, can be formed in various legal forms, ranging
from a contractual relation to a newly-established company with legal personality.
Depending on the form chosen to organize a joint venture, various areas of law
apply, the main areas being contract law and corporate law (Palmieri, 2012).
7istics that are important for the internal governance of an organization
(Posner, 2010b).
1.2 Organizations and Internal Governance
When talking about ﬁrms, one often refers to the term organization as
a synonym. This is because a ﬁrm is a formation to organize the work
of many in order to produce a joint outcome. However, for the purpose
of this thesis it appears beneﬁcial to consider the more abstract point
of view that Organization Science takes on organizations. In this view
an organization is a set of multiple agents, often people, that inter-
acts as a single entity with its environment and that is deﬁned by at
least one system-level goal (Baligh, 2005, 1-3).5 For this interaction
the organizational structure has to transform the agents' individual
decisions into a single organization decision. To maintain the func-
tioning of this transformation process and to ensure that it serves the
organization's system-level goals, speciﬁc governance mechanisms are
required (Gibbons and Roberts, 2013, 3-4; Calder, 2008, 1-2).
In the contemporary business landscape one can also observe forma-
tions to organize the eﬀorts of ﬁrms, conversely to individual agents,
towards a common goal. Joint ventures or business networks are ex-
amples of such formations that build a meta layer above existing orga-
nizations. Such meta-organizations are, therefore, organizations that
themselves consist of organizations (Gulati et al., 2012; Ahrne and
Brunsson, 2005, 9-14). This distinguishes meta-organizations from
normal ﬁrms, or employment-based organizations, as these consist of
individual employees. Because of the absence of employment relation-
ships between the members and the organization, there is no strong
5Examples according to this deﬁnition are manifold. In this sense, everything
from a football team to the United Nations qualiﬁes as an organization. Here,
however, the term organization will only be used for entities that serve a business
purpose such as companies, joint ventures, or business networks.
8internal hierarchy within a meta-organization. Moreover, for the mem-
bers of a meta-organization it is usually very important to maintain
their independence, which further hampers the establishment of formal
authority in the top layer of the meta-organization.
The absence of formal authority as one of the main characteristics
of meta-organizations poses substantial challenges to their governance
systems (Gulati et al., 2012). These challenges occur since meta-
organizations can only to a limited extent seize on the governance
mechanisms of employment-based organizations as these mechanisms
often require formal authority. For instance, the management of an
employment-based organization exerts its formal authority to solve the
problem of shirking in cooperative production transactions by moni-
toring its employees (Alchian and Demsetz, 1972) or to resolve dis-
putes between organizational members with conﬂicting interests (Per-
row, 1986, 131-133). Due to the lack of formal authority in meta-
organizations, meta-organizations require diﬀerent forms of governance
mechanisms that do not rely on formal authority to solve and pre-
vent intra-organizational problems. In sum, hierarchy as a governance
mechanism is not eﬀective in the context of meta-organizations.
A diﬀerent view, however considers the inter-organizational relation-
ships between ﬁrms as market-based relations rather than hierarchical
relations (Levine and White, 1961; Hall et al., 1977). Such market-
based inter-organizational relationships are governed by mechanisms
that do not require formal authority. Nevertheless, these governance
mechanisms are not perfectly suitable for meta-organizations either,
because they usually only focus on the individual goals of the agents
and hence disregard the subordinate system-level goals of meta-organi-
zations.
This is illustrated by the following hypothetical example. Consider two
companies in a joint venture for the development of a new class of mo-
bile phones, which ﬁnd themselves in a dispute regarding the technical
9speciﬁcations. If the transaction between these two partners would be
only market-based, then the terms of the transaction would be solely
stipulated in the contract and every dispute regarding the transaction
would be directed to an ordinary court for resolution. However, in the
situation of a joint venture there are usually superior system-level goals
such as perpetuating the business of the joint venture - in this exam-
ple the successful development of the new mobile phone architecture.
If the partners in a joint venture would submit their internal dispute
about the speciﬁcations to an ordinary court, they would risk its pub-
lic disclosure which might not only damage their reputation and the
reputation of the joint venture but also disclose their intended techno-
logical advancement to the public. A reputation damage could have
a negative impact on the actions of customers or potential investors
and a disclosure of details about their development, in turn, could be
useful for competitors that are working on rival products. Therefore,
a public disclosure of the two companies' dispute on technical details
would hurt the system-level goal,  to successfully launch the devel-
oped product,  of the joint venture. At the same time, however, the
joint venture lacks an internal formal authority that can make a deci-
sion and resolve the dispute, because each party remains independent
rather than being subjected to the joint venture.
As this example of a hypothetical research joint venture illustrates,
it is vital for meta-organizations to employ governance mechanisms
that accommodate their hybrid form between market and hierarchy
(Williamson, 1991). Given their hybrid nature, meta-organizations
cannot simply resort to proven governance mechanisms from either the
market or a hierarchy. Instead, they require a suitable mixture of both
that meets the speciﬁc characteristics of meta-organizations (cp. e.g.
Figure 1.3). In the aforementioned example of the dispute between the
two partners in a research joint venture, neither an internal decision
maker nor an ordinary court could satisfactory resolve the conﬂict be-
cause of the absence of formal authority and the existence of a superior
10
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Figure 1.3: Composition of governance mechanism for meta-
organizations
system-level goal. Therefore, a hybrid arrangement that combines gov-
ernance mechanisms from both the market and a hierarchy could oﬀer
a solution. A third party decision maker, such as an arbitrator, could
resolve the dispute in the manner of an ordinary court while serving as
an internal formal authority at the same time. Such decision-making
by a third-party would then serve as a quasi constitutional court for
the microcosm of the respective meta-organization (Schanze, 1993).6
Third party decision-making is a governance mechanism that mainly
builds on authority and hence is closer to a hierarchical governance
mechanism than to a market governance mechanism. This set-up is
possible in the context of joint ventures because they are mostly set
up as speciﬁc legal entities with a particular legal form (Prime et al.,
1997, 63-68). Due to this tailored set-up, it is possible to equip the
third party with the required decision making power to resolve dis-
putes between the parties. However, such a construction cannot be
established easily for other types of meta-organizations such as strate-
gic alliances or business networks (Oxley, 2013, 41-46). In a business
network, for example, the need for the individual partners to preserve
6The constitutional characterization of the inter-organizational agreement im-
plies that the extent of these arrangements exceeds the standard meaning of con-
tracts as derived by contract law. Schanzes characterization raises the question
if it is purposeful to direct all disputes within the hybrid to an ordinary court
specialized in contract law, or if the hybrid-symbiotic organization should not ap-
ply its own constitutional court to these disputes. Third party decision-making
could be considered such an intra-organizational constitutional court. From that
perspective the arbitrator can be characterized as part of the governance structure
and hence the organization.
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their independence (Teubner, 2009, 25-26) or the legal requirements
of competition law7 (Kling and Burley, 1991, 2-4) may prevent the
establishment of strict formal power with the meta-organization over
business decisions of its members. Therefore, these meta-organizations
have to rely on more market-based mechanisms to govern their coop-
eration. Before fully committing their resources to a single business
network, a company could ﬁrst join multiple candidates to survey the
cooperativeness within those networks. After such a survey period the
network with the most cooperative partners can be selected. Such a
group selection mechanism is based on independent mutual selection
and accordingly tends to be a rather marked-based governance mech-
anism.
As the examples of third party decision-making in a research joint ven-
ture and group choice for business network selection illustrate, there is
no single mechanism that is suitable for all types of inter-ﬁrm collab-
oration within meta-organizations. In turn, it is necessary to design a
tailored governance structure for each speciﬁc meta-organization, con-
sidering the particular economic and legal context. The hybrid struc-
ture of meta-organizations between market and hierarchy requires their
governance structure to be hybrid, too. As the examples further indi-
cate, possible governance compositions can be rather hierarchy related
as well as rather market related. This heterogeneity in governance
structures demands a sophisticated understanding on the part of the
policy maker when regulating meta-organizations.
This thesis oﬀers a new law and economics view on meta-organizations,
contrasting meta-organizations with employment-based organizations
in terms of the beneﬁts and obligations involved. By integrating as-
7For example, on a European level Article 101 of the Treaty on the Function-
ing of the European Union limits the type of agreements that undertakings may
conclude with one another when these may prevent, restrict or distort competition
on the market. Additional EU legislation speciﬁes to what extent horizontal agree-
ments for speciﬁc purposes are permitted, such as the block exemption regulations
on research and development and specialisation agreements.
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pects from the ﬁelds of law and economics and Organization Science,
the thesis contributes to the understanding of meta-organizations and
their governance. The thesis proceeds as follows. Firstly, chapter 2
contrasts employment-based organizations with meta-organizations. It
shows that the diﬀerence between the two lies in the association rela-
tionship with the organization, which is an employment relationship
in the case of an employment-based organizations, and a contractual
or ownership relationship in the case of meta-organizations. It further
argues that this diﬀerence has implications for the applicability of par-
ticular governance mechanisms, as these build upon the characteristics
of the relationships within the organization. Subsequently, chapter 3
discusses diﬀerent types of meta-organizations and empirically stud-
ies the popularity and membership structure of joint ventures, as an
example of meta-organizations. This empirical analysis makes use of
a newly compiled dataset on joint ventures over a time-span of the
last 50 years. This chapter, moreover, provides a legal background of
joint ventures and discusses types of disputes that are common to joint
ventures, oﬀering a starting point for the subsequent chapters on the
governance of meta-organizations. The thesis then discusses two types
of governance mechanisms that are suitable for meta-organizations.
First, chapter 4 considers third party decision making as a means to
resolve disputes within meta-organizations. It argues that third party
decision making, such as arbitration, assumes the function of an in-
ternal governance mechanism and therefore lies within the boundaries
of the meta-organization. This chapter thus puts forward an inno-
vative perspective on the role of alternative dispute resolution in the
context of meta-organizations. This perspective provides lessons as re-
gards the role of alternative dispute resolution for the governance of
meta-organizations. A second governance mechanism is discussed in
chapter 5, which analyzes the importance of choice between various
meta-organizations for the level of cooperation. This chapter consid-
ers how the availability of various meta-organizations allows parties
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to self-sort according to their attitude towards cooperation, and ﬁnds
that this positive eﬀect prevails over the eﬀorts to coordinate between
the diﬀerent meta-organizations. This chapter oﬀers insights regarding
the eﬀect of group selection for cooperation within meta-organizations.
By the end of the thesis' main part it should have become clear what
meta-organizations are and in what ways they inherently diﬀer from
employment-based organizations, from a law and economics perspec-
tive. This diﬀerence originates from their distinct membership com-
positions, and the associated rewards and obligations. The thesis
will have illustrated how, as a consequence of this diﬀerence, meta-
organizations require speciﬁc governance. Based on these contribu-
tions, chapter 6 introduces further research questions that arise from
these ﬁndings and provides an overview of policy relevant issues. The
thesis concludes with the ﬁnal chapter 7 that summarizes the main
contributions.

2 | Inter-organizational relation-
ships in Meta-organizations
2.1 Inter-organizational relationships
The traditional view of economics centers around the market. Transac-
tions on the market are the kernel of the analysis and the lion's share of
economic theory concerns the question of the eﬃciency of these market-
transactions. In this paradigm, ﬁrms are seen as individual actors that
interact with their environment exclusively through the market. This
market-transaction view deﬁnes inter-organizational relationships in
the form of exchange relations (Levine and White, 1961; Hall et al.,
1977). To regulate these exchange transactions, market governance
primarily relies on contract law. According to the exchange theory,
the sole purpose of relationships between organizations is to exchange
values, such as goods, services, or money. While the exchange theory
explicitly includes non-economic values as well, it neglects to concep-
tualize the power in inter-organizational relationships that is not based
on market governance (Cook, 1977).
Markets are eﬃcient in governing inter-organizational relationships if
they are perfect and if the transaction does not require cooperation
between the parties. In a non-cooperative transaction on a perfect
market no actor has the power to set prices above the marginal costs
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and hence each party in an inter-organizational exchange receives an
eﬃcient beneﬁt from the relationship. However, a set of conditions has
to be met for a market to be perfect and, accordingly, for the market to
be a suitable governance mechanism for inter-organizational relation-
ships. Moreover, it has to be given that the relationship requires no
cooperative transactions, from which one party could derive power over
the other. The conditions for this include the absence of monopolies
and monopsonies (Friedman, 1962, 120-123), perfect market informa-
tion and hence the full veriﬁability of all transactions (Akerlof, 1970),
the inability to specify all assets including the absence of relationship-
speciﬁc investments (Joskow, 1987), as well as the non-existence of
any public good problem. Such a public good problem exists, for ex-
ample, with intellectual property (Pigou, 1924, 151). A violation of
these requirements provides individual parties with additional power,
which they can use to extract the quasi rents from the transaction
(Klein et al., 1978). In economic theory a rent is a proﬁt that is en-
tirely driven by the demand for a production factor or good because
its supply is ﬁxed and hence inelastic, such as land (Ricardo, 1817,
49-76). A quasi rent is a return based on a non-permanent inelasticity
of a good from causes such as market power, patent protection, or the
speciﬁcity of assets (Marshall, 1938, II.IV.12). In the context of inter-
organizational relationships such inelasticities occur when an asset is
speciﬁc to the relation between the organizations. Imagine a machine
that can only be used to produce speciﬁc parts for a single customer,
no other customer has use for these parts. If this single customer de-
cides not to purchase the parts from the producer anymore, the speciﬁc
production machine becomes valueless to the producer. This depen-
dency gives the customer power in the relationship with the producer,
which can be abused to extract the relationship's quasi rent. As this
example illustrates, markets provide insuﬃcient governance for inter-
organizational relationships when the nature of the transaction yields
power to a single party in the relationship.
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The most straightforward remedy for a failure of market governance
is to integrate the respective organizations into a single entity. In
an integrated organization, all actors are subject to a single hierar-
chy, which is governed primarily by corporate law rather than con-
tract law. Such a hierarchical governance concentrates all power at
the top of the hierarchy, which prevents the extraction of quasi rents
(Klein et al., 1978; Alchian and Demsetz, 1972). Because the actor at
the top of the hierarchy is the beneﬁciary of the organization's resid-
ual proﬁt, he uses his decision power to maximize the joint proﬁt of
all intra-organizational transactions. However, although hierarchical
governance mitigates problems with autonomous adaptation capabili-
ties, coordination eﬀorts and principal-agents problems, the governance
costs of a hierarchy are increasing in the size of the organization. These
increasing governance costs limit the scope of integration as a remedy,
particularly in respect of organizations that conduct transactions with
multiple other organizations.
Assume an organization X that carries out transactions with the or-
ganizations A and B via imperfect markets. To pursue the integra-
tion remedy X, A, and B would have to be integrated into a single
organization. If now A would additionally transact with another or-
ganization Y, then Y would also have to be integrated into the supra-
organization. This logic implies that all organizations in an imperfect-
market transaction-network should be merged into a single organiza-
tion. Imagine, for instance, a single, very large, universal technology
company just to standardize USB-sockets. Since such a super orga-
nization would be subject to very high hierarchy costs, it would not
be feasible. Therefore, real-world organizations more and more seek
hybrid solutions in between market- and hierarchy-governance.
Hybrid governance solutions are particularly beneﬁcial for inter-organi-
zational relationships in the form of research collaborations (Vonortas,
1997a,b) or for the purpose of foreign market entries (Agarwal and
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Ramaswami, 1992). One of the major vehicles for the governance of
these relationships between multiple organizations are joint ventures
(Oxley, 2013, 3). Given their prevailing role, joint ventures are also
an eligible proxy to empirically illustrate the growing importance of
inter-organizational relationships world wide.8
Joint ventures are not only a good proxy to illustrate the global rise of
inter-organizational relationships but also a good object of study for re-
search on inter-organizational relationships on the intersection between
economics and legal science. This is because both disciplines provide
reasons for the existence of joint ventures, which are mostly interde-
pendent and hence are best studied in an interdisciplinary context. For
instance, the need of companies that engage in inter-organizational re-
lationships to manifest their cooperative relation but at the same time
preserve their legal independence, is driven by limitations of the laws
governing these relationships. These limitations are the inability of
contract law to precisely stipulate all aspects of a transaction and the
fact that corporate law grants the management more formal authority
the more integrated an organizations becomes. These properties of the
legal system create diﬀerent beneﬁts and costs of inter-organizational
cooperation, which have to be balanced while designing the relation-
ship between the cooperating organizations. One approach to achieve
this balance is to set up a purpose-speciﬁc organization, for instance a
joint venture, that consists of two or more independent and separate
organizations, the joint venture partners. Such a hybrid organization
(Williamson, 1991) utilizes the constructs of corporate law (hierarchy-
like aspect) to provide legal security for the cooperative transactions
between the partners but simultaneously limits the forfeiting of in-
dependence to the contractually deﬁned purpose of the relationship
(market-like aspect).
8A descriptive empirical analysis of the growing importance of joint ventures
follows in the next chapter, section 3.2.2.
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2.2 Hybrid organizations
2.2.1 Hybrids between market and hierarchy
Various challenges in the current business environment require ﬁrms
to collaborate with each other more often. Such inter-ﬁrm collabo-
rations are, for example, necessary to enter new markets or to draft
common standards for newly developed technology (Ring and van de
Ven, 1992; Hagedoorn and Hesen, 2007). They are, moreover, vital
for smaller ﬁrms to join their research eﬀorts in order to compete with
large-scale corporations (Tsakanikas and Caloghirou, 2004). The inter-
organizational relationships of these collaborations are only in very
rare cases purely market-based interactions (Hagedoorn, 2002). This
is because the stakes are usually high (Becker and Dietz, 2004) and
the nature of the relations makes them vulnerable to exploitation (c.f.
Klein et al., 1978; Williamson, 1981). Two key drivers of this poten-
tial for exploitation are the necessity to share trade secrets and the
importance of relation-speciﬁc investments. To remedy these threats
to cooperation, the aﬀected ﬁrms seek to increase the formality of the
relationship and hence their de jure as well as their de facto security,
without completely integrating into a single organization and having to
submit their decision-making power to a centralized authority(Oxley
and Silverman, 2008). To master this trade-oﬀ between formalization
of the relationship and preservation of their legal independence, hybrid
forms are created that fall in between the classical dichotomy of market
and hierarchy.
In a seminal paper Williamson (1991) is the ﬁrst to elaborately discuss
the hybrid organization, deﬁning it as a distinct type of governance
structure that lies between market and hierarchy. His starting point
is that organizations have to adapt to changing situational contexts in
order to survive, and that organizational types vary in their capacity
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to adapt accordingly. He distinguishes two types of adaptation, au-
tonomous and cooperative, which mirror the two generic governance
structures of market and hierarchy. In particular, in the governance
mode `market' autonomous adaptation works best to address changes,
whereas in 'hierarchy' cooperative adaptation is most eﬃcient. The
hybrid organization, as a combination of market and hierarchical fea-
tures, has the advantage of being reasonably suitable to tackle both
types of adaptations. As a result, it depends on the particular situa-
tional context which governance mode is the most suitable to keep an
organization viable (c.f. Emery and Trist, 1965).
Hybrid governance is a form of inter-organizational governance in which
all activities related to the inter-organizational transaction are inte-
grated into a distinct organization while, at the same time, the coop-
erating entities remain independent organizations. Such hybrid orga-
nizations are intended to combine the advantages of both the market
and hierarchy as governance forms. (Williamson, 1991). Because the
activities that are related to the inter-organizational transaction are
bundled in the hybrid organization, hierarchical governance mecha-
nisms can be utilized to prevent that single parties can draw power
from interactions that require cooperation. This cooperation gover-
nance enables the hybrid organization to perform cooperative adap-
tations in a changing environment. At the same time the individual
members of the hybrid organization preserve their autonomous adap-
tation capabilities because they remain independent organizations. To
constitute this hybrid governance structure, a composition of contract
law and corporate law is used.
2.2.2 From hybrid- to meta-organizations
This combination of contract law and corporate law can be approached
in two manners. On the one hand a hybrid governance structure can be
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Governance structure
Attributes Market Hybrid Hierarchy
Instruments
Incentive intensity ++ + 0
Administrative control 0 + ++
Adaptation capabilities
Autonomous ++ + 0
Cooperative 0 + ++
Contract law ++ + 0
Corporate law 0 + ++
++ = strong; + = semi-strong; 0 = weak
Source: Adaptation from Williamson (1991, 281).
Table 2.1: Distinguishing attributes of market, hybrid, and hierarchy
governance
seen as contractual relationships that are complemented with corporate
ingredients, and on the other they could rather be seen as corporate
structures that are attenuated by contractual instruments to retain the
autonomous adaptation capabilities of the involved parties. Examples
of the ﬁrst are industry consortia or franchise systems, and the latter
are, for instance, joint ventures. While industry consortia are mainly
contractual agreements, they often employ a joint and several liability
clause which is an instrument of corporate partnerships (Milton, 1980,
125-126). Franchises are also contractual agreements, in this case be-
tween a franchisor and franchisee which are both legally independent
entities. However, the franchise contract grants the franchisor speciﬁc
control rights over the franchisee, such as the right to determine the lo-
cation of the business or to make decisions regarding pricing, advertise-
ment, business processes, or employee training. These attributes are
usually only found within hierarchical, corporate organizations (Emer-
son, 2013, 650-653). Conversely, joint ventures are usually created as
distinct legal vehicles with an internal hierarchy. Nevertheless, the
parties remain legally independent entities besides their cooperation
within the joint venture, using the joint venture contract as a strategic
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instrument to govern their relationship (Salbu, 1991).
An alternative deﬁnition of hybrid organization is proposed by Schanze
(1993), who names these structures `symbiotic arrangements' since
they are mutually advantageous to all involved parties. Besides the dif-
ference in name Schanze agrees with the deﬁnition of Williamson that
these organizations are an intermediate in the dichotomy of market and
hierarchy. He names the founding contract of such hybrid-symbiotic
organizations, such as a large investment project, constitutional con-
tracts.
This view of the modern ﬁrm's fuzzy boundaries is conﬁrmed in the
seminal contribution of Zingales (2000), in which he notes that "the
nature of the ﬁrm has changed" (Zingales, 2000, 1640). Modern as
opposed to traditional ﬁrms are not large business corporations that
are vertically integrated and asset-intensive with a strong central au-
thority, but are rather human-capital intensive organizations that are
not vertically integrated and lack a strong formal authority. This drift
away from a central authority for complex business endeavors requires
the entrepreneur in a modern organization to secure its power by dif-
ferent means than through the hierarchical relationships that prevail
in classical organizations. The analysis and perspective of Zingales
is general and not only focused on inter-organizational relationships,
but nevertheless also reﬂects the impact of hybrid organizational forms
upon the corporate landscape.
Hybrid organizational arrangements play an important role in mod-
ern day to day business. For example, by the end of the year 2014
869 out of 2,105 Ahold, a large retailer holding in the Netherlands,
stores (Albert Heijn, Etos, Gall & Gall) were operated by franchises,
representing 41% of the total.9 Joint ventures, franchises, or business
networks are omnipresent in the contemporary corporate landscape
9Source: Ahold annual report 2014, page 34.
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and not only in business to business transactions but also in busi-
ness to consumer transactions. The role of hybrid organizations in
the economic environment, incentives to go hybrid, as well as inter-
nal organizational challenges have been addressed in the literature on
hybrid organizations (Ménard, 2013, 2004). However, this stream of
literature often conﬁnes itself to the transaction costs view (Ménard,
2013; Grandori and Soda, 1995; Williamson, 1991). While transaction
costs economics provides valuable insight in coordination problems of
inter-organizational relationships, it neglects the segmentation of ca-
pabilities within these complex organizations (Langlois, 1992). Since
the key capabilities of a business strongly inﬂuence the distribution of
power within each organization, transaction costs economics remains
mainly descriptive on the issue of governance of hybrid organizations
(c.f. Ménard, 2013, 1088-1093). Therefore, a more composition-focused
lens, that concentrates on the composition of organizations that en-
compass multiple other organizations, could improve our understand-
ing of modern inter-organizational relationships and their governance
requirements.
Such a composition-focused lens is the theory of meta-organizations
(Gulati et al., 2012; Ahrne and Brunsson, 2005). In this theoretical
view inter-organizational relationships in the form of hybrid organiza-
tions are seen as meta-constructs (meta Greek: µητα; after or beyond)
on top of cooperating organizations. Hence, a meta-organization is an
organization that itself consists of organizations. This distinguishes
meta-organizations from classical employment-based organizations, in
which the members (i.e. the employees) are individuals and not organi-
zations themselves (Ahrne and Brunsson, 2005, 4). Since the behavior
of individual agents and organizations can be fundamentally diﬀerent
ceteris paribus (c.f. Anderson, 1999), the diﬀerence in member identity
can lead governance mechanisms that are well-proven in employment-
based organizations to fail in meta-organizations. For example, an
individual agent might respond diﬀerently to liability when he is di-
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rectly liable than in a situation in which his liability is pooled by an
intermediate organization. In addition to this methodological individu-
alism concern (c.f. Schumpeter, 1908, 88-87), the formal manifestation
of a meta-organization might further hamper the use of traditional
governance mechanisms. This is because the formal manifestation of
a meta-organization is materially diﬀerent from an employment-based
organization. As the name already suggests, an employment-based
organization is composed of employment contracts that form employ-
ment relationships between the employees (the members) and the or-
ganization (see ﬁgure 2.1). Meta-organizations, in contrast, are usually
formed by contractual relationships that, while making the cooperating
organizations members of meta-organization, are not as comprehensive
in respect to rights and duties as employment relationships.
2.3 Meta-organizations: Diﬀerences to employment-
based organizations
A meta-organization is an organization that comprises multiple legally
independent entities (Gulati et al., 2012). This particular organiza-
tional design implies that the members, which create the organiza-
tion, are legally autonomous and not bound to the organization by an
employment relationship (Ahn et al., 2008, 142-148). Instead they
are associated with the organization by contracts and or property,
which means that their rights and obligations are deﬁned in the spe-
ciﬁc contract or by the general provisions on ownership. This dif-
ference in the aﬃliation relationship distinguishes meta-organizations
from employment-based organizations because both the rewards and
the obligations from participation in the organization are elementary
diﬀerent (see table 2.2). While an employee in a employment-based
organization receives a wage as compensation for his participation,
the incentives that motivate a company to join a meta-organization
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Employment-based organization Meta-organization
Organizational Maximize proﬁt of System-level goal
objective residual claimant of involved parties
Membership Centralized Dispensed
relationship employment contractual
Internal Formal Informal
authority power power
Membership Generic Speciﬁc
obligations Chain of command Financial contribution,
knowledge transfer
Membership Distinct Diverse
rewards Wage, amenities Proﬁt sharing, knowledge
exchange, market access
Table 2.2: Distinguishing characteristics between employment-based-
and meta-organizations
can be very diverse. Gaining access to foreign markets or combining
sales- and marketing-activities are intended beneﬁts of participating in
a meta-organization, just as obtaining intellectual property rights or
the co-determination of future industry or technology standards. The
obligations of participation are also diﬀerent for employment-based and
meta-organizations. By entering into an employment relationship with
an employment-based organization, the employee accepts that the or-
ganization's management has the authority to give directions, which
have to be executed by the employee. This authority is general and
broad, going beyond what is explicitly speciﬁed in the employment
contract in terms of the tasks and responsibilities of the employee (Ar-
row, 1974, 63-64). Conversely, in a meta-organization the members'
obligations have to be either speciﬁed in the aﬃliation contract or are
deﬁned by corporate law. They are not by far as comprehensive and
generic as in an employment relationship.
Especially the diﬀerence in the members' obligations distinguishes meta-
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organizations from classical employment-contract-based organizations
and has far-reaching implications for the requirements of an organi-
zation's governance system. To better understand this diﬀerence in
obligations, a closer look at the origins of the employment relationship
in classical organizations oﬀers valuable insights. The contemporary
employment relationship can be seen as a humanized modiﬁcation of
the system of serfdom, which was the prevailing governance form of
labor in the European Middle Ages (Sweezy and Dobb, 1950). One
important step in the development of modern labor law, the main le-
gal body to govern employment relationships, was the British Master
and Servant Act of 1867,10 which gave cause for an inﬂuential report by
the Royal Commission on Trade Unions (Brodie, 2003, 1-2).11 While
the act marked the end of penal employment-law in the United King-
dom, the name Master and Servant Act forcefully illustrates which type
of relation the legislator still had in mind when drafting the statutes
(Hay, 2004). Not a relationship inter pares but a master as principal
and a serving subordinate. This closely connects to the tradition of
serfdom, in which the serf was in limited ownership of the master (Ka-
han, 1973). Owing the serf endowed the master with certain property
rights, which we nowadays still have for things and certain intellectual
works. Particularly the rights usus and fructus gave the master the
formal authority to give work directives to the serf and enjoy the fruits
of his labor (Weber, 1956, 626-627).
Without any doubt the development of labor law has improved the
balance between the employee and the employer, as employment is
nowadays voluntary and employees cannot be forced to work anymore.
Nevertheless, the general arrangement of the relationship between the
10Master and Servant Act 1867 (UK) 30&31 Vict c 141.
11'Eleventh and ﬁnal report of the Royal Commissioners Appointed to Inquire
into the Organization and Rules of Trades Unions and Other Associations : together
with an appendix containing a digest of the evidence, correspondence with Her
Majesty's missions abroad regarding industrial questions and trades unions and
other papers.' Parliamentary papers (1868-1869), Vol XXXI (4123).
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principal and the subordinate has remained mostly unchanged. An
employer still has the generic rights to give the employee working di-
rections and to enjoy the proﬁts from his labor (Weise et al., 2002,
284-285). Because of this speciﬁc status of personal work relations,
the law characterizes employment contracts as a distinct class of con-
tracts and hence mandates speciﬁc status (Freedland and Kountouris,
2011). Examples from Dutch labor law of such statutes that apply to
employment contracts but not to ordinary contracts are the prohibi-
tion of at will dismissal,12 the limitation of the number of sequential
ﬁxed-term employments,13 as well as the determination of a minimum
wage.14 Legal science names diﬀerent reasons for this special regu-
lation of employment contracts, such as the imbalance of power (c.f.
Hogbin, 2006), relationship-speciﬁc investments (Vandenberghe, 2009,
2000), organizational eﬀects (Houweling, 2012, 27-30), as well as the
incompleteness of employment contracts and authority of employers
(Collins, 2003, 10-12).
Employment contracts are concluded as future contracts, often for an
indeﬁnite period. Since the future can generally not be foreseen, the
employer faces uncertainty about the assignments he has for the em-
ployee in the future. Therefore, employment contracts are necessarily
incomplete and do not precisely specify the concrete assignments of
the employee (Collins, 2003, 10-11).15 This incompleteness gives the
12Article 7:677 of the Dutch Civil Code stipulates that a party to an employment
contract who cancels the contract without a pressing reason (dringende redden) is
liable to pay compensation.
13Article 7:668a of the Dutch Civil Code speciﬁes limitations to the number of
sequential ﬁxed-term contracts, as well as to the total duration of multiple ﬁxed-
term contracts. After more than three ﬁxed-term contracts or when 36 months
have passed, the contrast is considered to be a permanent employment contract.
14Article 7 of the Minimum wage and minimum holiday payment/bonus (Wet
minimumloon en minimumvakantiebijslag), and Article 7:626 paragraph 1 of the
Dutch Civil Code (Burgerlijk Wetboek).
15Of course modern labor contracts provide a job description and state the gen-
eral tasks of the employee. Nevertheless, speciﬁc assignments are usually not postu-
lated in the labor contract. Therefore, the employee requires speciﬁc instructions
from the employer in order to know what his concrete tasks are. For instance,
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employer the necessary discretion to direct the labor to its most pro-
ductive use (Collins, 2003, 10; Cheﬃns, 2000, 82-83). The directive
discretion is especially important since the usual employer has more
than only one employee and hence is required to coordinate their co-
operative eﬀorts. To transfer the incompleteness of the employment-
contract into the competence of direction giving, the contract stipulates
authority to the employer over the employee in exchange for a wage and
also contingent rewards such as bonuses, promotions, or general career
paths. Without this authority in the employer-employee relationship,
the fulﬁllment of the contract would be at risk because the incomplete
nature of the employment-contract makes it diﬃcult for an external
party (e.g. a court) to determine a potential breach. Thus, the stip-
ulation of authority and the discretion to give the employee directives
are vital to the exchange of labor and wage as they create a hierarchy
within an employment-based organization. This endows the employer
with the necessary ﬂexibility of adaptation within a continuous and
changing environment.16
By entering into an employment-relationship, the employee accepts
certain restrictions to his legal independence and acknowledges the em-
ployer's power to take the decisions in all employment-related matters
in exchange for a monetary compensation (Coase, 1937, 390-391). This
an IT-specialist might be hired by a large corporation to maintain its IT-systems.
Without further directions from the IT-manager, the employee does not know which
systems he should work on, or which problems he should ﬁx ﬁrst. These speciﬁc
assignments only emerge during the term of the labor-relation and hence could not
be speciﬁed at the conclusion of the contract. Moreover, when the employee is
required to cooperate or coordinate with coworkers, he requires instructions from
the employer to govern this cooperation or coordination (Collins, 2003, 10-12).
16One might object that the view on employment relationships expressed in
this paragraph is not necessarily correct for modern employments, as these are
nowadays also more task focused and comprise high degrees of independence for
the employee. This is correct and, in fact, point to the reasons why the traditional
governance forms of labor law increasingly struggle to deﬁne the appropriate scope
for these modern forms of employment (see e.g. Countouris, 2007, 2-12). However,
in the remainder of the chapter the term employment relationships will be used for
employments in the classical labor law sense.
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power gives the employer and hence the organization formal authority
over its employees and enables the creation of a hierarchical structure.
This hierarchy is the foundation for an eﬀective management of the
cooperative transactions within the organization (Simon, 1951). As a
consequence, the governance systems of classical employment-based or-
ganizations are mainly aimed at maintaining and preventing the abuse
of the formal authority to sustain this vital hierarchy (Armour et al.,
2009).
Meta-organizations, on the contrary, are characterized by the absence
of formal authority (Gulati et al., 2012, 573). This is a direct conse-
quence of the members' requirement to preserve their legal indepen-
dence. Because the members in a meta-organization are not willing to
forfeit their legal independence, the organization is not able to attain
universal decision-making power over its members. This means that
the members' obligations towards the organization are not generic as
in classical employment-organizations, but conversely that they have
to be speciﬁed in the association agreement. As a result of these
very speciﬁc, interdependent obligations, the internal structure of a
meta-organization can only to a limited degree be based on hierar-
chical elements. This lack of formal authority and hence hierarchy
has far reaching implications for the eligible governance mechanism
for meta-organizations. More speciﬁcally, it means that the proven
governance mechanisms of classical employment-based organizations,
which concern the internal hierarchy, are not necessarily eﬀective for
meta-organizations.
2.4 Corporate governance: Aims and authority
In his landmark report Cadbury (1992, 15) deﬁnes corporate gover-
nance as the system by which companies are directed and controlled.
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In this sense corporate governance can be understood as a set of le-
gal and economic institutions that regulate the relationship between a
ﬁrm and its owners as well as other stakeholders (Shleifer and Vishny,
1997, 738). Therefore, it is important in situations in which the own-
ership and the control of a ﬁrm are separated in order to ensure the
owners' interests (Fama and Jensen, 1983b; Easterbrook and Fischel,
1991, 22-25). The prevailing reason for this importance is the existence
of an agency problem between the owner (the principal) and the man-
agement (the agent), which originates in the information asymmetry
between the principal and the agents in terms of speciﬁc knowledge
and the veriﬁability of actions (Fama, 1980; Eisenhardt, 1989). In the
absence of appropriate governance this agency-problem would enable
the management to use its decision-making discretion to appropriate
the residual proﬁt from the owners (Fama and Jensen, 1983a; Shleifer
and Vishny, 1997, 740-758).
The concept of corporate governance, traditionally, focuses on ﬁnancial
aspects (Cadbury, 1992, 15; Shleifer and Vishny, 1997). As the use
of the term residual proﬁt and the mentioning of the agency theory
already suggests, the main focus in the traditional understanding of
corporate governance lies in the protection of the ﬁnancial interests of
the owners (Cadbury, 1992, 9-10). This focus is also comprehensible
as in the process of separating the ownership and the control of a
ﬁrm, the role of the owner shifts from an entrepreneur to an investor.
While the type of investor varies from small, private shareholders to
large scale pension funds, investors generally are united in their aim to
achieve a proﬁt with their investment (Romano, 1993). As an eﬃcient
monitoring is usually diﬃcult for disperse groups of investors, they rely
on the corporate governance system and its institutions for this task
(Monks and Minow, 2004, 195-202).
In the Principal-agent theory monitoring is a means to overcome the
information asymmetry between the principal and the agent (Fama,
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1980; Eisenhardt, 1989). In the context of corporate governance, mon-
itoring accordingly means the supervision of the management. There-
fore, monitoring assumes an important role in between the investor and
the management in corporate governance. Thus, the corporate gover-
nance system provides diﬀerent institutions for this important task,
such as the supervisory board or rating agencies (Fama and Jensen,
1983b; Jensen and Meckling, 1976; Tirole, 2006, 16-18). Generally,
these monitoring actors can be divided into two groups: internal and
external monitoring actors. Internal monitoring, on the one hand, is
done from within the ﬁrm from institutions such as the supervisory
board that have access to the internal information ﬂow but no execu-
tive decision-making power (Cheﬃns, 2000, 95-108; Monks and Minow,
2004, 195-199). On the other hand, external monitoring is performed
by institutions as auditors or ﬁnancial analysts outside the ﬁrm and
hence strongly relies on ﬁnancial information as mandated by the regu-
lation regarding accounting practices (e.g. IAS, IFRS, or GAAP). This
reliance highlights the focus of monitoring in corporate governance to
serve the general goal of the investor to earn a ﬁnancial proﬁt.
Conversely, the focus of corporate governance on the ﬁnancial interests
of the investor or owner implies that other interests might not be ade-
quately protected. This can be exempliﬁed by Hewlett-Packard's (HP)
takeover of Compaq Computer (Compaq). On September 3rd 2001,
then HP CEO Carly Fiorina announced that HP and Compaq would
seek to merge under the brand of HP.17 This takeover was followed
critically by especially Walter Hewlett and David W. Packard, minor
shareholders and sons of HP's founders. Both Packard and Hewlett
campaigned against the takeover because they believed that it ran
counter the company's core values as established by the founders. To
illustrate this Packard named the massive employee layoﬀs planned af-
17See: HP Inc, 'Hewlett-Packard and Compaq agree to merge, creating $87
billion global technology leader', 2001. http://www8.hp.com/us/en/hp-news/
press-release.html?id=230610#.VzCYOuZp2uM - accessed on May 09, 2016.
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ter the merger.18 They had a diﬀerent strategic goal in mind for the
company, and were concerned that Fiorina's management would expose
the company to competition from aggressive, low-proﬁt PC business.
However, Packard and Hewlett lost the decisive vote on March 19th in
a special meeting of shareholders.19 This vote was subsequently chal-
lenged in court by Hewlett.20 Because of the law's neutrality towards
business strategy, the takeover could only be challenged on procedural
grounds. The court, however, concluded that Hewlett failed to prove
that HP disseminated materially false information about its integra-
tion eﬀorts or about the ﬁnancial data provided to its shareholders
and hence dismissed the claim.21 As this case illustrates, Hewlett was
protected as a shareholder in his ﬁnancial interests. However, he could
not challenge the decision to merge with Compaq based on his strategic
goal for the company.
The example of the HP-Compaq takeover illustrates that the corpo-
rate governance system through monitoring provides several remedies
if the owner's goal of achieving a proﬁtable investment is imperiled,
but struggles when the owners following more complex, strategic goals
(Cheﬃns, 2000, 609-614). As mentioned in the previous section, this
is precisely the case for meta-organizations where the members usually
follow complex system-level goals such as the development of new tech-
nologies or strategic market access. Additionally, members in meta-
organizations are not only investors but also contribute to achieving
18The New York Times, 'Disgruntled Relatives May Seal
the Fate of HP and Compaq', Steven Lohr, November
8, 2001. http://www.nytimes.com/2001/11/08/business/
technology-market-place-growing-group-disgruntled-relatives-may-seal-fate.
html - accessed on May 13, 2016.
19See: HP Inc, 'HP Announces Certiﬁed Vote Tally on Compaq Merger Proposal',
2002. http://m.hp.com/us/en/news/details.do?id=302538&articletype=
news_release - accessed on May 09, 2016.
20Hewlett v. Hewlett-Packard Co., Court of Chancery of Delaware, 2002 W.L.
549137 (2002).
21Hewlett v. Hewlett-Packard Co., Court of Chancery of Delaware, 2002 W.L.
818091 (2002), para. 16.
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these system-level goals. This complexity in the goals and in internal
relationships of the organization makes it hard to determine whether
members of a meta-organization are monitoring by the use of internal
or external monitoring institutions. On the one hand the members are
usually represented in the board of the organization and rely on exter-
nal ﬁnancial data, but on the other hand are they themselves subject to
monitoring to a certain extent. Therefore, in contrast to employment-
based organizations successful governance in meta-organizations re-
quires a peer-monitoring mechanism that enables the supervision of
the members' contributions to the meta-organization.
Besides the problem of monitoring, the complex relationship struc-
ture of meta-organizations has another negative inﬂuence on the func-
tioning of traditional governance institutions. The executive board in
employment-based organizations has the formal authority to take de-
cisions on the strategic direction of the organization, based on the
employment relations that constitute the organization (Monks and
Minow, 2004, 254-256). The decision-making power of the executive
board allows it to balance internal interests and resolve potential con-
ﬂicts between, for example, diﬀerent divisions within the organization.
For meta-organizations the management usually lacks the formal au-
thority to decide in case of disputes between diﬀerent members as they
are usually legally independent entities. Therefore, the governance of
meta-organizations requires a conﬂict resolution mechanism to settle
disputes in accordance with the system-level goals.
3 | Meta-Organizations
3.1 Overview: Types of meta-organizations
When joining meta-organizations ﬁrms often have to pool assets and
give up control over key rights, raising the question why ﬁrms choose
to do so in the ﬁrst place. Firms may have diﬀerent motivations to
collaborate in a meta-organization rather than relying on pure market
transactions or fully integrating. Several economic theories, such as
transaction cost economics and agency theory, provide explanations
for the existence of meta-organizations (Ménard, 2013, 1075) as will be
discussed in chapter 4. In the ﬁrst place, however, ﬁrms' reasons to join
meta-organizations vary depending on the type of meta-organization
that we are talking about.
This chapter provides an overview of the diﬀerent types of meta-organi-
zations. In a second step, it considers joint ventures as an example to
provide a more detailed view of their characteristics and their legal
classiﬁcation. The chapter contributes to the understanding of the
role and purpose of joint ventures by providing an empirical study on
the popularity and structure of joint ventures. Joint ventures became
very popular in the 1980s, but their popularity has declined since then.
It is also found that over 90% of joint ventures consist of two mem-
bers, and in 80% of these joint ventures each members owns 50% of
the shares. Finally, this chapter studies disputes that arise in joint
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ventures, setting the stage for the subsequent chapters in this thesis
that focus on the governance of meta-organizations. The Danone vs.
Wahaha case is considered in detail as a case study, and ﬁve additional
arbitration cases are discussed that illustrate the typical characteristics
of disputes in joint ventures.
In the previous chapter a meta-organization was deﬁned as an orga-
nization that itself consists of organizations (see section 2.3). This
deﬁnition does not tell us much yet about the character of the ar-
rangement between the members of the meta-organization. In fact,
meta-organizations can take diﬀerent places on the spectrum of hybrid
organizations between the two poles of market and integration, depend-
ing on the intensity of the coordination and the density of the rights
shared (Ménard, 2013, 1073). A ﬁrst type of meta-organization, the
joint venture, is used to collectively engage in commercial activities,
particularly when these activities involve a complex daily operation,
substantial skills and technical innovation, or substantial ﬁnancial risks
or resources (Gale et al., 1998, 2). Joint ventures can be characterized
as "simultaneously contractual agreements between two or more or-
ganizations and a separate legal (and usually organizational) entity
with its own purpose" (Borys and Jemison, 1989, 245). Depending on
the way in which the joint venture is established, it may resemble a
contractual relationship or rather a more integrated arrangement (see
further section 3.2.1).
Joint ventures are sometimes selected as an alternative to a licensing
agreement or a franchise. In a franchise the franchisee has the right
to use a ﬁrm's business model and brand name for a prescribed pe-
riod of time within a geographical area. In exchange, the franchisor
obtains a fee for the trademark, reimbursement for training or ad-
vice, and a royalty payment depending on the franchisee's sales. This
royalty usually ranges from 3 to 7 percent of the annual franchise rev-
enue (DePamphilis, 2013, 544). In addition, the franchisor retains con-
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trol over pricing, marketing and standardized service norms (Todeva
and Knoke, 2005, 125). The franchisee beneﬁts from the franchisor's
knowledge, experience, research, capital and reputation. By entering
in a franchising relationship, the franchisee can run a business without
having to invest substantial time and money to develop a successful
business method (Emerson, 2013, 642). Franchises developed rapidly
in the 1960s and 1970s in the provision of ﬁnal goods and services
to consumers, (Ménard, 2004, 348) providing a method for quick and
inexpensive business expansion into various markets (Emerson, 2013,
641). Franchises reduce customers' search costs and allow the involved
parties to beneﬁt from joint marketing (Ménard, 2004, 349). A key
element of franchises is that the partners pool certain property rights
while abandoning part of their decision rights, in order to beneﬁt from
brand names and joint actions (Ménard, 2013, 1072).
A related type of meta-organization is a collective trademark, which
is a trademark owned by an organization and used by its members to
identify themselves with a common characteristic, such as a quality
level or geographical origin. Collective trademarks usually arise on
the initiative of suppliers and involve less monitoring and control than
franchises (Ménard, 2004, 349).
Related to collective trademarks are cooperatives. A cooperative is a
coalition of enterprises, often each small in size, that combine, coordi-
nate and manage their collective resources (Todeva and Knoke, 2005,
125). Cooperatives can take a variety of forms ranging from market-like
arrangements to quasi-integrated ﬁrms, making their characterization
diﬃcult (Ménard, 2013, 1072). Cooperatives usually rely on decen-
tralized decisions and have to ﬁnd ways to monitor and control the
partners, for example when it comes to product quality or sharing the
rents of shared property rights (Ménard, 2004, 350).
Whereas franchises primarily concern distribution, buyer-supplier agree-
ments usually involve production. Buyer-supplier or supply chain col-
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laboration has been deﬁned as "two or more chain members working
together to create a competitive advantage through sharing informa-
tion, making joint decisions, and sharing beneﬁts which result from
greater proﬁtability of satisfying end customer needs than acting alone"
(Simatupang et al., 2002, 289-308). Buyer-supplier agreements facili-
tate the cooperation of participating members along the supply chain
to improve their performance, for example in terms of revenue, costs
and ﬂexibility in production (Bowersox, 1990; Fischer, 1997). The aim
of buyer-supplier agreements may be to coordinate quantity or quality
(Ménard, 2004, 348). Buyer-supplier agreements require coordination
across stages in the supply chain based on complementary activities or
competences (Ménard, 2013, 1071). Parties remain autonomous and
the cooperation is monitored by either a leading ﬁrm or a speciﬁc gov-
erning entity. As Ménard (2013, 1072) puts it, "[s]upply-chain systems
beneﬁt from powerful market incentives while providing tight control
over key transactions, without the burden of integration."
Strategic alliances are generally more dense and extensive than buyer-
supplier agreements in terms of shared rights (Ménard, 2013, 1071).
Strategic alliances can be characterized as "relatively enduring inter-
ﬁrm cooperative arrangements, involving ﬂows and linkages that uti-
lize resources and/or governance structures from autonomous organi-
zations, for the joint accomplishment of individual goals linked to the
corporate mission of each sponsoring ﬁrm" (Parkhe, 1993, 795). A
strategic alliance generally involves two or more ﬁrms that contribute
to one or more strategic areas and share the beneﬁts and managerial
control over the performance in these areas, while remaining legally in-
dependent (Yoshino and Rangan, 1995, 5). Strategic alliances are com-
monly used for the development or transfer of technologies and other
R&D projects (Kotabe and Scott Swan, 1995; Mowery et al., 1996). A
strategic alliance is distinguished from a merger or acquisition because
the partners maintain distinct core assets and keep control over re-
lated property rights (Ménard, 2013, 1071). Strategic alliances may be
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relatively close to standard contractual practices (Ménard, 2004, 350),
although cooperation usually goes beyond spot or short-term agree-
ments as partners jointly plan and monitor substantial activities, pur-
suing mutual beneﬁts. Partners may provide the strategic alliance with
resources such as funding, capital equipment, distribution channels, or
knowledge, expertise and intellectual property. Strategic alliances of-
ten involve technology transfer or economic specialization, and as a
result parties commonly share expenses and risk. For these purposes,
a spot agreement of the market type is often inappropriate (Jorde and
Teece, 1989). While some consider strategic alliances to include joint
ventures, franchises and other varieties of inter-organizational relations
(Todeva and Knoke, 2005), others deﬁne them separately. Those con-
sider strategic alliances to be less involved and less permanent than
a joint venture, for example. As a key distinguishing factor is named
that in case of a joint venture the parties form a new, separate entity,
while in a strategic alliance ﬁrms collaborate while remaining distinct
entities.
Finally, ﬁrms may collaborate in a business network. Network is a
very general term that covers about all arrangements involving a set of
recurrent contractual ties among autonomous entities (Ménard, 2004,
348). In the context of meta-organizations, two particular types of net-
works can be distinguished that are not (fully) covered by the types
already discussed above, namely trade associations and industry con-
sortia. A consortium is seen by some as a contractual agreement,
with participants normally not contributing assets to the consortium
and not sharing in the proﬁts of the consortium (Milton, 1980). In-
dustry consortia often seek agreement among their members on the
adoption of technical standards for manufacturing and trade (Todeva
and Knoke, 2005, 125). Networks can also be established in the form
of partnerships, such as associations of lawyers or other professionals.
Partnerships may also be less formalized, as illustrated by teams of re-
searchers from various universities (Ménard, 2004, 349). Partnerships
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may be set up to deal with common pool resources or to set common
standards. Partnerships usually have a broader purpose than consor-
tia, which exist for a single undertaking or purpose (Milton, 1980, 124).
As we have seen, meta-organizations as a group diﬀer from the ﬁrm
as an integrated solution, but vary in terms of the degree of control
over decision rights and ownership of assets. In a similar vain, the var-
ious types of meta-organizations diﬀer from pure market interactions
but vary in the degree to which are coordinated on a central level.
Indeed, meta-organizations range from loose clusters of ﬁrms to quasi-
integrated partners (Ménard, 2004, 348). In the following the focus is
concentrated on a very common type of meta-organization, namely the
joint venture.
3.2 Exemplifying by Joint Ventures
3.2.1 Legal background of joint ventures
Although the expression 'joint venture' is commonly used, in many
jurisdictions a legal deﬁnition of the term does not exist (Bauer, 2015;
Gillis et al., 2012, 35). The term joint venture may refer to all sorts of
arrangements that constitute strategic entities or agreements between
businesses. A joint venture can therefore cover several legal concepts,
and in many jurisdictions a large variety of forms is available for setting
up a joint venture. As a result, joint ventures as such are usually not
regulated. Instead, the applicable rules depend on the choice of legal
structure chosen for the joint venture. Moreover, the legal rules that
apply to the diﬀerent organizational forms are found in a range of
diﬀerent areas of law, in particular the areas of contract law, corporate
law, intellectual property law, antitrust rules and tax law.
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In most jurisdictions, a joint venture can be set up as a contractual
joint venture or as a corporate joint venture. Contractual joint ventures
are, as the name suggests, established under a contract which stipu-
lates that each participant operates the business independently from
each other. In this case, parties establish a cooperation or joint venture
without forming a new legal entity. The parties to the joint venture
agreement serve their common economic goal by carrying out their
activities through the participating entities (Shuke, 2012, 1). Contrac-
tual joint ventures may be formed for speciﬁc projects to be carried
out by multiple parties (Thió, 2012, 337).
Parties may also establish a corporate joint venture, which is a newly
established economic entity governed by company law. In this form,
parties to a joint venture become partners and shareholders of the
new legal entity, which has legal personality. This has implications for
the laws and rules governing the joint venture, and in particular has
consequences for the liability regime that applies to the joint venture.
A corporate joint venture independently assumes civil liability, whereas
in a contractual joint venture each participant assumes civil liability
for its own business (Sun and Sun, 2012, 94). Civil liability rules
may be a reason for parties to choose to establish a joint venture in
a corporate form rather than as a contractual joint venture. Another
reason to structure a joint venture as a corporate joint venture may
be that contractual rights are in general more diﬃcult to enforce, in
particular when it comes to joint decision making (Kusak and Temel,
2012, 101). Moreover, the joint venture often serves as a vehicle for
joint funding, where both parties contribute with money or know-how.
Generally, all corporate legal forms available in a jurisdiction can be
used to form a corporate joint venture. Often used corporate forms
for a joint venture include a joint stock corporation, a limited liability
company or a partnership. In many jurisdictions, such as the United
States, there is no express restriction on the type of joint venture that
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is allowed. In the United States joint ventures are generally set up
either as contractual arrangements or as entities. In the last case,
corporations or limited liability companies are most common, but var-
ious partnership entities are also permitted and often utilized (Dehner,
2015). Similarly, in Japan joint ventures can be set up as a contractual
joint venture in the form of a partnership agreement, or as a corpo-
rate joint venture in the form of a stock company or a limited liability
company (Nukada et al., 2015). In some jurisdictions a partnership
joint venture is recognized as a separate type of joint venture next to
contractual or corporate joint ventures, such as in China. In China, a
corporate or partnership joint venture must be registered with the local
branch of the State Administration for Commerce and Industry (Wu,
2015). In other jurisdictions, such as France, a joint venture without
legal personality, for example established as a partnership, still quali-
ﬁes as a corporate joint venture. In Australia, so-called incorporated
joint ventures are registered as limited liability companies. In an in-
corporated joint venture, participants become shareholders of the joint
venture company. In Belgium and Turkey a cooperation may qualify
as a company as soon as the joint venture partners agree to bring in
certain assets with a view to carrying out speciﬁc activities for proﬁt.
If parties do not wish to set up a distinct legal entity, they may set up a
contractual type of company in the form of a partnership or temporary
company. Similarly, in Turkey a corporate joint venture is formed as
a result of capital contributions (Thió, 2012, 337).
3.2.2 Descriptive empirics on joint ventures
To gain a better understanding of the characteristics of joint ventures,
this section provides a brief descriptive statistical analysis over the last
last 50 years. The data for this analysis was obtained from SDC Plat-
inum, a database on ﬁnancial information.22 This data downloaded
22For the precise SDC report query see appendix A.1.
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Figure 3.1: Number of quarterly announced joint ventures with events
from SDC Platinum was in a semi-structured format. In order to per-
form an empirical analysis, the data had to be pre-processed. For this
a program was written to obtain the necessary fully structured format.
The resulting dataset contains information on 144, 953 announced joint
ventures from November 1963 to May 2016. Besides the data of an-
nouncement and the name of the joint venture, this information also
includes data on the nation, the main ﬁeld of activity, and the members
of the joint venture. The data regarding the joint ventures' members
contains the nation of the individual member as well as its share of
ownership in the joint venture alliance.
Figure 3.1 shows the development of the number of quarterly an-
nounced joint ventures between 1980 and today. The data for the
years from 1963 to 1979 is deliberately omitted because the ﬁgures
for those years are relatively so small that they are indistinguishable
from zero on a linear scale.23 The graph depicting the years 1980 on-
ward shows that the number of announced joint ventures started to
rise around the year 1985. This rise coincided with the introduction of
23For a graph of these ﬁgures, see appendix A.2.
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special economic zones in China under Deng Xiaoping (Ho, 2004, 103-
104). Within the special economic zones foreign entities could invest
into China under the premises that the business was carried out by a
joint venture with a Chinese partner (Salem, 1981, 78). The number
of newly announced joint ventures boomed during the fall of the Iron
Curtain, during which establishing a joint venture with a local partner
was one of the most prominent market entry strategies for Western
companies in Central and Eastern Europe (Schuh and Holzmuüller,
2003, 179-180). This rally continued over the ﬁrst half of the 1990s
fueled by events such as the signing of the North American Free Trade
Agreement and ﬁnally peaked at the time of the commencement of the
World Trade Organization.24 After a mid 1990s low, the number of
announced joint ventures recovered towards the end of the decade and
boomed again at the time of the emergence of the Dot-com economy.
After the burst of the Dot-com bubble the number of newly announced
joint ventures began to drop again and retained over the crisis following
the 9/11 attacks. Moreover, many managers involved in joint ventures
had experienced disputes and a lack of trust between the parties, which
also contributed to a further decline in their popularity (Turowski,
2005). China's accession to the World Trade Organization also likely
contributed to the ﬁgure's decline as the joining processes included
commitments by China to abolish trade barriers such as mandating
speciﬁc types of joint ventures for foreign market entry (Mattoo, 2004,
24The peak at the time of the commencement of the World Trade Organization
is interesting since both its rise and its fall are very steep. This steepness suggests
the existence of particular reasons to establish a joint venture at that time. It is
the author's hunch that the liberalization of foreign investment rules required to
access the World Trade Organization can explain the spike in the number of joint
ventures at the time of its creation. For example, the possibility to hold a majority
ownership in a foreign joint venture in a country where this was not allowed before
may have attracted many new foreign investors. Nevertheless, the author is not
aware of literature supporting this hunch, nor does this argumentation explain the
subsequent drop in the number of announced joint ventures. A more extensive
study of the potential link between the creation of the World Trade Organization
and the number of announced joint ventures would be beyond the scope of this
PhD-project, but is an interesting area for further empirical research.
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Figure 3.2: Number of quarterly announced joint ventures per region
of the alliance
118). Instead, foreign investors could then enter the Chinese market
using subsidiaries rather than joint ventures, which had advantages
in terms of management and control of intellectual property rights
(Agarwal and Wu, 2004, 290; Deng, 2001). In the 2000s the number
of quarterly announced joint ventures settled around 1, 200 before the
ﬁnancial crisis that followed the Lehman Brothers bankruptcy as well
as the European debt crisis caused the number to drop. Lately the
number of new joint ventures seems to recover but a ﬁnal assessment
would require data on the years that are to come.25
Figure 3.2 includes the dataset's geographic information on the place
of business of the joint venture and hence adds a layer of geographic
detail to ﬁgure 3.1. It illustrates the number of yearly announced joint
ventures from 1964 to 2015, separated by the three regions North and
25Note that at the time of writing of this thesis, not all announced joint ventures
of 2015 might have been included in the database. Therefore, the number for 2015
has to be treated with caution.
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South America (Americas); Asia and the Paciﬁc region (Asia & Pa-
ciﬁc); as well as Europe, Middle East, and Africa (EMEA). The graph
shows that all three world regions follow the overall trend and are,
therefore, relatively similar in terms of the development of joint ven-
tures. However, the beginning of the 1980s' boom marks the start of
a domination by the Americas region that lasts until the beginning
of the ﬁnancial crisis in 2007. This domination is mostly driven by
the United States of America that are the host nation for by far the
most joint venture alliances (48, 521, followed in the ranking by China
with 12, 522 joint ventures and Japan with 8, 100 joint ventures). This
lead by the United States is visualized in ﬁgure 3.3, that illustrates
the number of hosted joint ventures for each country by the size of the
circle. As can be seen from ﬁgure 3.3, high numbers of joint ventures
are also found in India, which comes in ﬁfth with 4, 929 joint ventures.
India hosts considerably more joint ventures than Brazil, despite Brazil
outperforming India in most economic development statistics. Gener-
ally, Asian countries show much higher numbers of joint ventures than
Latin-American countries (for a more elaborate discussion of joint ven-
tures in emerging economies see Jaideep Anand, 2006).
Figure 3.3, moreover, shows the regional origin of the members of the
joint ventures. The fractions of the the circles denote the world region
from which the members originate. The amounts are weighted by
ownership share, such that all member shares of a given joint venture
add up to 1. This weighting is necessary in order to compare joint
ventures of diﬀerent sizes. The ﬁrst and most important impression
that can be obtained from the map is that for all regions the majority
ownership of joint ventures lies within the same region. Interestingly,
this is also the case for China for which approximately 72% of the joint
venture ownership is by the Asia and Paciﬁc region. This number is
largely driven by a domestic ownership of 46%, which is not a surprise
as it is common practice that the Chinese authorities mainly permit
joint ventures in which the foreign investor has at maximum a 49%
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and the Chinese at minimum a 51% share (Salem, 1981, 87).26
Joint ventures are a cooperation of multiple member companies. This
number can be as high as 20 members, as is the case, for example,
for Advanced Computing Environment, a joint venture that was an-
nounced in April 1991 by 20 computer companies to promote a new
processor architecture for the computer industry.27 However, in the
vast majority of all joint ventures world wide, only two ﬁrms are in-
volved. This can be seen from ﬁgure 3.4, which provides a histogram
of the distribution of joint ventures according to the number of their
members. As already mentioned the mode of this distribution is 2,
with almost 89% of all joint ventures consisting of two parties. In con-
trast, joint ventures with 3 members account for only 8.1% of the total
and the share sinks further as the number of members increases. While
joint ventures with 4 members still account for 1.8%, all joint ventures
with 5 or more members add up to only 1.2% of the total number of
joint ventures.
When investigating the ownership structure of joint ventures, not only
the sheer number of members is of interest, but also the eﬀective allo-
cation of the shares as previously indicated by the example of China
(Yan and Luo, 2001, 71-73,77-78). For this purpose ﬁgure 3.5 illus-
trates the distribution of shares in the joint ventures of the dataset.
The joint ventures are split into four groups: joint ventures with 2
members (a and e), 3 members (b and f), 4 members (c and g), and 5
or more members (d and h). The graphs in the ﬁrst row of the ﬁgure
provide a scatter plot of the minimum and the maximum share for each
group. The maximum share is stated on the x-axis (scale from 0% to
100%), while the minimum share is stated on the y-axis (scale from
26For a detailed overview of the ownership of Chinese joint ventures regarding
the country of origin, see appendix A.3.
27See e.g. The New York Times, 'New Computer Alliance Forms', John
Markoﬀ, April 8, 1991. http://www.nytimes.com/1991/04/08/business/
new-computer-alliance-forms.html - accessed on March 10, 2016.
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Figure 3.4: Distribution of the number of members of announced joint
ventures
0% to 50%). The second row of the ﬁgure contains a histogram of the
distribution of the maximum share for each of the four groups. The
maximum shares are categorized into bins of the size of 5 percentage
points.
For the joint ventures with two members sub-ﬁgures (a) and (e) show
the distribution of the ownership shares. Since in a joint ventures with
only two members the sum of the minimum and the maximum share
must equal 100, sub-ﬁgure (a) unsurprisingly shows a straight line from
{50; 50} to {100, 0}. However, sub-ﬁgure (e) depicts that the mode of
the distribution of the maximum share lies with 78% at 50 percentage
points. This means that a vast majority of almost 80% of all two-
member joint ventures has a 50 : 50 allocation of membership shares.
Moreover, this means, given that two-member joint ventures account
for 89% of all joint ventures, that almost 70% of all joint ventures world
wide are two-member, 50 : 50 ownership joint ventures.
Sub-ﬁgures (b) and (f) depict the ownership structure of joint ven-
tures with three members. Sub-ﬁgure (b) shows a triangle with a tip
at {33; 33}. An allocation at point {33; 33} means for a three-member
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joint venture that all parties have an equal membership share of 33%.
From this tip two frontiers span, one to the point {50; 0} and another
to the point {100; 0}. The side of the triangle from {33; 33} to {50; 0}
denotes all ownership allocations with two equally large parties (max-
imum) and one small party (minimum). Conversely, the side from
{33; 33} to {100; 0} marks all ownership allocations with a single large
party (maximum) and two equally small parties (minimum). Addition-
ally, a cluster of instances can be seen along the line {50; 0}−{50; 25}.
This visual impression is conﬁrmed by sub-ﬁgure (f) that shows a bi-
modal histogram with modes at 33 and 50 percentage points of the
maximum share. This bimodal distribution means that, while a ma-
jority of 40% of the three-member joint ventures has a equal ownership
allocation, the second-most used ownership allocation with 22% is one
where a large member holds half of the ownership rights.
The allocation of the minimum and the maximum ownership share
for joint ventures with four members is exhibited in (c) and (g). The
scatter plot (c) shows a triangle with the tip residing at point {25; 25}.
For a four-member joint venture an allocation where both the minimum
and the maximum are at 25% means that all four parties have an equal
share of 25% in the joint venture. Two frontiers span from the tip of the
triangle to the points {100; 0} and {33; 0}. Similarly as in sub-ﬁgure
(b), the triangle side from the tip to {100; 0} marks all ownership
allocations with one large party (maximum) and, here, three equally
small parties (minimum). The side from {25; 25} to {33; 0}, conversely,
represents all ownership allocations with three equally large parties
(maximum) and a single small party (minimum). Additionally, sub-
ﬁgure (c) reveals two further clusters of membership allocations in two
lines. First, a line from the tip to the point {50; 0} can be noticed. This
line denotes all membership allocations with two equally large parties
(maximum) and two equally small parties (minimum). The second line,
also visible in sub-ﬁgure (b) for the three-member joint ventures, lies
along the line {50; 0}−{50; 16.7}, which also for the four-member joint
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ventures illustrates the popularity of ownership structures in which one
party has a 50% share. Accordingly, the histogram of the maximum
share in sub-ﬁgure (g) discloses a bimodal distribution, with the two
modes laying at 25 and 50 percentage points. The dominating mode
with 41% at 25 percentage points, symbolizes an equal allocation of
ownership among the four parties. The second mode with 13% at
50 percentage points conﬁrms the popularity of ownership structures
where one party holds 50% of the ownership rights.
Joint ventures of ﬁve or more members are grouped together and their
ownership structure is visualized in sub-ﬁgures (d) and (h). Sub ﬁgure
(d) also shows a triangle for the scatter plot of minimum and maximum
shares. The tip of this triangle lies at point {20; 20}, which reﬂects
an equal allocation of the ownership shares in a ﬁve-members joint
venture. However, unlike the triangles in (b) and (c), the triangle in
(d) is not obtuse but acute. This is because the scatter plot in (d)
actually shows not one but multiple, overlaying triangles, one for each
of the member-sizes that are grouped together. This overlap produces
a left side of the triangle that points to the origin of the plot and
hence causes the triangle's shape to be acute. The line that marks the
left side connects all tips of the overlapping triangles. Therefore, the
side represents every all-equal membership allocations from the ﬁve-
members {20; 20} to the twenty-members {5; 5} joint ventures. Similar
to the scatter plots (b) and (c), a cluster of allocations along the one-
party-50% line {50; 0} − {50; 12.5} exists.
The corresponding histogram (h) shows the distribution of the max-
imum share of the group of the ﬁve-or-more-members joint ventures.
Because of the grouping, the distribution is not truly bimodal, but, nev-
ertheless, reveals similar characteristics as previously observed. The
dominating mode lies at 20 percentage points, which represents an
equal allocation of ownership shares in a ﬁve-member joint venture.
Since ﬁve-member joint ventures account for a bit more than half of
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the joint ventures in the group ﬁve-or-more, the location of the domi-
nating mode is also in line with previous ﬁndings. Again in line with
the previous ﬁndings, the second mode lies at 50 percentage points,
which conﬁrms the overall observation that the one-party-50% owner-
ship structure is a widely used model.
In conclusion, from this brief empirical analysis the following general
points can be drawn on the popularity of joint ventures and their typ-
ical membership structure. Joint ventures are widely used as a vehicle
for inter-organizational cooperation since the 1980s. More joint ven-
tures are founded when the general economic climate is positive than
in times of crisis. Especially, economic crises, such as the one after
the Lehman Brothers bankruptcy, negatively aﬀect the overall level of
founded joint ventures. The popularity of joint ventures is not spe-
ciﬁc to a certain region, as all main world regions follow a correlating
trend. However, these clusters are the main drivers of this world wide
trend: North America, Western Europe, and the Asia & Paciﬁc region.
The vast majority of the members originates from the same region as
the joint venture itself. With almost 89% of all joint ventures, the
two-member joint venture is undisputed the most used form. In terms
of membership structure the all-parties-equal ownership structure is
the most prominent design. However, the one-party-50% ownership
structure seems to be a focal point across all membership sizes. An
explanation for this prominence is that a 50%-share combined with an
additional vote guarantees a voting majority, which grants a certain
decision power (Yan and Luo, 2001, 81-83). However, such decision
power prevents not from arising conﬂicts between the joint venture's
parties, neither grantees it the success of the party with the majority.
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3.2.3 Case Study: Danone versus Wahaha
An illustrative case in which the ownership structure did not prevent
a conﬂict from arising is the Danone versus Wahaha case (Lee and
Tan, 2009; Garicano and Rayo, 2016, 9-11; Dickinson, 2007). Danone
Group, a French drinks and yoghurt producer, and its partner Wa-
haha Group Company, a Chinese producer of milk products, formed
the Wahaha Joint Venture in February 1996.28 As an experienced
multinational, Danone provided resources such as capital and knowl-
edge, as well as access to international markets and jobs. Wahaha
provided access to cheap labour, local regulatory knowledge and ac-
cess to the growing Chinese market.29 The joint venture was initially
very successful, with Wahaha's products becoming a leading brand in
the market and the joint venture accounting for more than 5 per cent
of Danone's proﬁts in 2006.30
A conﬂict between the two cooperating parties arose in 2007, when
Danone publicly accused Wahaha of illegally producing and selling
Wahaha-branded products outside the joint venture. The Wahaha
Group and its chairmen Mr. Zong created a series of non-joint ven-
ture companies that competed directly with the joint venture, selling
the same products and using the Wahaha trademark.31 According to
Danone, the parallel operation was of such a scale that it made simi-
lar proﬁts to the joint venture itself. Wahaha Group's chairman, Mr.
Zong, conversely accused Danone of trying to take control of Wahaha
28Bloomberg News, 'Danone Forms Milk Venture With Hangzhou Wahaha in
China', April 2, 1996. Bloomberg Identiﬁer: NSN DP81W11A1I5C.
29The Economist, 'Wahaha-haha!', April 19, 2007. http://www.economist.
com/node/9040416 - accessed on May 24, 2016.
30Financial Times, 'How Danone's China venture turned sour',
Geoﬀ Dyer, April 11, 2007. http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/
89a31958-e855-11db-b2c3-000b5df10621.html#axzz3ltqN0Rz2 - accessed
on May 24, 2016.
31Bloomberg News, 'Danone Accuses Wahaha of Breaching China Partnership',
April 10, 2007. Bloomberg Identiﬁer: NSN JGALXG1A1I4I.
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subsidiaries that were not part of the joint venture.32
Legally, Danone had the upper hand as it owned 51% of the joint
venture. The way that this had come to be, however, already indicates
a source for conﬂict in the joint venture. At the start of the Wahaha
joint venture, three participants were involved, with Wahaha Group
owning 49% of the joint venture and Danone and the third party, Baify,
each owning 25.5%. From this point of view, Wahaha Group was
the majority shareholder in the joint venture and felt it controlled
the joint venture. When Wahaha Group transferred its trademark to
the joint venture, it therefore did not feel concerned. However, in
1998 Danone gained a 51% ownership by buying out the interest of
Baifu, giving Danone complete legal control over the joint venture as
well as Wahaha's trademark. While this result was implied by the
structure of the joint venture from the beginning, it is clear from the
public statements that Wahaha Group did not anticipate it, leading to
resentment on the part of Wahaha Group and Mr. Zong (Dickinson,
2007).
At this point it also became clear that the 51% ownership of Danone
was not going to preclude a conﬂict between the partners, for two main
reasons. First, although Danone had a majority ownership, in China
employees in private enterprises often feel a stronger loyalty to their
manager than to the organization itself. Danone had not been involved
in the daily operations of the company, meaning that the joint venture
depended on Mr. Zong's continuing co-operation as chairman, gen-
eral manager and "driving force" behind the joint venture.33 Secondly,
Wahaha had not actually transferred the trademark to the joint ven-
ture, because the Chinese Trademark Oﬃce had rejected the request
32Bloomberg News, 'Danone Accused by Wahaha of Breaking Contract, Echos
Says', April 17, 2007. Bloomberg Identiﬁer: NSN JGMQHA1A74E9.
33Financial Times, 'How Danone's China venture turned sour',
Geoﬀ Dyer, April 11 2007. http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/
89a31958-e855-11db-b2c3-000b5df10621.html#axzz3ltqN0Rz2 - accessed
on May 24, 2016.
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to do so. Instead, the parties registered a license agreement with the
Trademark Oﬃce, which was not a full license agreement but only an
abbreviated one, because of concerns that the Trademark Oﬃce would
otherwise not accept it. This meant, essentially, that Wahaha Group
never met its obligation of capitalisation of the joint venture (Dickin-
son, 2007). It can thus be said that Wahaha Group, in various ways,
held assets that were crucial to the continuation of the joint venture
(Garicano and Rayo, 2016, 9-11).
In 2007 Danone started arbitration proceedings in Stockholm on the
basis that the non-joint venture companies violated both the trade-
mark license and the joint venture agreement.34 Shortly after Wahaha
Group applied for arbitration as well, before the Hangzhou Arbitration
Commission.35 Wahaha Group sought to have both trademark license
agreements declared void. The basis for this claim was that the license
would be illegal at the time it was granted because it was intended
to avoid the requirements of Chinese law (Dickinson, 2007; Garicano
and Rayo, 2016, 9-11). Wahaha won the trademark arbitration at the
Hangzhou Arbitration Commission, which accepted Wahaha's request
that the trademark transfer agreement be terminated.36 This ruling
was upheld on appeal in 2008.37 In late 2009, the Stockholm arbitra-
tion resulted in a cash settlement leaving the trademark with Wahaha
in exchange for a 300 million Euro cash transfer.38
34Bloomberg News, 'Wahaha Says It "Could" Sue Danone for 5 Billion Euros',
June 26, 2007. Bloomberg Identiﬁer: NSN JK94QN0UQVI9.
35Bloomberg News, 'Wahaha's Arbitration Claim Against Danone Accepted in
China', June 18, 2007. Bloomberg Identiﬁer: NSN JJTOEL1A1I4H.
36Bloomberg News, 'Wahaha Wins Suit Against Danone Director on Unfair Com-
petition', December 9, 2007. Bloomberg Identiﬁer: NSN JSTFZT1A74EA.
37Bloomberg News, 'China Court Rejects Danone Appeal Application in Wahaha
Dispute', August 5, 2008. Bloomberg Identiﬁer: NSN K5436F0UQVIA.
38Bloomberg News, 'Danone Wins Ruling Against Wahaha Over Now-Broken
Partnership', November 9, 2009. Bloomberg Identiﬁer: NSN KSUNLP1A1I4J;
Bloomberg News, 'Danone to Sell Wahaha Stake for 300 Million Euros, Caijing
Says', September 30, 2009. Bloomberg Identiﬁer: NSN KQRVIQ6LUTXS.
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3.2.4 Arbitrated Joint Venture disputes
Because of the private nature of arbitration, the results of joint ven-
ture disputes that were solved by commercial arbitration are usually
not published. This situation makes it nearly impossible to provide a
comprehensive empirical overview of arbitrated joint venture disputes.
Nevertheless, certain cases with speciﬁc relevance for the development
of arbitration case law are published anonymously.
This section makes use of this practice by taking four of these anony-
mously published cases as examples to illustrate typical disputes in an
international joint venture. Leaving aside the legal speciﬁcs, the pre-
sentation of these example cases concentrates on their facts because
the idea is rather to provide an abstracted impression of the nature of
these disputes than a profound legal analysis.
In order to present the nature of these example disputes, the claimant
and the responded are mentioned. Secondly, the purpose of the joint
venture and its ownership structure are brieﬂy introduced. Thirdly, the
dispute between the joint venture's parties is sketched. These disputes
fall into two broad categories: On the one hand conﬂicts about the dis-
tribution of the surplus (proﬁt or other beneﬁts) that the joint venture
had produced and on the other hand disagreement about the contribu-
tions a party made to the joint venture. Each example concludes with
the arbitrator's decision and his characteristics as third party decision
maker. These characteristics will then serve in a stylized manner as
basis for a formal analysis in the following chapter.
Mother company of joint venture corporation shareholder
(US) v. venture corporation shareholder (Mexico)
In the 2013 case Mother company of joint venture corporation share-
holder (US) v. venture corporation shareholder (Mexico), which was
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arbitrated under French jurisdiction by the International Court of Ar-
bitration of the International Chamber of Commerce in San Diego
(United States), the main cause of dispute was disagreement over the
distribution of the proﬁt of the joint venture.39 The claimant (C), a
US company, and the respondent (R), a Mexican venture corporation,
engaged into a joint venture for the operation of C's warehouse stores
in Northwest Mexico. 50% of the ownership shares of the joint venture
were allocated to C whereas the other 50% were allocated to R.
The proﬁts were almost entirely reinvested and hence the joint venture
produced an accumulated, single surplus until the moment at which
the dispute arose. This occurred 15 years after the joint venture was
founded because R desired the distribution of the accumulated proﬁt.
In order to do so, it took two actions: First, it removed the director
of operations, a former employee of C. Second, it called for a share-
holder meeting to "decide on the distribution of dividends"40. This
meeting ended in a deadlock between C and R and triggered further
negotiations about the distribution of the joint venture's surplus.
In the course of these negotiations regarding the proﬁts distribution,
R ﬁled a case at a local court attempting to force a distribution of
the surplus. Through the court decision, R acquired the payment
of its dividends, according to Mexican company law. In response C
started the arbitration proceedings against R, arguing that R violated
the contractual mechanisms for resolving a deadlock. The arbitrator
followed the argumentation of C and ordered R to repay the dividends
to restore the joint venture's ﬁnancial status. With this award the
arbitrator enforced the surplus sharing rule that the parties agreed on
at the foundation of the joint venture.
39Mother company of joint venture corporation shareholder (US) v. venture
corporation shareholder (Mexico), Final Award, ICC Case No. 15248 in Albert
Jan van den Berg (ed), Yearbook Commercial Arbitration 2013 - Volume XXXVIII,
Yearbook Commercial Arbitration, Volume 38, Kluwer Law International, pp. 127
- 173.
40Ibid. p. 127.
59
Limited Liability Company (Bahrain) v. Establishment (Saudi
Arabia)
In the 2006 case Limited Liability Company (Bahrain) v. Establish-
ment (Saudi Arabia), which was arbitrated under Bahrain jurisdiction
by the Gulf Cooperation Council Commercial Arbitration Center in
Manama (Bahrain), a main cause of dispute was the respondent's fail-
ure to provide balance sheets for the joint venture and the resulting
ambiguity about its ﬁnancial state.41 The claimant (C), a limited li-
ability company from Bahrain, and the respondent (R), the owner of
a Saudi Arabian Establishment, engaged into a joint venture for the
operation of R's establishment. 83.33% of the ownership shares of the
joint venture were allocated to C whereas the other 16.67% were allo-
cated to R. Additionally, R held 16.67% of C's shares. Because of its
majority position C was appointed as the manager of the joint venture,
but the de facto management was with R.
In 2002 R violated its obligation to report the joint venture's ﬁnancial
situation in terms of the provision of balance sheets. C, subsequently,
alleged that R attempted to embezzle the joint venture's surplus and
hence invoked arbitration proceedings. The arbitration court applied
expert knowledge in order to survey the ﬁnancial and contractual sit-
uation of the joint venture to verify the allegations. Because of the
extensive assignment of the expert, the time limit of concluding the
arbitration was extended by the GCC Commercial Arbitration Cen-
ter. As a result of the expert's investigations, the arbitrator awarded
C SAR 17,746,462 from R. By applying the expert's knowledge, the
arbitrator veriﬁed the joint venture's surplus and enforced its intended
sharing.
41Limited Liability Company (Bahrain) v. Establishment (Saudi Arabia), Fi-
nal Award, GCC Case No. 19XS/26/10/2006 in Albert Jan van den Berg (ed),
Yearbook Commercial Arbitration 2013 - Volume XXXVIII, Yearbook Commer-
cial Arbitration, Volume 38, Kluwer Law International 2013, pp. 63 - 79.
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Construction Company v Construction Company
In the 1996 case Construction Company v Construction Company,
which was arbitrated under Swiss jurisdiction by the International
Court of Arbitration of the International Chamber of Commerce in
Geneva (Switzerland), the dispute concerned disagreement over the
beneﬁciary of two Export Incentive Certiﬁcates issued by the Turk-
ish state.42 The claimant (C), a US construction company, and the
respondent (R), a Turkish construction company, entered into a joint
venture for a construction project for a Turkish authority. 50% of the
ownership shares of the joint venture were allocated to C whereas the
other 50% were allocated to R. R was appointed as manager of the
joint venture company.
Before and shortly after the foundation of the joint venture, R got
issued two Export Incentive Certiﬁcates (EIC) by the Turkish state.
These EICs granted the holder beneﬁts that were in relation with the
activities of the joint venture and therefore accounted to its surplus.
Six years after the establishment of the joint venture R sought payment
of the share of the surplus concerning the EICs' beneﬁts. Because of
the ownership structure, no decision regarding the sharing was reached
in the board of the joint venture. As a result, R issued a "leadership
decision"43 that granted itself the whole share of the surplus that was
generated by the EICs' beneﬁts. Hereupon, C called for arbitration,
claiming that it was agreed in the joint venture agreement that the
beneﬁts of the EICs are to be enjoyed by the joint venture. R replied
that Turkish law prohibits beneﬁts derived from EICs to be shared
with foreign entities.
In his decision the arbitrator diﬀerentiated between tax beneﬁts and
42Construction Company v Construction Company, Final Award, ICC Case No.
8528, 1996 in Albert Jan van den Berg (ed), Yearbook Commercial Arbitration
2000 - Volume XXV, Yearbook Commercial Arbitration, Volume 25, Kluwer Law
International, pp. 341 - 354.
43Ibid. p. 341.
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savings derived from EICs. The EICs' tax beneﬁts are governed by
Turkish law. As a consequence they are non-transferable privileges, to
which R is solely entitled to. The tax savings, on the contrary, are
governed by private contractual agreement between C and R. There-
fore, the stipulations in the joint venture agreement apply and hence
the joint venture is entitled to these beneﬁts. By applying his expert
knowledge in legal, contractual and ﬁnancial aspects, the arbitrator
deﬁned and delimited the joint venture's surplus and enforced the con-
tracted sharing rule.
First Investor, in liquidation (EU country), Second Investor
(EU country) v Ministry of Agriculture (Non-EU country)
In the case First Investor, in liquidation (EU country), Second Investor
(EU country) v Ministry of Agriculture (Non-EU country), which was
arbitrated by the International Court of Arbitration of the Interna-
tional Chamber of Commerce in Geneva (Switzerland), the dispute
concerned a failure by the respondent to contribute adequately to the
joint venture.44 The claimant (C), two investors from European Union
countries, and the respondent (R), the Ministry of Agriculture of a
Non-EU country, entered into a joint venture for the cultivation of
agricultural products and breeding of livestock, as well as their sales
and distribution. The joint venture agreement stipulated that C con-
tributes with funding and that R contributes with land, workforce,
equipment and facilities. Moreover, it was agreed that the joint ven-
ture would stop operations if it would be not proﬁtable for a ﬁve years
period (cease agreement).
44First Investor, in liquidation (EU country), Second Investor (EU country) v
Ministry of Agriculture (Non-EU country), Final Award, ICC Case No. 12112 in
Albert Jan van den Berg (ed), Yearbook Commercial Arbitration 2009 - Volume
XXXIV, Yearbook Commercial Arbitration, Volume 34, Kluwer Law International,
pp. 77 - 110.
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From the beginning the joint venture had diﬃculties starting oper-
ations mainly because the land was only partially cultivated due to
property conﬂicts with sedentary farmers, a lack of available workforce,
protests and not suﬃcient oﬃce space. The parties negotiated to rem-
edy the problems and adapted their agreement respectively. Neverthe-
less, the joint venture was producing losses over the ﬁrst years. In the
course of an outbreak of a conﬂict in a neighboring country, R inquired
C if part of the joint venture's land could be used by an international
organization to host refugees. C agreed to this request that the in-
ternational organization may use "a particle"45. Thereupon, R made
the whole land available for the international organization. Because
accommodation facilities were established on the land by cementing
the surface, a vast eﬀort would be required to restore the land for
agricultural production.
As a result, C rejected further ﬁnancial contributions to the joint ven-
ture and demanded its liquidation according to the initial cease agree-
ment by invoking arbitration proceedings. After determining his juris-
diction, the arbitrator examined the claim that R had failed to fulﬁll
its contribution obligations. As a result of his veriﬁcation of the con-
tributions to the joint venture, the arbitrator determined that R had
failed its contribution duty. Therefore, the arbitrator ordered the dis-
solution of the joint venture and awarded C damages to the amount of
its ﬁnancial contributions. In his role as third party decision maker,
the arbitrator veriﬁed the parties' contributions and concluded this in
the ﬁnal award.
Bermudian Company v Spanish Company
In the case the Bermudian company v. Spanish company that was ne-
gotiated under French jurisdiction in Paris in the year 1987 the dispute
45Ibid. p. 77.
63
between the parties concerned the distribution of proﬁts of a joint ven-
ture between the parties.46 The joint venture was established in Spain
in the year 1972 for the purpose of the construction and operation
of petrochemical products for the Spanish market. Each party the
claimant (C), a Bermudian company, as well as the respondent (R), a
Spanish company, were in passion of 50% of the ownership rights to
the joint venture. While the joint venture contract (Basic Agreement)
stated that each party could veto the expansion of the business beyond
the production and the sale of petrochemicals and the investment in
additional facilities, the distribution of the joint venture's proﬁts was
not subject to any veto rights. It was stipulated in the contract that the
maximum dividend that maintains the mandatory legal reserves would
be paid to the two owners each year unless the annual shareholders
meeting would decide diﬀerently.
The dispute arose during the annual shareholders meeting in 1985.
During the meeting the annual report, the balance sheet, and the
proﬁt-and-loss statement were unanimously approved. Subsequently,
C put the distribution of the year proﬁt of approximately 359 million
pesetas to vote. R rejected this with the argument that the proﬁt
should be kept within the joint venture as a reserve for the expansion
of its production capacity. This expansion was suggested by R at a
board meeting, preceding the annual shareholders meeting. However,
at the same meeting C refused the expansion plan by executing his
aforementioned veto right.
Based on his refusal of R's expansion plans, C declared that based on
the joint venture contract R is obligated to approve the distribution
of the proﬁts. When R at a subsequent shareholders meeting, approx-
imately two month later, again rejected to conﬁrm the distribution
46Bermudian Company v Spanish Company, Final Award, ICC Case No. 5485,
18 August 1987 in Albert Jan van den Berg (ed), Yearbook Commercial Arbitration
1989 - Volume XIV, Yearbook Commercial Arbitration, Volume 14, Kluwer Law
International, pp. 156 - 173.
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of the proﬁts, C ﬁled for arbitration at the International Chamber of
Commerce. C amended his request in the following year to also include
this distribution of the proﬁts for the ﬁscal year 1986 in the arbitration
proceedings. R challenged the proceedings with the argument that the
arbitral tribunal has no jurisdiction as the arbitral agreement was null
and void under Spanish law. After determining its jurisdiction, the
arbitration tribunal concluded that R failed to fulﬁll its contractual
obligations and, accordingly, awarded C 50% of the maximal payable
proﬁts for the ﬁscal year 1984 and 1985 plus relevant interests.
3.3 Hard and soft governance mechanisms
The disputes presented in the previous section illustrate the need of
meta-organizations for adequate governance. However, meta-organizations
often cannot seize on governance mechanisms that were established for
employment based organizations because, as already noted in chapter
2, meta-organizations are diﬀerent from employment based organiza-
tions with respect to their structure and internal organization. The
absence of a hierarchical structure in meta-organizations means that
there is no central authority to give directions and to solve disputes.
Moreover, a peer-monitoring of the members is necessary as the mem-
bers' tasks cannot be determined hierarchically. This means that meta-
organizations require speciﬁc governance mechanisms for these partic-
ular functions.
These speciﬁc mechanisms for the governance of meta-organizations
can take diﬀerent forms. Krebs and Jung (2015) derive a deﬁnition
in the context of business networks that distinguishes hard and soft
governance mechanisms. Their deﬁnition follows the notation of hard
and soft law to diﬀerentiate binding legal instruments from quasi-legal
instruments without any legally binding power. Translated to gov-
ernance, this distinction means that hard governance mechanisms are
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legally binding and hence can be enforced, while soft governance mech-
anisms are not legally binding and only rely on self-enforcement.
In meta-organizations hard governance concerns mechanisms to take
decisions, which can be enforced in ordinary courts. For this enforce-
ability the mechanisms have to be stipulated in the meta-organization's
founding agreement and must be in accordance with the relevant com-
pany and contract law. For employment based organizations a direc-
tive by the board could be seen as such a hard governance mechanism.
The board's authority to give directions to its employees is established
by the employment contracts and is enforceable in court. If an em-
ployee refuses to follow working directions, a labor court cannot force
the employee to perform a certain task, but can allow the employer to
terminate the contract. This way, the court provides a legal remedy in
case the hard governance mechanism is not honored.
Soft governance mechanisms, on the contrary, are practices in meta-
organizations that contribute to the organization's governance but
which are not enforceable in court. These mechanisms may be, but are
not necessarily, explicitly stipulated in the meta-organization's found-
ing agreement. Nevertheless, the design of the meta-organization needs
to facilitate the eﬀective functioning of the mechanism. In the context
of employment based organizations, such a soft governance mechanism
could be the system of promotion. The possibility of a promotion as
a beneﬁt for good performance motivates the employees to work hard.
While this system provides governance in favor of the organizational
goals, it is not stipulated in the employment contract. Accordingly,
it is not possible to sue for the lack of promotion in a laborcourt.47
Nevertheless, the design of the organization has to incorporate career
paths such that promoting an employee is possible.
Because both hard as well as soft governance mechanisms are very
47Except in case of discriminatory practices, which is not the type of situation
that is referred to here.
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important for the governance of meta-organizations, one example of
each will be studied in detail in the following two chapters. Chapter
4 concerns decision making by third parties, such as arbitration, as
a hard governance mechanism for meta-organizations. Subsequently,
chapter 5 discusses a soft governance mechanism in the form of peer
monitoring and partner selection for research joint ventures.
4 | Conﬂict Resolution in
Meta-Organizations48
4.1 Third Party Decision Making in
Meta-Organizations
In recent years, the collaboration of legally independent entities for the
production or commercialization of innovative products has become in-
creasingly important (Oxley, 2013, 3). These meta-organizations are
often found in an international context, such as for the market entry in
China, or for the development of high technology, as for instance the
recent partnership of IBM and Twitter for big-data intelligence.49 The
motivation of these interorganizational collaborations is to cooperate in
exploration and exploitation (Oxley and Silverman, 2008; Parmigiani
and Rivera-Santos, 2011; Gulati et al., 2012; Gulati, 1998; Argyres
and Mayer, 2007). Because of its composition of legally independent
ﬁrms, the meta-organization misses the level of formal authority that
an organization build upon employment relationships would provide
48This sections is based on the paper Conﬂict Resolution in Meta-Organizations:
Internal or External Governance, which is joint work with Klaus Heine.
49See: IBM, 'Twitter and IBM Form Global Partnership to Transform En-
terprise Decisions', October 29, 2014. http://www-03.ibm.com/press/us/en/
pressrelease/45265.wss - accessed on August 11, 2015.
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(Gulati et al., 2012, 573). In the absence of formal authority the de-
sign of the meta-organization has to provide mechanisms to resolve
disputes between the business partners (Lumineau et al., 2015; Ahrne
and Brunsson, 2005; Macneil, 1978). An eligible form for this conﬂict
resolution is third party decision making, such as commercial arbitra-
tion, which means that the dispute is decided by a supposably exter-
nal party. But the use of third party decision making in the design
of a meta-organization raises two questions: Primarily, what are the
relevant attributes that a third party has to embody to be appropri-
ate? But more generally in the sense of Santos and Eisenhardt (2005),
should the third party not be considered part of the meta-organization
in contrast to the external position that its name suggests?
Since these inter-ﬁrm collaborations usually involve complex interac-
tions that are not fully veriﬁable, they, contrariwise, cannot be solely
governed by contractual agreements (Gibbons, 2005; Chi, 1996). For
this reason, alternative governance structures such as in form of a
meta-organization are necessary (Ménard, 2004, 2013; Baker et al.,
2008). However, a key aspect in their design is how to accommodate
the absence of formal authority. This power gap can be ﬁlled by a
third party that is assigned an arbitrary decision right to solve dis-
putes within the meta-organization (c.f. Schanze, 1993). An example
for such an incorporation of third party decision making in the de-
sign of meta-organizations are joint venture agreements that contain
an arbitration clause (Casella, 1996; Lumineau and Oxley, 2012).
The advantages of commercial arbitration compared to decisions of
ordinary courts can be summarized in four points. Neutrality: partners
in an international joint venture prefer a jurisdiction for their disputes
that is not linked to the home country of one of the partners, since that
would imply the risk that the local legal system is not fully understood
or that the ordinary court is biased against foreign companies. Privacy:
it is easier to maintain trust and continue business after the conﬂict
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resolution if the nature of the dispute is not publicly discussed (Fulmer
and Gelfand, 2012). Expertise of the tribunal: an arbitration court is
formed by experts from the ﬁeld in order to resolve the conﬂict. Final
and enforceable decisions: arbitration usually does not foresee appeal,
giving the parties a clear prospect for their future cooperation and
plans. Because of the New York Convention of 1958  which has been
signed by more than 140 countries  the enforcement of the decision
award is easier than that of a domestic court's ruling (Mentschikoﬀ,
1961).
Because of his private nature, a third party decision maker, in con-
trast to an ordinary court, is not bound by strict procedural rules and
hence has the necessary latitude to base the decision only on his con-
viction (Born, 2009, 1739-1765). Moreover, due to the aforementioned
characteristics of privacy and expertise, third party decision makers
have better access to the internal information ﬂow of joint ventures
than ordinary courts. Translating these two advantages of third party
decision making into the hold-up view of inter-ﬁrm collaboration can
lead to a better formal understanding of the balancing of (bargaining)
power in meta-organizations. Moreover, it allows to identify relevant
attributes for a third party to be eligible for decision making in a meta-
organization.
Based on this formal view of third party decision making in meta-
organizations, an answer to the question of positioning the third party
decision maker can be discussed. The term third party suggests that the
decision maker is external and hence not part of the meta-organization.
In this view the third party, a commercial arbitrator for example, is
seen as a contractual enforcement mechanism that can be both substi-
tute as well as complement to ordinary courts (Katz, 2008). Consider-
ing third party decision making also as a complement to ordinary courts
improves our conceptual understanding of inter-organizational dispute
resolution. But narrowing its function only to contractual enforcement
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and hence ignoring its functional role might hamper our understanding
of the speciﬁc corporate governance system of meta-organizations (c.f.
Aguilera et al., 2015).
While traditionally the literature diﬀerentiates between internal and
external corporate governance (Aguilera et al., 2015; Walsh and Se-
ward, 1990), this dichotomy might not be appropriate for meta-organi-
zations. Given their nature as a hybrid between hierarchy and mar-
ket, meta-organizations are necessitated to employ market based gov-
ernance mechanisms for critical functions inside the organization. The
reward distribution, for instance, is a key function of the organizational
design, that has to be addressed by new forms of organizations (Pu-
ranam et al., 2014). Since third party decision making can be of high
importance for the distribution of a meta-organization's rewards, it can
be understood as internal part of the organizational structure. This
conceptual placement within the boundaries of the ﬁrm provides a new
perspective to the relation between meta-organizations and third party
decision making. By taking this rather organizational perspective, the
focus of analysis shifts from mainly contractual and legal questions
to questions of organizational design. Therefore, including the role of
third party decision making into the design analysis contributes not
only to our understanding of this organizational governance mecha-
nism, but it also sheds light on means to balance bargaining powers
within meta-organizations and on the corresponding reward distribu-
tion.
4.2 Meta-organizations, Conﬂict and the Theory
of the Firm
Meta-organizations consist of legally independent organizational enti-
ties (Gulati et al., 2012; Parmigiani and Rivera-Santos, 2011). This dis-
tinguishes meta-organizations from employment-based organizations
71
which are hierarchically composed of individual agents, mostly em-
ployees. Employment-based organizations emerge as a hierarchy of
individuals and build upon employment relationships, which formally
deﬁne power and authority. Because meta-organizations have not the
employment relationship at center stage but complex corporate con-
tracts, they miss to a large degree the typical hierarchical organization
of power, and as a consequence they are either characterized by the ab-
sence of formal authority at all or formal authority plays out through
complex contractual networks.
In the absence of formal authority, the individual interests of each
member can impair or even block the decision making process in the
meta-organization (Lumineau et al., 2015; Ahrne and Brunsson, 2005).
Conﬂict areas such as the coordination of eﬀorts or the distribution
of beneﬁts can potentially deadlock the whole decision making pro-
cess (Macneil, 1978, 875-880). To prevent that inﬁghting between the
members deadlocks the meta-organization, a sophisticated governance
mechanism is required that is able to resolve internal disputes by means
of external enforcement (Lumineau and Oxley, 2012).
To address the speciﬁc governance requirements the design of meta-
organizations can provide a third party decision maker, who is equipped
with the necessary power to resolve internal disputes. In case a dispute
arises between the members of the meta-organization, the third party
decision maker is called for resolution. Thereby it can be assumed
that a private dispute resolution mechanism has multiple advantages
over calling for a decision from a public court. In particular, a third
party decision maker is not bound by national laws, which may pro-
vide strict procedural rules or limits the jurisdiction of ordinary courts
(see Benson, 1999; Craig et al., 1990). In addition, a private third
party has typically more expert knowledge and hence is better able to
observe the entities' eﬀort levels. This is because, private third party
decision makers are not only legal professionals but often also experts
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in the respective industry of their assignment. These industry experts
hold business and technical knowledge that helps to better understand
the circumstances of the dispute and to timely provide an adequate
resolution. Moreover, the high conﬁdentiality of alternative dispute
resolution increases the parties' willingness to share sensitive business
information, which improves the third party's access to relevant in-
formation (see Stipanowich, 2004, 846). Finally, conﬁdentiality allows
the involved parties to maintain the meta-organization's external im-
age and reputation, which might be negatively aﬀected by a revelation
of the internal dispute (for a discussion see Noussia, 2010).
Highlighting these advantages of private third party decision making
for internal dispute resolution in meta-organizations, raises the ques-
tion if this governance mechanism should be considered as external
as the term third party suggests, or whether it is rather internal. All
the mentioned attributes, access to the internal information, authority
for decision making, and privacy, are very similar to the features of
internal governance mechanisms such as the board of directors in a
regular company. Moreover, decision awards of the private third party
ultimately rely also on enforcement by ordinary courts, such as any
other internal governance mechanism has to be backed by the exter-
nal public governance system (Aguilera et al., 2015). To substantiate
this conceptual placement of third party decision making within the
boundaries of meta-organizations, it seems beneﬁcial to test it against
the ﬁrm boundary concepts of incumbent theories of the ﬁrm.
Understanding inter-ﬁrm collaboration as a meta-organization is not
the ﬁrst attempt to elaborate on the determination of the boundaries
of the ﬁrm. Williamson (1991) uses the term hybrid organization to
discuss this distinct type of governance structure that lies between
market and hierarchy. His starting point is that organizations have to
adapt to changing situational contexts, in order to survive, and that
organizational types vary in their capacity to adapt accordingly. He
73
distinguishes between two types of adaptation, autonomous and co-
operative, which mirror in the two generic governance structures of
market and hierarchy. In particular, in the governance mode `mar-
ket' autonomous adaptation works best to address changes, whereas in
'hierarchy' cooperative adaptation is most eﬃcient. The hybrid orga-
nization, as a combination of market and hierarchical features, has the
advantage of being reasonably suitable to tackle both types of adapta-
tions. As a result the concrete situational context determines, which
governance mode is the most suitable to keep an organization viable.
Transaction cost economics is another important approach towards
a theory of the ﬁrm. This approach mainly concerns the question
whether a transaction is more eﬃciently conducted in the market or
inside an organization (Coase, 1937; Williamson, 1975, 1985; with a
critical appraisal of Coase's approach see Alchian and Demsetz, 1972).
Therefore, transaction cost economics concludes that ﬁrms occur when
market transactions are too costly. However, given the hybrid nature of
meta-organizations as an intermediate between market and integration,
the transaction cost lens promises only very limited information on
the role of third party decision making as internal governance device.
Moreover, the transaction cost perspective is relatively imprecise with
regard to the allocation of power and authority within the ﬁrm (Hart,
2011; Rajan and Zingales, 1998).
From a legal point of view the power in an organization bases on the
in rem rights of property. This means that the answer to the question
of authority in a meta-organization lies in the allocation of asset own-
ership of involved parties (Baker et al., 2002). The importance of the
allocation of assets in a ﬁrm was stressed in the property rights ap-
proach by Grossman-Hart-Moore (Grossman and Hart, 1986; Hart and
Moore, 1990), which emphasizes the importance of the residual right
of control that ultimately gives the power to govern the interactions of
production.
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The New Property Rights theory is especially elaborative on the impli-
cations of the two polar transaction structures market and integration.
In a system of integrated ownership the owner can selectively replace
certain workers and assets from the production process whereas in a
market transaction only the counterparty as a whole can be replaced,
thus in the latter case the decision is only digital. Following this, the
boundaries of the ﬁrm are deﬁned by the integrated ownership of pro-
ductive assets which are controlled by a single entity. Applying this
boundary criteria to meta-organizations would draw the ﬁrms' bound-
aries around the individual entities and qualify the transactions within
the meta-organization as market transactions. Accordingly, dispute
resolution by third party decision making would have to be consid-
ered as external governance which is a sheer substitute to ordinary
courts. This consideration reveals that the very stringent classiﬁcation
by ownership is not very appropriate to investigate the boundaries of
meta-organizations. Since the New Property Rights theory focuses
exclusively on the power vested in property rights, it cannot accom-
modate meta-organizations which are characterized by the absence of
formal authority and the non-integration of property rights.
The boundary problem is further seized by Zingales (2000), who de-
scribes from a corporate ﬁnance point of view the development of the
theory of the ﬁrm. He argues that the incumbent theories of the ﬁrm
are certainly a necessary foundation for a principal understanding of
ﬁrm organization. However, over the years the traditional approaches
towards a theory of the ﬁrm have lost their predominance as the stan-
dard role model for the more complex (meta) organizational structures,
as hybrids, which are widely emerging. In the modern distributed econ-
omy the boundaries of the ﬁrm have become fuzzy and "the major cor-
porate governance problem has become how to prevent conﬂicts among
stakeholders from paralyzing or destroying the ﬁrm."(Zingales, 2000,
1648) Therefore, a sensible balance between the diﬀerent actors in an
organization and especially between their de jure and de facto control
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power is crucial (see also Rajan and Zingales, 2000a,b). This func-
tion of balancing the diverging powers in a meta-organization could be
fulﬁlled by third party decision making.
Taking an holistic perspective, Santos and Eisenhardt (2005) derive
four concepts of the boundaries of the ﬁrm that build upon traditional
theories such as transaction cost economics, the new property rights
theory, the resource-based view, and the knowledge-based view. The
ﬁrst concept, eﬃciency, sets the boundary where a certain transaction
can be carried out more eﬃciently, in the market or inside the organiza-
tion. This boundary is materialized by the combination and separation
of property rights in order to reach the eﬃciency frontier. Power, as
the second concept, places the boundary at the point at which the
organization's area of inﬂuence ends. It, therefore, understands an or-
ganization as a means to exert control over crucial factors and hence
sets the boundary where this sphere of power ends. The third con-
ception, competence, refers to the question which resources should be
held by the organization. Accordingly, the boundary is deﬁned by the
resources that are instrumental to the organization's objective. The
fourth boundary concept of Santos and Eisenhardt is identity, which
refers to the members' deﬁnition of the organization's attributes and
purpose. This self-deﬁnition implies that the boundary is set by the
shared values, norms, and intentions of the organization members.
For the analysis if third party decision making is an internal or exter-
nal governance mechanism, eﬃciency and identity appear not suitable
because these concepts are too stringent in deﬁning boundaries. Since
eﬃciency focuses on the consolidation of property rights it is unable
to identify boundaries of meta-organizations, which are characterized
by distributed ownership in form of separate legal entities. Identity
focuses on the individual members and their identiﬁcation with the
organization, which is not applicable for meta-organizations that con-
sist of other organizations and not of individuals. Conversely, power
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and competence seem to be good candidates to discuss the bound-
aries of meta-organizations because they regard the essential functions
of dispute resolution, namely the resources and authority to resolve
the conﬂict. However, to further discuss the placement of third party
decision making on the basis of these two boundary conceptions, it
is necessary to conceptualize our understanding of alternative dispute
resolution and to clearly distinguish its role in meta-organizations from
ordinary courts. For this conceptualization the following section makes
use of a formal model that allows to identify relevant characteristics for
third party decision makers as internal conﬂict resolution mechanism
in meta-organizations.
4.3 A Formal View on Third Party Decision Mak-
ing in Meta-Organizations
Because of the absence of formal authority in a meta-organization, in-
ﬁghting between the members over the proﬁts might arise. This conﬂict
potential is likely to be anticipated by the members, with the result
that they may withhold critical resources or more generally devote
less eﬀort to the meta-organization. Because of these lower eﬀorts, the
meta-organization underperforms and the members miss out on poten-
tial proﬁts. To attain these proﬁts the design of the meta-organization
can include a governance mechanism to internally solve conﬂicts be-
tween the members. For this internal dispute resolution the design can
stipulate a third party decision maker that has the power to form a
decision to settle the conﬂict.
This dispute resolution requires two attributes to be feasible. Firstly,
the third party decision maker must have external authority, compara-
ble to the board of directors of a classical organization. This external
authority enables the third party's decision to rely on external gover-
nance mechanisms, such as ordinary courts, which in turn gives him
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the power to resolve internal disputes. An arbitration court, as an ex-
ample, issues an award that is enforceable in ordinary court and hence
fulﬁlls this criteria. Secondly, the third party decision maker must be
able to observe internal information of the meta-organization, such as
the members' eﬀort levels. If this is not the case, the third party has
not the necessary information to reach an appropriate decision. If these
two characteristics are met by the third party decision maker, then he
is able to resolve conﬂicts within the meta-organization by issuing a
binding decision award.
Figure 4.1: Process of dispute resolution by third party decision making
To illustrate the role of the third party in balancing the bargaining
power of the individual parties in the meta-organization on basis of
their eﬀorts this section employs a model of collaborative production
with imperfect contracting. As meta-organization a joint venture be-
tween two parties is assumed and the eﬀort levels are represented by the
investments in the joint venture. In a ﬁrst step the joint venture with
a unanimous sharing rule is illustrated. Then a third party decision
maker is introduced that is able to observe the investment levels and
that allocates the shares of the surplus by the means of a contest. Since
this allocation is enforceable in court, the third party's decision deter-
mines the parties' outside option and hence their bargaining power
over the surplus. By introducing the third party decision maker in this
way, the underinvestment problem is solved because the investment is
directly linked to the proﬁt. The purpose of the model is therefore
not to show that introducing a third party decision maker is beneﬁcial,
but to examine the relevance of his characteristics for resolving con-
ﬂicts in meta-organizations. Therefore, the third party decision maker
is assumed to be neutral, and to act in the interests of the parties,
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which means that this model is ignorant to his incentives. This ideal
situation serves as a benchmark for evaluating the characteristics of
the third party decision maker.
To do so, ﬁrst it is analyzed how strongly the third party decision maker
weighs investments in his decision (decision elasticity), to study the
importance of his domain knowledge. Next, certain ideality conditions
are removed. By studying the eﬀect of noisy observability, the model
illustrates the importance of non-disclosure and access to conﬁdential
evidence. Imperfect enforcement is considered in order to show the
relevance of the general and worldwide enforceability of the award.
Finally, introducing lengthy proceedings illustrates how important it
is to reach a decision quickly.
Consider two ﬁrms A and B, who jointly found a joint venture. The
joint venture is in possession of a productive asset. Because of this
ownership structure A and B jointly own the asset and, consequently,
either of them can veto its use.
Figure 4.2: Timeline of the model
In order to make use of the asset, A and B need to make relation-
speciﬁc investments a and b in period 1, which cannot be contracted ex
ante for two reasons. Firstly, the production function is unknown at t =
0, which means that no party knows the optimal levels of investment
ex ante. Secondly, while at t = 2 investment levels can be observed
by the parties of the joint venture, they cannot be veriﬁed externally
by a court. As a result, courts cannot enforce the contract of the joint
venture. Since it is not possible to contract and to enforce speciﬁc
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investment levels, the governance structure of the joint venture has
to set the proper incentives in order to stimulate eﬃcient investment
levels.
In period 2 the joint venture produces a surplus according to a pro-
duction function F (a, b) which is continuously diﬀerentiable, concave
in the investment levels and satisﬁes:
F (0, 0) = 0,
∂F
∂x
> 0,
∂2F
∂x2
< 0 ∀ x ∈ {a, b} (4.1)
Furthermore, it is assumed that the investment of both parties are
equally eﬃcient:
∂F
∂a
=
∂F
∂b
∀a = b ∈ [0,∞) (4.2)
Given these assumptions there exists a ﬁrst-best investment level that
maximizes the overall surplus F (a, b)− a− b, which satisﬁes:
∂F
∂aFB
=
∂F
∂bFB
= 1 (4.3)
The two parties' individual payoﬀs are described by the following func-
tions:
piA(a) = z(a, b|g)F (a, b)− a (4.4)
piB(b) = (1− z(a, b|g))F (a, b)− b (4.5)
Thereby z(a, b|g) describes the rule for sharing the joint surplus, which
is determined by Nash bargaining. The outside options for the par-
ties, namely the payoﬀ in case of disagreement, depend on the form
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of governance g, which can be either unanimous sharing (g = US) or
determination by third party (g = TP).
4.3.1 Unanimous Surplus Sharing
In the baseline scenario without the governance of third party decision
making the joint venture lacks a formal internal authority and hence
decisions can only be reached collectively. This collective control is due
to the fact that both parties own the joint venture jointly and hence
either can veto decisions regarding its surplus. Because of the absence
of formal authority and the consequential veto power, each party is able
to block the proﬁt distribution in case of disagreement. Consequently,
a consensus is required for the implementation of a sharing rule. This
implies that the parties' outside options in the bargaining stage are
zero. Accordingly, this simple two-person Nash-bargaining without
outside options (at t=2) leads to an equal sharing of the surplus:50
z(a, b|US) = 0.5 (4.6)
Given this sharing rule each agent only takes the marginal eﬀect on
his own proﬁt into account when he chooses his investment level:51
0.5
∂F
∂aUS
= 0.5
∂F
∂bUS
= 1 (4.7)
Notice, that the left-hand side of equation (4.7) describes the marginal
beneﬁts whereas the right-hand side describes the marginal costs of
investing. Since the marginal costs in the ﬁrst best solution are iden-
tical, the marginal beneﬁts of the ﬁrst order conditions of both (4.3)
50For a proof see Appendix C.1
51For a proof see Appendix C.2
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and (4.7) can be equalized:
0.5
∂F
∂aUS
=
∂F
∂aFB
=⇒ ∂F
∂aUS
>
∂F
∂aFB
(4.8)
0.5
∂F
∂bUS
=
∂F
∂bFB
=⇒ ∂F
∂bUS
>
∂F
∂bFB
(4.9)
Given assumption (4.1), the investment levels will be below the ﬁrst-
best solution:
aUS < aFB (4.10)
bUS < bFB (4.11)
Proposition 1. The application of unanimous surplus sharing leads
to an underinvestment by the joint venture's parties in comparison to
the ﬁrst-best solution.
4.3.2 Third Party Decision Making
With an unanimous sharing rule the parties' outside options are zero
in a dispute over the surplus. Therefore, the Nash bargaining in t = 2
between the two parties will lead to an equal sharing. However, this
sharing rule means that the parties proﬁt from the marginal product of
their investments only partially. Because of this limitation in beneﬁt of
their investments' marginal products, the parties' incentives to invest
are weaker than in the ﬁrst-best solution. This incentive issue causes
an underinvestment in the joint venture.
Third party decision making can remedy this underinvestment problem
by making the parties' outside option contingent on their investment
levels. Therefore, it is assumed that the third party decision maker is
able to observe the individual investment levels in the same manner
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as the joint venture's parties do in t = 2. This contingency allows the
parties to improve their outside option (i.e. their payoﬀ in case of dis-
agreement) by investing and accordingly sets an additional incentive
to invest. This means, while under unanimous sharing the incentive to
invest is only provided by the internalized share of the marginal prod-
uct of investment, the investment incentive under third party decision
making is twofold. On the one hand the share of the marginal product
that is internalized and on the other hand the prospect to improve
payoﬀ in the event of disagreement during the Nash bargaining stage.
This outside option improves in higher levels of investment because
in case of a dispute the third party decides about the distribution of
the surplus. Since the arbitrator does not know the optimal levels of
investment, he is bound to reward higher investments only. Applying
the rule  the more a party invests, the higher will be his share of the
surplus (4.12)  the third party decision maker makes use of his abil-
ity to observe individual investment levels. By basing his distribution
on the investment levels of the parties, the third party decision maker
creates a contest for the surplus of the joint venture that sets addi-
tional incentives to invest. These additional incentives emerge because
investing is the mean to compete this surplus-seeking contest. Because
the outside options determine the sharing in a Nash bargaining and
because the third party distributes the whole surplus, the factual shar-
ing rule z(a, b|TP) will be directly assigned by him even if no dispute
arises.52
52Since the third party decision maker determines the distribution of the surplus
in case of a dispute, the disagreement point {dA, dB} for the Nash bargaining is
given by his distribution decision. Given that the outcome of the Nash bargaining
has to satisfy the condition max (xA − dA)(xB − dB) and that the third party
assigns the whole surplus of the joint venture F (a, b) = dA+dB , it follows that the
factual distribution of the surplus as an outcome of the Nash bargaining is equal
to the distribution the third party decision maker would determine in case of a
disagreement (i.e. xA = dA and xB = dB).
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∂z
∂x
(a, b|g = TP)
> 0 if x = a< 0 if x = b (4.12)
While other views on dispute resolution usually emphasize the wasteful
activities of the contest, such as litigation costs (c.f. Schweizer, 1989),
this analysis concentrates instead on a non-wasteful mean of competi-
tion, namely the level of investment. To increase his outcome of the
contest, each party has to raise his level of investment. This raise
signals greater productivity to the decision maker, who, consequently,
awards a greater share of the surplus to the respective party. There-
fore, investing has two positive consequences for the parties' payoﬀs.
Firstly, it increases their share of the surplus and secondly, it simul-
taneously increases the joint venture's surplus itself. Because of this
instrument of competition, the eﬀorts exerted in the contest are not
wasteful but increase the contest's prize: the surplus of the joint ven-
ture (c.f. Chung, 1996).
Moreover, the third party is by assumption not biased towards any
party. Because of that, he awards the same share of the surplus to
each party if the investments are equal:
z(a, b|g = TP) = 0.5 if a = b (4.13)
The following general Tullock contest success function satisﬁes these
conditions (Hirshleifer, 1989; Skaperdas, 1996):
z(a, b|g = TP) = a
m
am + bm
(4.14)
The mass eﬀect parameter m describes the shape of the sharing rule
in relation to the relative investments of the two parties. Figure 4.3
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illustrates this for the investment of A relative to a given investment of
B. The mass eﬀect parameter indicates the elasticity of the arbitrator's
decision, which is at the point of equal investment (a = b):53
εz =
m
2
(4.15)
If m is very small (e.g. 0.1), then the third party's decision is very in-
elastic. This means, that the third party decision maker departs only
marginally from a 50:50 sharing of the surplus even if the investment
levels diﬀer dramatically and hence the contest sets only little extra
incentives to invest.54 On the contrary, if m is very large, then the de-
cision elasticity of the third party decision maker is very high. A high
decision elasticity indicates that the third party signiﬁcantly alters the
division of the surplus even if there are only minimal diﬀerences in the
investment levels. Thus, a high decision elasticity implies that the con-
test provides strong additional investment incentives. Because of this
relation between the mass eﬀect parameter and the decision elasticity,
it determines the intensity of the investment incentives that the con-
test creates. Therefore, the mass eﬀect is an important parameter for
the decision maker to set in order to balance the investment incentives
of the joint venture.
53For a proof see Appendix C.3.
54 A special case is the situation if m = 0, in this situation the third party's
decision is perfectly inelastic which means that he awards always half of the surplus
to each party irrespective of their investment levels. Since this mimics the situation
of unanimous surplus sharing, it is not further considered in the remainder of the
section.
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Figure 4.3: Mass eﬀect parameter and decision elasticity
Including the third party decision maker's sharing rule into the two
parties' individual proﬁt functions (4.4)+(4.5) and maximizing these
by choosing the investment levels, leads to the following optimality
conditions:55
mam−1bm
(am + bm)2
F (a, b) +
am
am + bm
∂F
∂a
= 1 (4.16)
mambm−1
(am + bm)2
F (a, b) +
bm
am + bm
∂F
∂b
= 1 (4.17)
Giving symmetry assumption (4.2), the investments of both parties are
equally productive and hence both parties will face symmetric objec-
tive functions. Because of this symmetry both parties will invest in
equilibrium the same amount (a = b). Therefore, equations (4.16) and
(4.17) simplify to:
55For a proof see Appendix C.4.
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m
4a
F (a) +
1
2
∂F
∂a
= 1 (4.18)
Solving for the marginal investment ∂F
∂a
leads to:
∂F
∂a
= 2− m
2a
F (a) (4.19)
From (4.7) it is known that for unanimous surplus sharing the invest-
ment level is such that ∂F
∂aN
= 2. Plugging this result into (4.19) allows
to compare the investment level under third party decision making and
unanimous surplus sharing:
∂F
∂a
=
∂F
∂aUS
− m
2a
F (a) (4.20)
If a non-zero level of investment is assumed then any m ∈ (0,∞)56
means that ∂F
∂a
< ∂F
∂aUS
. Accordingly, it can be concluded given as-
sumption (4.1) that the investment levels will be higher with third
party decision making than with unanimous surplus sharing (a > aUS
and b > bUS).
Proposition 2. If the third party decision maker sets the sharing rule
with a non-zero mass eﬀect parameter m, then third party decision
making induces additional investment incentives which increase the in-
vestment above the level of an unanimous surplus sharing rule.
Equalizing equations (4.3) and (4.18) gives the condition under which
third party decision making induces ﬁrst-best investment:
56An m = 0 would lead to a 50:50 sharing of the surplus irrespective of the
levels of investments (see supra note 54). This exactly mimics the incentives under
the non-arbitration regime and hence the investment levels would be equal in both
cases.
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m
4aFB
F (aFB) +
1
2
∂F
∂aFB
=
∂F
∂aFB
(4.21)
Solving for m:
m = 2
∂F
∂aFB
aFB
F (aFB)
= 2× εF,aFB ⇔ εF,aFB = m
2
= εz (4.22)
Where εF,aFB describes the investment elasticity of production. It can
be concluded, accordingly, that to achieve the ﬁrst-best investment
levels the investment elasticity of production must be equal to the
third party's decision elasticity. Therefore, the sharing rule under third
party decision making should be set in a way such that the elasticity
of the sharing rule is equal to the elasticity of the production in the
point of ﬁrst-best investment.
Proposition 3. Third party decision making leads to ﬁrst-best invest-
ment if the elasticity of the decision rule is equal to the elasticity of the
production in the point of ﬁrst-best investment.
The result that the elasticity of the third party's decision rule must
be equal to the investment elasticity to reach ﬁrst-best investment
levels, circumstantiates the earlier claim that the third party has to
carefully balance the incentives of the contest. If, on the one hand,
he applies a very elastic decision rule, the additional incentives might
be too strong and inveigle the parties to overinvest. On the other
hand, if the third party applies a rather inelastic rule, the investment
levels might be below ﬁrst-best. Therefore, it is important for the third
party decision maker to have expertise in the production technology in
order to successfully calibrate the additional incentives the veriﬁcation
contest sets.
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4.3.3 Noisy Observability
Besides the calibration problem, a third party decision maker could
also suﬀer from noise in his observability of the individual investment
levels. To analyze this, assume that α describes the degree of noise in
the third party decision maker's observations of the investment levels,
where α ≥ 0 (Amegashie, 2006). If α = 0 then the third party can
perfectly observe the individual investments. Thus, a α > 0 means
that the observability is noisy. The larger the degree of noise gets, the
higher is the inﬂuence of chance in the third party's decision.
z(a, b) =
am + α
am + bm + 2α
(4.23)
Taking this modiﬁed sharing function with noise and plugging it into
the parties' proﬁt functions leads to the following optimality condition
for the investment level:57
∂F
∂a
=
∂F
∂aUS
− m
2
am−1
am + α
F (a) (4.24)
In comparison to the optimality condition under no noise (4.20), in the
last term 1
a
changed to a
m−1
am+α
. To analyze this change, the sensitivity
of the fraction a
m−1
am+α
in α is examined. If there is a very low degree of
noise the fraction approaches:
lim
α→0
am−1
am + α
=
1
a
(4.25)
This matches the situation under perfect observability. However, the
larger the degree of noise gets, the lower are the additional investment
57For a proof see Appendix C.5.
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incentives the contest sets. If α becomes very large, the fraction a
m−1
am+α
approaches:
lim
α→∞
am−1
am + α
= 0 (4.26)
This implies that the last term of equation (4.24) becomes zero and
hence the investment levels under unanimous surplus sharing and un-
der third party decision making with a very high degree of noise are
equal. This means that high noise in the observability of the third
party cancels out the additional investment incentives the contest sets.
Proposition 4. If there is a very high degree of noise in the observabil-
ity of the third party decision maker, then third party decision making
fails to increase investment levels above the level of unanimous surplus
sharing.
4.3.4 Imperfect Enforcement
Another issue that could impair the eﬀectiveness of third party decision
making is the possibility that the decision maker's award cannot be
perfectly enforced. This means technically that the third party decision
maker is not able to distribute the whole surplus between the parties
and that the parties have to unanimously share the remainder. If
β ∈ [0, 1] is assumed to be the severity of the enforcement problem,
then the sharing rule changes accordingly:
z(a, b) = β × 0.5 + (1− β) a
m
am + bm
(4.27)
Taking this modiﬁed rule with imperfect enforcement and plugging
it into the parties' proﬁt functions leads to the following optimality
condition for the investment level:58
58For a proof see Appendix C.6.
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∂F
∂a
=
∂F
∂aUS
− (1− β)m
2a
F (a) (4.28)
Comparing this optimality condition to the situation under perfect en-
forcement (4.20), one can see that the enforcement problem aﬀects the
additional incentives the contest sets. If β becomes very low the invest-
ment levels approach the levels with perfect enforcement. However, if
the enforcement problem increases, the last term of (4.28) approaches:
lim
β→1
(1− β)m
2a
F (a) = 0 (4.29)
This means that the additional incentives the contest sets vanish and
hence the investment levels will be the same as under unanimous sur-
plus sharing. This intuitive result highlights the importance of the
enforceability of the third party's decision. If the decision award can-
not be enforced at all, the joint venture's parties have to revert to
unanimous surplus sharing.
Proposition 5. If it is problematic to enforce the third party's decision
award, then third party decision making fails to increase investment
levels above the level of unanimous surplus sharing.
4.3.5 Lengthy Proceedings
The eﬀectiveness of third party decision making is also compromised
when it takes a long time until a decision is reached. During such
a lengthy proceeding the surplus of the joint venture is blocked and
hence not accessible by the parties. This means that the period of time
from investment in the joint venture to the payment of the surplus is
relatively long. Investments with large gaps between investment and
repayment yield smaller real returns than other investments with equal
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nominal returns but shorter maturity. Therefore, lengthy proceedings
by the third party decision maker harm the attractiveness of the joint
venture investment and consequently cause underinvestment.
In order to formally analyze the problem lengthy proceedings generate,
assume that the parties discount future returns with the factor δ ∈
(0, 1) (this could be e.g. the parties' ﬁnances costs) and that the length
of the decision proceedings by the third party is denoted by l. Given
these assumptions the parties' proﬁt function becomes:
piA(a) = δ
l a
m
am + bm
F (a, b)− a (4.30)
Maximizing this modiﬁed proﬁt functions leads to the following opti-
mality conditions for the investment of the parties:59
∂F
∂a
=
1
δl
∂F
∂aUS
− m
2a
F (a) (4.31)
If the third party's proceedings are not lengthy l = 0, δl becomes 1
and hence the equation reﬂects the result under perfect conditions. To
analyze the parties' investment decision as the length of the proceeding
increases, the derivative of optimality condition with respect to l is
taken:
∂F 2
∂a∂l
= − 1
δl
∂F
∂aUS
log(δ) (4.32)
Since 0 < δ < 1 it follows that log(δ) < 0. Given this and the as-
sumption that the marginal investment is always positive ∂F
∂a
> 0,
equation (4.32) implies that if l increases then the marginal product
of investment increases as well. Because a larger marginal product of
59For a proof see Appendix C.7
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investment denotes a lower investment level, it can be concluded that
as the third party's proceedings get lengthier the parties invest less
into the joint venture.
Proposition 6. If the third party's proceedings to determine the shar-
ing of the surplus are lengthy, then third party decision making fails to
remedy the underinvestment problem.
4.4 Third Party Decision Making and the Bound-
aries of Meta-Organizations
The formal model in the previous section depicts the attributes  deci-
sion enforceability, latitude, information access, and fast decision mak-
ing  as crucial for third party decision makers to eﬀectively resolve
disputes within meta-organizations. These four attributes clearly dis-
tinguish alternative dispute resolution from ordinary courts and, there-
fore, indicate that third party decision making is not a sheer substitute.
Conversely, alternative dispute resolution ultimately relies on ordinary
courts for the enforcement of its decision awards, which implies that
these two are rather complements than substitutes. In this view a
decision award reminds of a board resolution, which executes the deci-
sion authority of the entire organization but at the same time seizes its
factual power from the fact that it can be enforced in court if necessary.
Considering the enforceability attribute in view of the power boundary
conception (Santos and Eisenhardt, 2005), indicates that third party
decision making lays within the boundaries of meta-organizations. By
the means of third party decision making the meta-organization re-
tains control over the resolution of internal conﬂicts because it au-
tonomously selects the third party and also determines the procedural
rules of dispute resolution. Equipped with this decision power the
meta-organization ensures its sphere of inﬂuence on internal conﬂicts.
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This inﬂuence is supported by the non-disclosure of dispute-related
information by the third party decision maker, which secures that in-
ternal disputes are not becoming publicly known and hence the meta-
organization can maintain its public image.
Not only the meta-organization is free in choosing the desired dispute
resolution but also the appointed third party is usually granted ample
leeway by the procedural rules. This latitude in the decision making
process allows the third party to decide in favor of what he believes are
the business interests of the meta-organization. In an analogous man-
ner the board of directors in a classical organization is only bound by
basic internal rules and the rather fundamental rules of corporate law.
The business judgment rule gives the board considerable discretion in
deﬁning the business strategy and hence preserving the organization's
sphere of inﬂuence. In this respect, the latitude attribute indicates
that third party decision making lays within the power boundaries of
meta-organizations.
While enforceability and latitude concern the power boundaries of
meta-organizations, information access and fast decision making, as
further attributes of third party decision making, should be assessed
by means of the competence boundary conception (Santos and Eisen-
hardt, 2005). In respect to the access to business information, alter-
native dispute resolution reﬂects rather the attributes of a board of
directors than of ordinary courts. The board of directors of a classical
organization usually consists of managers with expertise in the industry
of the organization that are able to evaluate business-related informa-
tion while judges in ordinary courts are legal experts. Expertise in the
meta-organization's industry provides third party decision making with
the competence to assess business-related information more accurately
than only legal expertise would permit. This information competence
is strengthened by the fact a third party decision maker can more eas-
ily access relevant business-information. Because of the conﬁdentiality
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of the alternative-dispute-resolution proceedings, the parties are able
to share trade secrets of the meta-organization and to use them for
their argumentation. In front of an ordinary court these information,
in contrast, cannot be presented as evidence since this would endan-
ger the meta-organization's trade secrets. Therefore, the information
competences of third party decision making are more similar to those
of internal governance institutions, such as the board of directors, than
they are to the information competences of external governance.
Fast decision making, as the second attribute that relates to the meta-
organization's competence boundary, pinpoints likewise that the func-
tion of third party decision making rather reﬂects the function of the
board than of ordinary courts. While courts require time for their
proceedings, the board of directors is able to pass resolutions on short
notice. This allows the organization to adapt to changing conditions
in a dynamic business environment. This competence of adaptability
is seized by the meta-organization by the use of alternative dispute
resolution. The short-term decision making process of the third party
facilitates fast resolution of internal conﬂicts and hence ensures that the
meta-organization can quickly adapt to dynamic market conditions.
Discussing these four characteristic attributes shows that third party
decision making operates within the power and the competence bound-
aries of meta-organizations. Moreover, the comparison with the board
of directors and with ordinary courts reveals more similarities with in-
ternal than with external governance institutions. Therefore, conﬂict
resolution by third party decision making should be considered an in-
ternal governance device of meta-organizations. It is integral to the
design because internal conﬂict resolution gives the meta-organization
a competitive advantage over market-based contractual-relationships
between organizations.
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4.5 Integral Part of Meta-Organizations
This chapter argues that third party decision making should be con-
sidered as an integral part of meta-organizations. This view shifts the
analysis of third party decision making from mainly legal and contrac-
tual questions towards questions of organization design. By taking an
organizational design perspective, the chapter applies a formal anal-
ysis to identify the relevant attributes of a third party to become an
eﬀective decision making body. Thereby it becomes apparent that con-
trolling the reward distribution function is a decisive element for the
success of meta-organizations.
The chapter underpins its argument by focusing on joint ventures that
use commercial arbitration to settle disputes between the parties. This
example has been selected because joint ventures are very prominent
for inter-ﬁrm collaboration. Commercial arbitration addresses the is-
sue of cooperation better than other forms of third party decision mak-
ing, and it is no wonder that it is very appealing for joint ventures.
Moreover, in an international context, arbitration has several institu-
tional advantages over ordinary courts such as no home country bias,
enforcement according to the New York convention, greater latitude in
decision making, and better observability.
While arbitration in international joint ventures is an illustrative ex-
ample, it is not the only case in which third party decision making is
used in meta-organizations. Every interaction between self-interested
agents poses the risk of a dispute about tasks, performance and proﬁt
sharing. Meta-organizations are no exception, conversely, they might
be even more prone to ﬁerce disputes due to their lack of formal
authority. Therefore, it is not surprising that third party decision
making has become an attractive governance mechanism for meta-
organizations. Moreover new forms of organization (Puranam et al.,
2014) use third party decision making to settle disputes between their
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members (c.f. O'Mahony and Ferraro, 2007). The dispute resolution
policy of Wikipedia, for example, formulates that third party decision
making is required in the last stage of a dispute resolution process.
There third party decision making assumes the form of an arbitration
committee, whose members are third parties to the dispute but not to
Wikipedia.60
Third party decision makers in a meta-organization are third party to
the dispute they are resolving but this does not mean that they are nec-
essarily third party to the organization itself. In this regard, it seems
reasonable to consider the opposite, namely that third party decision
making, when adopted, is an integral part of the meta-organization.
It is the glue that ﬁxes the sometimes capricious contractual relations
of meta-organizations when there is not only one locus of power. By
the same token third party decision making is a vehicle to stabilize
meta-organizations and to reap their speciﬁc beneﬁts, while vertical
integration or stand-alone production are only second best solutions in
a globalized world with fragmented knowledge bases.
60For the Wikipedia dispute resolution policy see https://en.wikipedia.org/
w/index.php?title=Wikipedia:Dispute_resolution&oldid=673659518 and for
the Wikipedia arbitration committee see https://en.wikipedia.org/w/index.
php?title=Wikipedia:Arbitration_Committee&oldid=675583118 - accessed on
August 11, 2015.
5 | Selection of
Meta-Organizations61
5.1 Cooperation in Research Joint Ventures
The previous chapter considered third-party decision making as a gov-
ernance mechanism to resolve disputes and balance the interests of the
parties involved in a meta-organization. Taking a step back, however,
rather than resolving conﬂicts it is usually better to avoid them. This
raises the question how conﬂicts can be avoided in the speciﬁc context
of meta-organizations.
One aspect that may help to avoid conﬂicts is to have a homogeneous
group of members to the meta-organization, who are committed to
the system-level goal of the meta-organization and who have similar
attributes towards cooperation. To obtain such a homogeneous and
cooperative group, governance mechanisms are required that enable
the parties sort within the meta-organization according to the cor-
respondence with the goal of the meta-organization, as well as their
attributes towards cooperation. This way, uncooperative parties or
those with a diﬀerent goal can be sorted out. Such a mechanism is not
61Financial support from the Gesellschaft für experimentelle Wirtschafts-
forschung in the form of the Heinz Sauermann-Förderpreis 2015 is gratefully ac-
knowledged.
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only beneﬁcial from the perspective of the meta-organization but also
from the side of the individual party, who able to select the particular
meta-organization that suits his characteristics best from the pool of
potential meta-organizations (Yan and Luo, 2001, 19-20).
Of course, such a soft governance mechanism as group selection is more
important in some environments than in others. In meta-organizations
where the obligations and the beneﬁts of the individual parties can
be precisely speciﬁed, a contractual speciﬁcation in combination with
hard governance mechanisms such as third-party decision making may
be more appropriate. An example could be franchises, in which both
parties may be primarily interested in the ﬁnancial costs and beneﬁts
involved, so that the common goal is relatively clear and the ﬁnancial
speciﬁcations can be agreed upon with relative ease at the start of the
cooperation. Conversely, one could also think of various types of meta-
organizations for which this is not the case. For instance, members of
an industry alliance that sets common standards may have more diﬃ-
culty specifying the exact goal and contributions at the outset. While
all the members of the alliance might share the system-level goal that
a common standards should be deﬁned for the industry, there might
be conﬂicting interests regarding its exact speciﬁcation. The beneﬁts
of each individual party may therefore also diﬀer depending on the
solution that is ultimately chosen by the industry alliance. Although
it would be possible to apply third-party decision making to balance
these conﬂicting interests, it might not be the preferred governance
mechanism for this situation. A more practical solution may be to
foster cooperation between the members of the meta-organization. To
achieve this, it might be more adequate to employ a governance mech-
anism that allows the parties to select a meta-organization of members
with similar attributes.
Another example where the governance mechanism of group selection
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is highly relevant is research and development joint ventures.62 In
our contemporary, technology-driven economy, agents regularly need
to cooperate in groups rather than by individual eﬀorts in order to
achieve virtuous outcomes. Research joint ventures are special legal
vehicles, funded by multiple companies, with the purpose of conducting
collaborative research and development. This cooperative eﬀort fosters
technological development because within the group, knowledge and
talent from diﬀerent parties are combined.
Despite their catalyzing eﬀects on technological progress, research joint
ventures are vulnerable to the public good problem. Collective re-
search in joint ventures shares the two main characteristics of public
good games, namely voluntary private contribution to and collective
beneﬁts from the group eﬀort. Furthermore, it is not possible to for-
mally enforce all necessary contributions to the Joint Venture because
they cannot be perfectly deﬁned in a contract. While formal payments
to the Joint Venture can be contracted, the transfer of crucial knowl-
edge or the assignment of skilled people (i.e. the level of eﬀorts) is
not contractible since these allocations are not externally observable.
Consequently, the essential contributions to the Joint Venture can be
considered as voluntary.
All cooperating companies proﬁt from the developments of the joint
venture. These technical enhancements typically result in patents,
which can be utilized by all cooperation partners. Even if the Joint
Venture is not able to obtain any patent, technological enhancements
are indirectly absorbed by all participating companies. As a result of
this mechanism, it is not possible to exclude any partner from the joint
venture's outcomes and thus all beneﬁt from its outcomes.
Given these two characteristics, an research joint ventures between
diﬀerent companies can be formally described as a public good game.
62For an overview discussion see Vonortas (1997b, x-xi).
100
However, one should not consider a joint venture as a standard one-shot
public good game. Firstly, repeated interaction between the cooper-
ating companies is possible because the development process may en-
counter diﬀerent stages with intermediate results or because the joint
venture is intended to develop diﬀerent technologies one after each
other.
Secondly, the composition of the group operating the joint venture
will not be ﬁxed and exogenously given. Usually companies have a
certain level of freedom to choose with whom they want to found a joint
venture, although this choice is limited to those companies that have a
similar development scope. Nevertheless, this introduces a choice stage
to the public good game, in which reputation plays a key role.
Lastly, research cooperation seeking companies are able to participate
in multiple joint ventures at the same time.63 They are free to start a
joint venture with company A and another with company B. This par-
allelism can serve diﬀerent purposes; an important example for these
seems to be the opportunity to test diﬀerent partners because the right
group composition is seen crucial to the success of the research joint
ventures (Yan and Luo, 2001, 37-41; Tsakanikas and Caloghirou, 2004,
91). However, each company always has to manage its limited re-
sources when engaging in the market for research and development
cooperation and hence is only capable to undertake a limited number
of research joint ventures in parallel.
Applying standard economic theory to analyze research joint ventures
as a public good problem leads to the result that no rational agent
contributes to its production because the individual beneﬁts are lower
than the individual cost. In contrast to this non-contribution predic-
tion, there is robust evidence that people cooperate in public good
63Vonortas (1997a) reports that in the time between 1985 and 1995 more than
30% of the companies, which were registered with the US Department of Justice
as participating in research joint ventures, were engaged in more than one research
joint venture.
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experiments.64 One important factor for cooperation in these experi-
ments is that some subjects are conditionally cooperative. Conditional
cooperators are willing to contribute to the public good if they believe
the other subjects will contribute as well (Fischbacher et al., 2001).
For the emergence of such a belief an environment is necessary that
oﬀers the possibility to build up a reputation for cooperation. Settings
that allow for reputation building usually contain repeated interactions
in which the subjects are able to identify their cooperation partners
(Keser and van Winden, 2000). As a result, conditionally cooperative
subjects contribute to the public good despite the theoretical predic-
tion of free-riding.
Another environmental aspect that fosters the contribution of condi-
tionally cooperative subjects is distinct boundary rules (Ostrom, 2009,
194-199). These rules allow the subjects to determine the group that is
participating in the production of the public good, which increases the
level of cooperation for two reasons. Firstly, an appropriate group for-
mation mechanism improves the matching of conditional cooperators
by excluding uncooperative agents ex-ante (Page et al., 2005; Char-
ness and Yang, 2014). Secondly, the threat of expulsion from the group
works as a non-monetary punishment mechanism that also incentivizes
subjects with a lower willingness to cooperate ex-post (Cinyabuguma
et al., 2005). In other words, a distinct set of entry- and exit-rules af-
fects the average level of contribution in public good games positively
(Ahn et al., 2008, 2009).
However, the boundary mechanisms that have been experimentally
tested so far could be too artiﬁcial to reﬂect the market for research
and development cooperation. This is because they employ rigid rules
to manage the composition of the group. In contrast, a more market-
like mechanism would on the one hand give freedom of partner choice
but on the other hand would refrain from over emphasizing the possi-
64For an overview see Ledyard (1995) and Chaudhuri (2011).
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bility of re-formation. A mechanism that could solve this contrast is
to oﬀer each subject a choice between multiple, parallel public good
games with diﬀerent compositions of players. This choice allows the
subject to select the group(s) he is willing to participate in. Hence, a
conditional cooperator is able to choose the group partners which he
believes are the most cooperative. This boundary mechanism reﬂects
more adequately reality where agents usually face diﬀerent options in
which they can participate.65
Moreover, to reﬂect reality more appropriately the subjects should
not be completely unconstrained in their choice between the diﬀer-
ent games. On the contrary, the subject should be limited by ﬁxed
resources, as a company on the market for research and development
cooperation is. This choice constraint can be established in an experi-
ment by a common endowment over all games (Bernasconi et al., 2009;
McCarter et al., 2014). With such a ﬁxed budget, the subject's ability
to contribute in diﬀerent games is capped. As a result, two opposing
eﬀects of greater choice can be deduced. On the one hand, greater
choice increases the ex-ante matching as well as the ex-post threat of
expulsion (sorting eﬀect). Therefore, the contribution level should rise.
On the other hand, a greater choice of public goods ampliﬁes the prob-
lem of coordination between cooperative subjects (coordination eﬀect),
which should negatively aﬀect the contribution level (Corazzini et al.,
2013).
An analysis of these opposing eﬀects is interesting because it enhances
65In the terminology of Hirschman (1970), who distinguishes the concepts voice,
loyalty and exit as possible responses of a member to an organization demonstrating
a decrease in quality or beneﬁt to this member, the mechanism in this chapter
focuses on the concept exit. Its intention is to study the impact on the cooperation
of the latent threat of ultimately withdrawing from the relationship. To achieve
a meaningful result for this question, the two other concepts by Hirschman are
omitted. Nonetheless, these concepts are important to an holistic understanding of
cooperation in meta-organizations. To judge which of these concepts is the most
important, is a complicated and delicate task and therefore shall not be attempted
here.
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the understanding of the gradient of the cooperation level for the pro-
duction of public goods as a function of choice. This understanding
can help policy makers that seek to promote cooperation by the mean
of partner choice. If, for instance, the gradient is continuously upwards
sloping, then every increase in the amount of possible partners raises
the overall level of cooperation and hence the policy should focus on
increasing choice as much as possible. On the contrary, if the gradient
of the function reaches a maximum at a certain point, then the policy
maker should ﬁrst attempt to estimate this maximal point and then
implement a policy that concentrates on maintaining this optimal level
of partner options. Therefore, it is important to understand the rela-
tive magnitudes of the underlying eﬀects of greater choice if it should
be used as a means to foster cooperation for the production of public
goods.
This importance can be illustrated by the means of an example; when
countries liberalize their foreign investment laws, this inter alia en-
larges the pool for the selection of partners for research and develop-
ment. A report by the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and
Development (OECD) of 2008 ﬁnds evidence that trade liberalization
has encouraged cooperation in research and development. In particu-
lar, this OECD report suggests that trade liberalization has played a
signiﬁcant role in the dramatic increase in research and development
of the last decades.66 However, it is debatable if a direct relation be-
tween the pool of possible cooperation partners and the overall level of
cooperation perpetuates. Ghosh and Lim (2013) conclude that trade
costs, or coordination costs, are essential for the link between trade
liberalization and cooperation between ﬁrms, ﬁnding that ﬁrms coop-
erate more when these coordination costs are low. To provide another
insight into further policy discussions this chapter tries to deepen the
66See: Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development, 'OECD Sci-
ence, Technology and Industry Outlook 2008', OECD Publishing, Paris. Page 3.
http://www.oecd.org/berlin/41820706.pdf - accessed on April 23, 2016.
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understanding of the mechanism of increased choices for promoting
cooperation in public good dilemmas.
5.2 Studying cooperation with laboratory experi-
ments
Despite the theoretical prediction, cooperation between subjects is
widely observed in public good experiments (Ledyard, 1995; Chaud-
huri, 2011). The most prominent theory to explain cooperation in
public good experiments is conditional cooperation (Fischbacher et al.,
2001; Keser and van Winden, 2000). This theory states that a certain
share of subjects in a public good experiment behaves conditionally
cooperative. This means that these subjects are willing to cooperate
by contributing to the production of the public good if the others do
so as well.
Given the theory of conditional cooperation, a means to establish co-
operation in a public good experiment is to sort subjects according
to their attitude towards cooperation (Chaudhuri, 2011, 72-77). The
principal idea behind this consideration is that if cooperative and non-
cooperative subjects are sorted into separate groups, then the condi-
tionally cooperative subjects only interact among their kind. In such a
homogeneous-cooperative group, these subjects' condition to cooperate
is met and hence cooperation will emerge between them.
The argumentation that cooperation levels are higher in sorted groups
was conﬁrmed by studies that applied an exogenous sorting mechanism
(Gächter and Thöni, 2005; Gunnthorsdottir et al., 2007; de Oliveira
et al., 2015; Burlando and Guala, 2005) as well as by studies that ap-
plied an endogenous sorting mechanism (Cinyabuguma et al., 2005;
Page et al., 2005; Charness and Yang, 2014; Ahn et al., 2008, 2009;
Gürerk et al., 2014). While the studies with an exogenous sorting
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mechanism aimed to establish that sorted groups are more coopera-
tive, the studies with endogenous sorting also tested whether subjects
are able to form such sorted, cooperative groups by themselves. How-
ever, the sorting mechanism in these endogenous-sorting studies was
mostly salient to the subjects and relatively formalized, in contrast to
real-life group sorting interactions which are rarely governed by formal
rules. Therefore, studying a less salient and rather informal sorting
mechanism would improve our understanding of how sorting leads to
voluntary cooperation in real-life transactions.
In real-life situations that require cooperation - such as in an organiza-
tion - agents often encounter a limited set of potential group projects
and face limited resources such as time. Therefore, these agents have
to choose to which group project(s) to allocate their scarce resources.
This situation-induced group-choice leads the agents to self-sort to-
wards the most cooperative, hence promising, group project(s). This
type of choice situation can be reﬂected in an experimental design
which assigns subjects into multiple, parallel public good games that
consist of diﬀerent members (c.f. McCarter et al., 2014; Bernasconi
et al., 2009; Corazzini et al., 2015). In this game setup, the subjects
are able to choose among the parallel group projects. In order to in-
duce a choice between these projects, the group projects are set up
as substitutes which is implemented by a common budget constraint.
This allows subjects with a cooperative attitude to self-sort into the
group projects that are more cooperative. Therefore, presenting sub-
jects with a group-choice positively aﬀects the level of cooperation by
means of sorting.
Besides this positive sorting eﬀect, having to choose between multiple
group projects also requires coordination between cooperative subjects.
The reason is that these conditional cooperators not only have to signal
their cooperative attitude and identify other conditional cooperators,
but also have to collectively engage in the respective group project.
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This coordination problem in a group-choice setting can impair the
level of cooperation (Corazzini et al., 2015). Consequently, a choice
between diﬀerent groups also causes a coordination eﬀect which nega-
tively aﬀects the level of cooperation.
The experiment reported in this paper analyzes the trade-oﬀ of group
choice between improved sorting and the increased necessity of coordi-
nation. It aims to provide a deeper understanding of the sorting eﬀect
and the coordination eﬀect of choosing among diﬀerent groups for the
production of a public good. Therefore, the ﬁrst treatment variable
of the experiment is the amount of group projects that each subject
is participating in, which is either one (G1) as baseline or four (G4)
as group-choice treatment. In order to disentangle the two eﬀects the
study applies as a second treatment variable two diﬀerent contribution
mechanisms to the public good: On the one hand a voluntary contri-
bution mechanism (VCM), which serves as the baseline that triggers
the sorting as well as the coordination eﬀect. And on the other hand
a weakest-link contribution mechanism (WL), which is a pure coordi-
nation game and hence mainly evokes the coordination eﬀect.67 This
2 × 2 design allows to test group choice as a mechanism to sustain
cooperation and, moreover, to study the coordination eﬀect separately
from the sorting eﬀect.
5.3 Cooperation in sorted groups
Ledyard (1995) surveys the existing experimental literature on public
good games (PGG) until the mid-nineties. He identiﬁes, as the main
ﬁndings of the literature, a signiﬁcant amount of voluntary coopera-
tion is observed in one-shot as well as in repeated games. Average
67In the literature, the name minimum-eﬀort coordination game is used as a
synonym for the weakest-link game.
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contributions in the experiments range from 30% to 70% of endow-
ment; however, the individual contributions are very heterogeneous
and cover the whole strategy set from zero to full contribution. Fac-
tors that improve cooperation are communication between subjects,
threshold or provision points, and higher marginal per capita return
(MPCR). Finally, Ledyard concludes that there are three types of sub-
jects: Nash players that are self-regarding as predicted by the theory
(free-riders), players that are also self-regarding given suﬃcient high
stakes but with the tendency towards mistaking due to decision costs
and other-regarding preferences, and ﬁnally players with inexplicable
(irrational) behavior.
Since the Ledyard survey, one major branch of the literature has been
concerned with studying and identifying the diﬀerent types of sub-
jects, which vary in their other-regarding preferences and their beliefs
regarding peers. The most prominent and most studied of these types
is the conditional cooperator, who exhibits a behavior of willingness
to cooperate provided that the other players cooperate as well (Keser
and van Winden, 2000; Fischbacher et al., 2001; Gächter, 2007).
In their seminal paper Fischbacher et al. (2001) analyzed diﬀerent
contribution functions and deﬁned four diﬀerent behavioral types of
subjects in public good experiments: Conditional cooperators, Free
riders, 'Hump-shaped' (mixture between Conditional cooperators and
Free riders), and Others. This categorization was later used for similar
studies, which were conducted in diﬀerent environments (Fischbacher
and Gachter, 2010; Herrmann and Thöni, 2008; Kocher et al., 2008).
Given the theory of conditional cooperation, a homogeneous group of
only conditional cooperators should reach higher contribution levels
than heterogeneous groups or groups of only free-rider types. This
means that a mechanism to create homogeneity within group social
dilemmas could foster cooperation among cooperative agents. The
most straightforward approach to test this hypothesis is to sort people
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(according to their cooperation type) into diﬀerent groups exogenously
and then to compare the levels of cooperation in the diﬀerent groups.
This was done ﬁrst by Gächter and Thöni (2005). Their experimen-
tal design consists of two stages. The ﬁrst was a classiﬁcation stage
(ranking experiment) to determine the subjects' cooperation types.
This was done with a one-shot linear PGG in randomly formed groups
of three without any feedback.68 For the second stage subjects were
sorted into groups to minimize the distance between their contribu-
tions in the ﬁrst stage, i.e. the three most contributing subjects in the
classiﬁcation stage formed a group etc.
After this formation of groups, the subjects were informed about the
grouping mechanism. This notiﬁcation included information about
their new group members as well as information about how much they
contributed in the prior stage. Furthermore, the subjects were in-
formed that they are playing the complete second stage with this group.
Then the newly formed groups played ten-round repeated linear PGG
with constant group membership.
The authors found a signiﬁcantly higher contribution level than in
the baseline treatment with random group forming. Additionally, the
study applied a punishment protocol, in which the subjects had the
opportunity to costly punish the other group members in the second
stage. This modiﬁcation had no positive inﬂuence on the contribu-
tion in the sorted treatment but improved cooperation in the random
groups.
Another mechanism to establish homogeneous groups in a repeated
public good game is used by Gunnthorsdottir et al. (2007).69 In com-
parison to Gächter and Thöni (2005), the authors do not apply a sin-
68MPCR = 0.6; Group size= 3; rounds = 10; contribution feedback after each
round.
69MPCR = 0.3, 0.5, 0.75; Group size = 4; rounds = 10; only own earnings
feedback after each round.
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gular classiﬁcation stage but re-match the groups after each round
is played. The re-matching procedure is done in two diﬀerent ways,
which represent the diﬀerent treatments. In the sorted treatment, sub-
jects are re-grouped depending on their contribution at the end of each
round. As a baseline, a random treatment is used, where subjects are
randomly re-matched into diﬀerent groups after each round. To avoid
strategic behavior, subjects are not informed about how the groups are
formed. Both treatments were tested for three diﬀerent MPCR (0.3,
0.5, 0.75).
The authors found a signiﬁcantly higher contribution level and a slower
decay in contributions among sorted groups than among random groups.
Based on their data, the authors argue that the higher contribution
level in the sorted treatment is due to the reduced number of interac-
tions between (conditional) cooperators and free-riders. Additionally,
the data shows that the more free-riders a cooperative subject meets
on average per round, the higher the rate of decay in his contribution
level is. Therefore, the authors conclude that the faster decay in the
random treatment is driven by the higher number of interactions a
cooperative type faces with free-riders.
De Oliveira et al. (2015) use a similar design as Gächter and Thöni
(2005). However, for the classiﬁcation they use the taxonomy by Fis-
chbacher et al. (2001). Additionally, the type elicitation was performed
over the Internet some days before the second stage of the experiment.
In the second stage the subjects were matched in groups of three to
play a repeated linear public good game with constant membership.70
The matching creates either homogeneous (either only conditional co-
operators or only selﬁsh players) or heterogeneous groups (two players
of one type and one of the other) according to their type in the clas-
siﬁcation stage. Whether the subjects know if they are in a homo- or
70MPCR = 0.5; Group size = 3; rounds = 15; only own earnings feedback after
each round.
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heterogeneous group depends on the treatment. In the known distri-
bution treatment, the subjects are informed about the composition of
their group, whereas in the unknown distribution treatment they are
not.
In line with the previous literature, contributions in homogeneous con-
ditional cooperator groups are signiﬁcantly higher than in the het-
erogeneous and homogeneous free-rider groups. Interestingly, for the
homogeneous conditional cooperators the contributions are higher in
the known distribution treatment than in the unknown distribution
treatment. This suggests that information about the group members'
attitude towards cooperation is an important factor in group social
dilemmas.
Burlando and Guala (2005) also used a two-stage design to ﬁrst cate-
gorize the subjects and then construct homogeneous groups. However,
they applied a more complex mechanism for the classiﬁcation stage
consisting of four diﬀerent methods: Strategy method (Fischbacher
et al., 2001), Decomposed Game Technique (Oﬀerman et al., 1996),
measures of behavior in repeated PGG (Burlando and Webley, 1999),
and a questionnaire. An important feature of this study is that the
second stage was conducted in a later session, a week after the ﬁrst.
There the subjects played a repeated linear public good game in homo-
geneous groups.71 Burlando and Guala also found higher contribution
levels in homogeneous groups. Additionally, the data suggests that
there is a stable level of relatively high contribution (almost no decay)
in homogeneous groups of cooperators and conditional cooperators.
However, as Chaudhuri (2011, 2009) argues, in most real-life situations
we can choose the groups of people we are interacting with. If we are
free to choose who we cooperate with, we also have the possibility
to exclude someone from the group if we no longer want to cooperate
71MPCR = 0.5; Group size = 4; rounds = 20 (+3); feedback: own total earnings,
own earnings last round, and average contribution level of the group.
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with him. This can be seen as a form of non-monetary punishment that
deters subjects from free-riding on the group's eﬀorts. Cinyabuguma
et al. (2005) evaluate cooperation levels under the threat of expulsion
in a repeated public good game.72 Their design allows subjects to ex-
pel members from the groups after each round by majority vote. In
their expulsion treatment contributions rose to almost 100% of the en-
dowment and accordingly, contribution was signiﬁcantly higher than in
the baseline treatment without expulsion. This supports the intuitive
conclusion that the threat of expulsion deters subjects from free-riding.
This ﬁnding raises the question of the inﬂuence of the endogenous for-
mation mechanism in general on contribution levels in repeated public
good games. In Page et al. (2005) the authors applied an experimental
design with an endogenous formation mechanism to analyze coopera-
tion in a repeated public good game.73 The group (re)-formation was
done at periodic intervals. After a certain number of rounds played,
the subjects were informed about the contribution history of all other
subjects in their session. Given this information, the subjects had to
state a preference-ranking of all other individuals for the next interval.
The re-formation was not done by satisfying the subjects' individual
preferences as good as possible by grouping the 4 individuals with the
highest overall ranking together etc. The subjects were informed about
their new group members' contribution history and then continued to
play the PGG in their newly formed group.
In comparison to the baseline treatment with random re-matching,
the average contribution increased signiﬁcantly. Additionally, the au-
thors included a monetary punishment mechanism for both treatments,
which allowed for costly punishment after each round played. The data
reveals a similar contribution pattern for the re-grouping without pun-
72MPCR = 0.2; Group size initially= 16; rounds = 15; contribution feedback
after each round.
73MPCR = 0.4; Group size = 4; rounds = 20; individual contribution feedback
after each round.
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ishment and the punishment without re-grouping treatment but with a
stronger endgame eﬀect in the only re-grouping treatment. The highest
average contribution level was achieved in the sessions with a combined
punishment and re-grouping treatment.
Charness and Yang (2014) use a more complex matching mechanism
to study endogenous group formation. In a repeated public good game
subjects are randomly matched into groups of three.74 After an interval
of 3 periods the re-matching mechanism starts. First, all subjects
receive information about the individual contribution in their group
and average contribution level in the other groups. After that, the
subjects have the option to voluntarily leave their group. Then the
remaining members can decide to expel someone from the group by
majority vote. Finally, remaining groups and single subjects have the
opportunity to merge. At this juncture, mutual agreement (at least
60% of both sides must approve the merger) is required to conduct the
merger. After the re-matching the newly formed groups continue with
the PGG for the next interval.
The design includes three diﬀerent treatments: A baseline treatment
with ﬁxed groups of diﬀerent sizes (3, 6, 9), a re-matching treatment
with increasing returns to group size, and a re-matching treatment
with increasing but capped returns to group size. In both treatments,
increasing as well as capped, the average contribution level was signif-
icantly higher than in the baseline. Furthermore, the increasing treat-
ment had slightly but signiﬁcantly higher average contribution levels
than the capped treatment. In addition, subjects in the increasing
treatment formed larger groups than in the capped treatment.
In a set of two related papers Ahn et al. (2008, 2009) study the ef-
fects of endogenous group formation on normal (Ahn et al., 2008) and
74MPCR depending on group size and treatment; Group size: initially = 3,
minimum = 1, maximum = 9; rounds = 15+15; contribution feedback after each
round.
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congestible public goods (Ahn et al., 2009).75 In the ﬁrst experiment
with a normal public good, the payoﬀ function is chosen in a way to
set incentives to form larger groups. On the contrary, with the modiﬁ-
cation of congestible public goods in the later paper, an optimal group
size becomes crucial. In both studies, the authors tested the impact
of three entry and exit rules: free entry and exit (baseline), restricted
entry (i.e. entering subjects had to be approved by present group
members by majority vote), and restricted exit (i.e. subjects could
only leave a group if this was approved by the other group members
by majority vote). The results of both papers show that under the
restricted entry regime the average contribution level was higher than
in the two others. Additionally, the second study reveals that for the
congestible public good restricted entry rules lead to higher earnings
for cooperative individuals and a higher likeliness of the formation of
groups with optimal size.
Gürerk et al. (2014) use a public good game environment with endoge-
nous group formation to analyze how subjects self-select into groups
with diﬀerent institutional settings. The design consists of two diﬀer-
ent groups (`communities') that play a repeated public good game.76
In one group, the subjects have the possibility to costly punish mon-
etarily other members after each round; in the other group they do
not. Before each round, subjects can choose in which group they want
to play this round (i.e. subjects are able to change the group every
round). The data show that the group with the punishment institu-
tion has high contribution rates and grows over time. This allows for
the following interpretation: in the beginning cooperative types use
the punishment group as a device to signal their cooperative attitude.
Later, other subjects learn that cooperation leads to high payoﬀs and
join the punishment group as well. Free-riding does not occur because
75Group size: minimum = 1, maximum = 12; rounds = 20; contribution feedback
after each round.
76MPCR depending on group size (MPCR ≈ 1.6 / n); Group size: minimum =
1, maximum = 12; rounds = 30; contribution feedback after each round.
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non-cooperator types are deterred by the potential punishment.
Conversely, Falk et al. (2013) do not apply a mechanism of endogenous
group formation but they study the eﬀect of social interaction by using
a novel design where subjects play an economically identical game in
two diﬀerent groups at the same time.77 With this design the authors
are able to infer the eﬀects of social interaction on behavior because this
is the only variable that changes across the two games. The authors
ﬁnd that there is a substantial eﬀect of social interaction on subjects'
behavior in a social dilemma.
The design of Bernasconi et al. (2009, henceforward BCKM) has no
mechanism to form groups but in the experiment the subjects have
the choice between two diﬀerent public goods.78 This means that the
subjects in the treatment group had to decide how to distribute their
round endowment among the two games and their private account.79
As a result, the subjects could decide to which degree they were willing
to participate in each of the public good games. However, this choice
was not a speciﬁc choice of group because the groups were randomly
rematched after each round. The purpose of this design was it to test
if unpacking a single public good game into two equal games promotes
contributions and hence cooperation. The results suggest that there
is a positive "unpacking eﬀect" (Rottenstreich and Tversky, 1997 as
cited in Bernasconi et al., 2009, 31) but the cooperative eﬀort is still
suﬀering from the decay in contributions over time.
McCarter et al. (2014, henceforward MSS) use a design that com-
bines the approach of Falk et al. (2013), where subjects play identical
public good games in two diﬀerent groups, with the common budget
77MPCR = 0.6; Group size = 3; rounds = 20 ; aggregated and individual outcome
feedback each round.
78MPCR = 0.5; Group size= 4; rounds = 12; aggregated contribution feedback
after each round.
79I.e. endowment = contribution game 1 + contribution game 2 + private ac-
count.
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constraint for two games of BCKM to contrast the divided loyalties
and the conditional cooperation perspective. This leads to a design,
in which subjects play two economically equal repeated public good
games in parallel but with a common endowment (single budget con-
straint) for both games.80 In the baseline the composition of the two
groups was equal for both games, whereas in the treatment the groups
consist of diﬀerent members. This group composition remains constant
during the entire experiment.
The results show that the average contributions are signiﬁcantly higher
when the subjects are playing the two games with diﬀerent groups.
Moreover, the data suggests that subjects in the diﬀerent-groups treat-
ment shift their contribution towards the game with the larger average
contribution. This result induces the interpretation that subjects with
a cooperative attitude concentrate their resources in the more cooper-
ative environment.
On the contrary, Corazzini et al. (2015) reach the conclusion that play-
ing multiple public good games in parallel has a negative impact on
contribution levels because it increases the diﬃculty of coordinating
among subjects. In their study Corazzini et al. compare contributions
to a single (baseline) threshold public good game with contributions to
multiple threshold public good games.81 In the multiple games setting
the subjects have to distribute their round endowment between four
diﬀerent games (in contrast to two in BCKM and MSS). The authors
apply three diﬀerent treatments in their design. In the equally-eﬃcient
treatment all four games have the same bonus for achieving the thresh-
old (equal to the single game baseline bonus). In the more-eﬃcient
(less-eﬃcient) treatment this bonus is higher (lower) for one of the
four games. There is no re-matching of groups during the experiment.
80MPCR = 0.4; Group size = 4; rounds = 20; aggregated contribution feedback
after each round.
81MPCR = 0.5; Group size = 4; rounds = 12; earnings feedback after each round.
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The authors ﬁnd that contributions are higher in the single game base-
line than in the two multiple games treatments equally-eﬃcient and
more-eﬃcient.82 Moreover, the results suggest that subjects tend to
concentrate their contributions to the more eﬃcient game (if appli-
cable). While this second result is in line with the ﬁndings of MSS
and BCKM, the ﬁrst that contributions are higher in the single game
baseline is in conﬂict with them. An explanation for this diﬀerence
in results could be the contribution mechanism to the public good. In
contrast to a voluntary contribution mechanism, which was used in the
previous studies, Corazzini et al. use a threshold contribution mecha-
nism. This design with substitutive threshold public goods is intended
to make coordination between the subjects more diﬃcult and hence
posed a coordination problem that aﬀected contributions negatively.
Coordination problems are classically studied in the lab by the means
of the weakest-link (or minimum eﬀort) game. In a weakest-link game
the outcome of a collaborative project is determined by the minimum
contribution (the weakest-link) to this project. In contrast to a pris-
oner's dilemma, the players have no conﬂicting incentives and hence the
problem of reaching the socially eﬃcient outcome is only coordinative
and not cooperative. Van Huyck et al. (1990) ﬁnd that this coordi-
nation problem leads to ineﬃcient coordination in a an experimental
weakest-link game. As important determinants of the coordination
problem's magnitude, their study points to the group size for the col-
laborative project and the eﬀort costs of contributing. The positive
eﬀect of smaller group sizes and lower eﬀort costs was conﬁrmed in
later studies along with the eﬃciency enhancing inﬂuence of a ﬁxed
group-matching, full contribution feedback (as opposed to informing
only about the minimum contribution) and pre-play communication
(Devetag and Ortmann, 2007).
The eﬀort costs of contributing to the collaborative project are the
82There was no statistically signiﬁcant diﬀerence between contributions in the
baseline (single threshold public good game) and the treatment less-eﬃcient.
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marginal opportunity costs divided by the marginal beneﬁt of con-
tributing to the collaborative eﬀort. Because they also include the
potential beneﬁt from contributing, the eﬀort costs form a good mea-
sure of how risky it is to contribute above the minimum contribution
is. In a weakest-link experiment with group sizes of two and three, Go-
eree and Holt (2005) study the eﬀect of high and low eﬀort costs on the
eﬃciency of the coordination between the subjects. Their results show
that for both two- and three-person groups, subjects in the high eﬀort
costs treatment did not reach an eﬃcient coordination while subjects
in the low eﬀort costs treatment managed to coordinate eﬃciently on
high eﬀort levels. Moreover, the contributions in the low eﬀort costs
treatment followed an increasing path, which indicates that the dy-
namic coordination process is not driven by the minimum, but by the
maximum contribution if the eﬀort costs are suﬃciently low.
The positive correlation between low eﬀort costs and an increasing
contribution path is conﬁrmed by Brandts and Cooper (2006). In their
design the subjects play for 30 rounds a weakest-link game, in which
the eﬀort costs change every ten rounds. In the ﬁrst ten rounds the
eﬀort costs are high and, as observed in previous studies, no eﬃcient
coordination emerged. After ten rounds the eﬀort costs were lowered
in the treatment group, while they remained high in the control group.
The results show an immediate increase in the contribution level for
the treatment group with low eﬀort costs, whereas in the control group
the contribution stagnated. This positive eﬀect of low eﬀort costs
was (partially) maintained after the eﬀort costs were increased again
after 20 rounds. To further study the sensitivity of the coordination-
eﬃciency on the eﬀort costs, Brandts and Cooper tested three diﬀerent
levels of low eﬀort costs. However, their results suggests that there is
no positive relationship between the magnitude of the eﬀort costs and
the increase in the contribution level. This implies that the positive
eﬀect of low eﬀort costs on the cooperation eﬃciency is rather discrete
than continuous.
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Also for coordination games is the eﬀect of group formation studied.
Yang et al. (2013) employ the matching mechanism of Charness and
Yang (2014) for a weakest-link experiment. Their results show that
the subjects in the re-matching treatment formed large groups and
that the level of coordination in this treatment approached perfect ef-
ﬁciency. This eﬃcient coordination was not reached for large groups in
the baseline treatment. The authors conclude that endogenous group
formation promotes eﬃcient coordination, especially for large group
sizes.
Riedl et al. (2011) test the impact of endogenous group formation, in
terms of neighborhood choice, on eﬃciency in coordination games. In
a weakest-link game, the subjects can choose with whom they play.
The data show an increase in eﬃciency between 40 and 60 percent in
comparison to the baseline treatment with exogenous, random forma-
tion. The authors also attribute this result to the exclusion function of
endogenous formation. They argue that in the early rounds high per-
formers exclude low performers and hence the low performers `learn'
to perform high as well.
The eﬀects of group formation are also studied in other environments
than public good games. Herbst et al. (2015), for example, study how
diﬀerent groups cope with free-riding in a Tullock lottery contest.83
They ﬁnd that voluntary (endogenously) formed groups spend signiﬁ-
cantly more to win the lottery than involuntary (exogenously) formed.
To summarize brieﬂy, we learn from this literature that homogeneous
groups of cooperative-attitude subjects are reasonably well able to cope
with social dilemmas, such as the public good game. This is predom-
inantly driven by the fact that people cooperate when others do so
as well (conditional cooperation). Therefore, to achieve high levels of
cooperation it is beneﬁcial when conditional cooperators interact with
83See Buchanan et al. (1980).
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other cooperators. Endogenous group formation has proven to be a
fruitful mechanism for the matching of cooperators as well as the dis-
tribution of information about others' cooperation type. However, the
endogenous formation mechanisms that have been tested so far in the
laboratory might set up the formation process too saliently to repro-
duce formation processes in real life. On the other hand, group-choice,
as an intermediate mechanism between ﬁxed groups and fully endoge-
nous formation, seems to be a good alternative because it reasonably
well resembles daily life selection decisions. This especially applies if
these selections are not exclusive but rather distributive as, for instance
the allocation of a ﬁxed endowment for instance. Additionally, the pro-
cedure of group-choice is fairly easy to understand for the subjects in
an experiment and at the same time provides a mechanism that allows
conditional cooperators to match in particular groups. There is reason
to believe that sorting through group-choice has a positive eﬀect on
the level of cooperation. However, a greater pool of groups to choose
from might induce a coordination problem that hampers cooperation
and ampliﬁes with the size of the pool. Consequently, the question
arises how these two eﬀects - sorting and coordination - aﬀect the level
of cooperation for a group-choice from a larger pool of groups.
5.4 Experimental Design and Hypotheses
The intention of the experimental design is it to separately identify
the sorting and the coordination eﬀect of group-choice. Therefore, the
basic structure builds on the participation of the subjects in one or mul-
tiple group projects of the size of three (m=3). This basic structure is
extended by the two treatment variables that specify whether the sub-
jects have a group-choice (ﬁrst) and what the contribution mechanism
to the group project is (second).
The primary treatment variable is whether the subject have a group-
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choice or not. This is implemented by varying the number of groups
each subject simultaneously participates in (similar to the design of
BCKM, MSS and Corazzini et al.). In the No-Choice treatment each
subject participates in only one group, while in theGroup-Choice treat-
ment each subjects participates in four parallel groups.
The existence of four parallel groups in the Group-Choice treatment
allows the subjects to sort themselves into one or multiple groups. The
group-choice is not implemented by an explicit selection rule but by a
common budget constraint for all parallel games. This common bud-
get constraint is held constant among all treatments. This means that
in the group-choice treatment each subject has to distribute his round
endowment between the four group projects and his private account
(see equation 5.1). The common budget constraint makes the group
projects substitutes and hence induces self-sorting into the most pre-
ferred group(s). Therefore, group-choice in this context does not mean
to select a single group but rather to engage in the contribution to the
respective group project(s).
e = x1 + . . .+ x4 + xprivate (5.1)
To allow the subjects in the group-choice treatments (G4) to sort them-
selves, the groups vary in terms of composition of members (see Figure
5.1). This means that each subject meets diﬀerent (other) subjects
in each group and hence has a real choice in terms of composition of
the groups. This selection is intended to be based on reputation. For
this reason no re-matching of the groups (partner protocol) takes place
during the experiment. Additionally, the subjects are provided with
individual feedback about the other subjects' contributions. However,
this feedback is limited to subjects' contributions in the same groups.
This means that if subject S plays with subject 1 in group A, then S
is only informed about 1's contribution to A but not about 1's contri-
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bution to his other projects or to his private account. In other words,
subjects only learn the contributions of other subjects in the groups
they are also member of. Thus it is uncertain to the subjects how
much their co-players keep in their private account or contribute to
other group projects they are participating in.
Endowment
Private
Project 
Group
Project A
2
S 1
Group
Project B
4
S 3
Group
Project C
6
S 5
Group
Project D
8
S 7
Figure 5.1: Example of diﬀerent games and their group composition
for a given subject (S)
To disentangle the sorting eﬀect from the coordination eﬀect of group-
choice, the experimental design incorporates a second treatment vari-
able which is the type of the game. In the Cooperation treatment
the subject play a normal public good game in which a group-choice
triggers both the sorting eﬀect as well as the coordination eﬀect. In
contrast, in the Coordination treatment the subjects play a weakest-
link game in which a group-choice only triggers the coordination eﬀect.
A comparison of the outcomes of both treatments, accordingly, allows
to investigate the eﬀects of sorting and coordination of group-choice
for a cooperative game.
The type of game is altered by implementing diﬀerent contribution
mechanisms for the group project. In the cooperation treatment the
contribution mechanism is a voluntary contribution mechanism (VCM).
Hence, subjects in this treatment play a standard public good game,
with the usual no-contribution incentive. This means that the round
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payoﬀ of each subject from a group project is the sum of contribu-
tions multiplied by β and divided by the number of group members m.
Given that each group project consists of three members (m = 3), β
is set to 1.8 to get a marginal per capital ratio (MPCR) of 0.6. Hence
the round payoﬀ are as follows in the no-choice (G1-VCM) treatment:
yi = (e− xi) + 1
m
× β ×
m∑
j=1
xj (5.2)
And in the group-choice (G4-VCM) correspondingly:
yi = (e−xi,1−. . .−xi,4)+ 1
m
×β×
m∑
j=1
xj,1+. . .+
1
m
×β×
m∑
j=1
xj,4 (5.3)
For the coordination treatment the group projects' contribution mech-
anism is a weakest-link game (WL), which requires the subjects to
coordinate on one of the Pareto-ranked Nash equilibria. This means
that the round payoﬀs of each subject from a group project are equal
to the lowest contribution times β. In order to be consistent with the
cooperation treatment, β is as well set to 1.8. While the payoﬀ multi-
pliers in both the VCM and the WL treatments are equal for the group
projects, they diﬀer for the private account. In the VCM treatment
the endowment, that is not contributed to any of the group projects,
directly adds to the subjects' payoﬀ. In the WL the private account
is multiplied by α before it is added to the subjects' round payoﬀ.
This is done to adjust the eﬀort costs (α/β ) of the coordination game.
In weakest-link experiments with relatively high eﬀort costs, the co-
ordination is usually not eﬃcient (c.f. Table B.2 in Appendix B.2).
Since the aim of the design is to identify a coordination eﬀect between
the no-choice and the group-choice treatments, it is necessary to have
an eﬃcient coordination in G1-WL. Therefore, α is set to 0.5, which
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results in relatively moderate eﬀort costs of 0.28. Based on this param-
eterization the round payoﬀ are as follows in the no-choice (G1-WL)
treatment:
yi = α× (e− xi) + β ×min(xi) (5.4)
And in the group-choice (G4-WL) correspondingly:
yi = α×(e−xi,1− . . .−xi,4)+β×min(xj,1)+ . . .+β×min(xj,4) (5.5)
These two treatment variables are combined in a 2 × 2 design. This
results in four diﬀerent treatments, which are illustrated in Table 5.1.
Cooperation Coordination
(Voluntary Contribution Mechanism) (Weakest-Link Game)
No-Choice G1-VCM G1-WL
(one group) (2) (2)
Group-Choice G4-VCM G4-WL
(four groups) (4) (4)
Table 5.1: Overview 2 × 2 treatment design (number of sessions in
parentheses)
This design is set up to test the following conjectures about the sort-
ing eﬀect and coordination eﬀect of group-choice. In the cooperative
treatments, G1-VCM is expected to reassemble the well-documented
pattern of declining contribution to public good games (c.f. Chaudhuri,
2011; Ledyard, 1995). By giving the subjects the possibility to choose
a group (G4-VCM), the contributions are expected to be higher than
in the the no-choice treatment (c.f. McCarter et al., 2014; Bernasconi
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et al., 2009). This sustained cooperation is expected to emerge because
a group-choice allows to sort out uncooperative subjects and hence all
conditionally cooperative subjects should interact with subjects with
a similar attitude towards cooperation.
If the contribution-level in G4-VCM is higher than in G1-VCM, then
this means that the coordination eﬀect of group choice is either non-
existent or that it is prevailed by the sorting eﬀect. As the eﬀort costs
for the coordination treatments are set relatively low, the coordination
in the no-choice treatment (G1-WL) is expected be eﬃcient. If the
coordination eﬀect, as identiﬁed by Corazzini et al. (2015), exists then
coordination in G4-WL should be less eﬃcient than in G1-WL. Con-
versely, if no coordination eﬀect exists then the coordination should be
similarly eﬃcient in G1-WL and G4-WL.
5.5 Experimental Procedures
The experiment was conducted in the ESE-Econlab at Erasmus Univer-
sity Rotterdam between April and June 2015. 12 sessions in total were
performed: 2 for each of the treatments G1-VCM and G1-WL as well as
4 for each of the treatments G4-VCM and G4-WL. In each G1-session
(G1-VCM and G1-WL) 12 subjects participated. In each G4-session
(G4-VCM and G4-WL) 18 subjects participated. Each sessions lasted
for 20 periods, which all were paid according to their outcome. In
each period subjects received an endowment of twenty tokens (e=20)
as common budget constraint for all group projects and the private
account.
The experiment was computerized and subjects were sitting in sepa-
rate cubicles. As experimental software z-tree was used (Fischbacher,
2007). Instructions (see Appendix B.7 and B.8) were read out loud
to the subjects by the experimenter. After the instructions were read,
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the subjects had to answer control questions to ensure to correct un-
derstanding of the instructions. The Experiment was performed fully
in English.
In total 192 subjects participated in the experiment. These subjects
were recruited from the ESE-Econlab subject pool by using ORSEE
(Greiner, 2015). The average earning per subject was 11.74 Euro
(min = 6.80 Euro, max = 14.90 Euro). Each sessions lasted for ap-
proximately 40 minutes (including reading the instructions, the control
questions, and a short exit survey).
The largest group of subjects was enrolled in an economics program
(40%), the second largest group was from a business administration
program (33%), other programs included law, health and ﬁnance. The
gender distribution of the subjects was relatively balanced (female:
41%, male: 59%). Almost two-thirds of the subjects were undergrad-
uate students (63%), and the remainder was almost entirely composed
of graduate students (for detailed demographic information see Table
B.5 in Appendix B.6).
5.6 Experimental Results
The results of the experimental sessions conﬁrm the theoretical hy-
potheses that were formulated in section 5.4. Introducing a group-
choice improves the extent and stability of the cooperative behavior in
a public good game. At the same time, it constitutes a coordination
problem that countervails the positive sorting eﬀect. In the present
design with four parallel group projects, though, the sorting eﬀect of
group-choice prevails the coordination eﬀect.
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5.6.1 Global behavior
The results of the cooperative treatment are illustrated in Figure 5.2.
Sub-ﬁgure (a) shows the average contributions over all periods of the
experiment for the no-choice (G1-VCM) and the group-choice (G4-
VCM) treatments, while (b) quotes the average round payoﬀ per sub-
ject. The no-choice treatment (G1-VCM) replicates the pattern of
declining cooperation that is observed in the literature.
Figure 5.2: Results cooperation treatment
Figure 5.2 reveals that the level of cooperation is higher with group-
choice (G4-VCM). A Wilcoxon-Mann-Whitney test shows that this
diﬀerence in cooperation is signiﬁcant at the 0.005 level (clustered:
p-value = 0.0046, nG1 = 8, nG4 = 8; see Appendix B.1). More-
over, the contributions on G4-VCM are relatively stable until the last
three rounds. At this point a substantial endgame eﬀect exerts and
the contributions drop visibly. The regression analysis in Table 5.2
conﬁrms this visual impression. The group-choice treatment dummy
(G4-VCM) has a positive coeﬃcient that is statistically signiﬁcant
(p-value = 0.000, n = 1920). This means that contributions were
on average 5.6 tokens higher in the group-choice treatment (more than
1/4 of the endowment).
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The coeﬃcient capturing the endgame eﬀect is negative and also highly
statistically signiﬁcant (p-value = 0.000, n = 1920). Model (4) con-
trols for the endgame eﬀect and has a separate trend variable for each
treatment. The trend in the no-choice treatment is highly statistically
signiﬁcant and has a negative coeﬃcient (p-value = 0.000, n = 1920).
This means that the contributions in G1-VCM dropped on average
by 0.3 tokens per round. Conversely, the trend for G4-VCM is not
signiﬁcant and has a very small absolute coeﬃcient (p-value = 0.202,
n = 1920). Hence, the visual impression that in the group-choice treat-
ment contributions were relatively stable in the pre-endgame stages is
conﬁrmed by the econometric analysis.
This ﬁnding diﬀers from the ﬁndings of MSS and BCKM, who both ob-
served also a declining pattern in the group-choice-like treatments. An
explanation for these conﬂicting results can be found in the designs of
the respective experiments. While the subjects in this experiment re-
ceive round feedback on individual contributions, the subjects in MSS
and BCKM received only aggregated feedback. It, hence, appears im-
portant for the stability of the contributions in the group-choice treat-
ment that subjects receive individual contribution feedback (on the
eﬀect of diﬀerent types of feedback see e.g. Sell and Wilson, 1991).
Models (5)-(8) use the round payoﬀ as dependent variable. Because
the regression models do not contain any subject-speciﬁc variable and
because there is no wasting of contributions in a public good game,
the coeﬃcients for the regressors on contribution and payoﬀ correlate
perfectly. Accordingly, conﬁrm the models (5)-(8) the statistical results
of the models (1)-(4) but do not facilitate any additional conclusion.
The outcomes of the coordination treatment are illustrated in Figure
5.3. Sub-ﬁgure (a) shows the average contributions over all periods
of the experiment for the no-choice (G1-WL) and the group-choice
(G4-WL) treatments, while (b) displays the average round payoﬀ per
subject. As intended by setting relatively low eﬀort costs, contribu-
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tions in both coordination treatments were very high (see Figure 5.3-a).
In the no-choice treatment (G1-WL) the contribution pattern matches
the ﬁndings of previous low eﬀort-cost experiments (e.g. Goeree and
Holt, 2005, p. 358). Moreover, the coordination between the sub-
jects was very eﬃcient in the no-choice treatment. This can be read
from the average round payoﬀ, which is mainly driven by the group
projects' minimum contributions. In the beginning the average round
payoﬀ increases substantially and then settles on a stable increasing
trend. After approximately 60% of the experiment, the payoﬀ reaches
the maximum possible level at 36 per round. This means that the
subjects accomplished to coordinate on contributing the whole endow-
ment. This Pareto-optimal coordination level is maintained until the
end of the game.
Figure 5.3: Results coordination treatment
Using the average round payoﬀ as a proxy to measure the eﬃciency
of the coordination, a Wilcoxon-Mann-Whitney test shows that the
coordination eﬃciency is signiﬁcantly diﬀerent between the no-choice
and the group-choice treatment at the 0.01 level (clustered: p-value =
0.0063, nG1 = 8, nG4 = 8; see Appendix B.1). In the group-choice
treatment (G4-WL) coordination between the subjects also emerged
but on a signiﬁcantly lower level than in the no-choice treatment (see
the G4-WL coeﬃcients in Table 5.3).
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Due to the low eﬀort costs contributions were also high in G4-WL,
starting from an even higher initial level than in G1-WL. While the
contributions in the opening increased in G1-WL (p-value = 0.073,
n = 1920), they followed a negative trend in G4-WL (p-value = 0.034,
n = 1920). However, none of these trends is statistically signiﬁcant.
Towards the end the contributions in G4-WL settled around two to-
kens, or approximately 10% of the endowment, below the level in G1-
WL.
In contrast to the trends in the contribution models, the trends in the
payoﬀ models are statistically signiﬁcant. Both the G1-WL (p-value =
0.001, n = 1920) as well as the G4-WL trend (p-value = 0.001,
n = 1920) have a positive coeﬃcient. This means that in both treat-
ments the round payoﬀ and hence the eﬃciency of the coordination
increased over the course of the experiment. The positive trend in G1-
WL was, however, larger than in G4-WL, which can also be seen in
Figure 5.3-b. While both treatments start from an equal initial payoﬀ
level, the round payoﬀs in G1-WL increased more rapidly than in G4-
WL. Moreover, stagnated the round payoﬀ from round 10 on around
30 in G4-WL, while they reached the maximal possible in G1-WL.
This means that the coordination with four parallel group projects to
choose from was less eﬃcient and hence this result shows the coordi-
nation eﬀect of group-choice.
5.6.2 In-group behavior
The analysis of the data on general behavior shows that the introduc-
tion of group-choice for a public good game with a voluntary contribu-
tion mechanism increases the overall cooperation level. It was argued
that this is due to the fact that with a group-choice the subjects are
able to sort out uncooperative peers. Table 5.4 provides further evi-
dence for this sorting eﬀect. It shows the change in group contribution
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behavior for the two VCM treatments and selected other public good
experiments. For each treatment the table states how many groups
kept their contributions constant, decreased them, or increased them
between the ﬁrst round and a later stage of the experiment. The com-
parison is not made with the last round to exclude potential end-game
eﬀects in the analysis.
0pct 5pct 10pct
C D I C D I C D I
G1-VCM 0 7 1 0 7 1 0 7 1
G4-VCM 0 72 24 2 72 22 11 67 18
Andreoni (1988)
partners 0 6 0 0 6 0 0 6 0
Keser and van Winden (2000)
partners 1 7 2 2 7 1 2 7 1
Nikiforakis (2008)
punishment 0 1 2 0 1 2 0 1 2
punish & counter 0 4 2 0 4 2 1 4 1
VCM 0 9 0 0 9 0 0 9 0
McCarter et al. (2014)
diﬀerent 0 29 3 0 29 3 0 29 3
same 0 20 0 0 20 0 0 20 0
Table 5.4: Categorization of change in group contribution behavior
in public good experiments between the ﬁrst round and the average
of 3 rounds between 0.8 × T and 0.9 × T (C: constant, D: decreas-
ing, I: increasing; Xpct: margin for constant contribution +/- X% of
endowment)
Table 5.4 shows that a majority of groups decrease their contributions
in normal public good experiments. This is the same for the no-choice
treatment (G1-VCM), in which 7 out of 8 groups lower their contribu-
tions to the public good. In contrast, in the group-choice treatment
(G4-VCM) for 25% of the groups the contribution level increases in the
course of the experiment. This means that when subjects are presented
with a group-choice they pick the groups which are more cooperative
and concentrate their contributions towards them.
Figure 5.4 states the development of the contribution spread for all
four treatments. The contribution spread is the diﬀerence between the
minimum and the maximum contribution to a group project. It, thus,
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indicates the discordance within the group projects. This discord can
be caused by two types of diﬀerences between the subjects: Firstly,
by diﬀerences in the attitude towards cooperation and hence diﬀerent
preferences for the desired contribution level. Secondly, by diﬀerences
in the beliefs of what the group contribution level will be. While in the
cooperation treatment both play a role, only the diﬀerences in beliefs
are relevant in the coordination treatment. This is because all subjects
should prefer, given the payoﬀ structure in the weakest-link game, the
highest contribution level, regardless of their cooperation-attitude.
This can be observed in sub-ﬁgure (a), which compares the contribu-
tion spread for both the cooperation and the coordination treatment
without group-choice. In the coordination treatment (G1-WL) the
spread begins on a relatively high level and then decreases rapidly to
zero as subjects form a common belief about the contribution level.
Also the cooperation treatment (G1-VCM) starts with a high spread
that decreases initially. Conversely to the coordination treatment, the
spread levels between 7 and 8 and does not dissolve. The reason for
this is that in the cooperation treatment diﬀerences in the cooperation-
attitude contribute to the group discord and without group-choice the
subjects have no possibility to self-sort.
Figure 5.4: Min-Max contribution spread with group projects
The group-choice treatment allows for sorting but at the same time
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increases the complexity of forming a common belief about the groups'
contribution levels. In the coordination treatment with group-choice
(G4-WL) the contribution spread started again on a moderately high
level (see Figure 5.4-b) but in contrast to G1-WL, the spread increased
in the beginning. Only after this initial rise, the spread began to
drop, however not as rapidly as in the no-choice treatment. Also, the
spread in G4-WL never reached zero but leveled slightly below 1. This
coordination eﬀect of group-choice occurs because ﬁnding a common
belief is more diﬃcult when each subject interacts in four parallel group
projects, compared to only one in the no-choice treatment.
The coordination eﬀect also causes disaccord in the G4-VCM group
projects. However, in this cooperation treatment the disaccord can be
elevated by diﬀerences in the subjects' attitudes towards cooperation.
The consequences of this diﬀerence among subjects can be moderated
by group-choice because it allows subjects to self-sort according to
their cooperation attitude. The implications of this sorting eﬀect can
be observed in sub-ﬁgure (b). The spread in the G4-VCM treatment
starts on an initially higher level than the spread in G4-WL (simi-
lar to G1-VCM and G1-WL), but as the experiment proceeds, the
subjects in G4-VCM were able to sort. This sorting caused the dif-
ference in the contribution spreads between G4-VCM and G4-WL to
fade away. In round 15, just before the endgame eﬀect in G4-VCM ex-
erted, the diﬀerence was down to less than 1. This convergence can be
explained with the sorting between the G4-VCM group projects that
remedied the cooperation-attitude disaccord, while the discoordina-
tion in beliefs persisted in the group projects both in the G4-WL and
the G4-VCM treatment. Interestingly, both in the No-Choice (G1)
and in the Group-Choice (G4) treatment the initial spreads of the
cooperation (VCM) treatments were approximately 1.9 times higher
than in the coordination (WL) treatments (G1-VCM/G1-WL=1.89;
G4-VCM/G4-WL=1.93). This is almost equal to the factor that the
private project was more proﬁtable in VCM than in WL (factor 2),
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which denotes the opportunity costs of contributing and hence could
be seen as a proxy for the social risk of contributing.
The sorting eﬀect can be further observed in Figure 5.5, which illus-
trates the development of the contribution distribution for all groups
in the G4-VCM treatment. The groups are categorized into two classes
according to their contribution level in the initial round. All groups
with a contribution level above the median in the ﬁrst period are la-
beled high, whereas all groups below the median are labeled low. For
comparison both sub-ﬁgures show the contribution distribution of the
G1-VCM treatment in the background in gray. In the groups with a
high initial contribution level, the individual contributions developed
towards the average group-maximum-contribution. This increasing
and stable contribution path lies well above the path in the no-choice
treatment (G1-VCM).
Conversely, in the groups with a low initial contribution level, the indi-
vidual contributions dropped towards the average group-minimum con-
tribution. This in-group contribution behavior matched very closely
the path in the no-choice treatment. This means that subjects that
are presented with a group-choice concentrate their contributions to-
wards the more cooperative group(s), while contributions in the less
cooperative groups follow the commonly observed path of declining
contributions in public good experiments. Because of this sorting ef-
fect the general contribution level in a public good experiment is higher
if there is a group-choice.
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Figure 5.5: Contributions in G4-VCM for Low and High groups
Figure 5.6 visualizes the coordination eﬀect in the coordination treat-
ment. It states the development of the contribution distribution for all
groups in the G4-WL treatment. The groups are categorized into two
classes according to their contribution spread in the initial round. All
groups with a contribution spread below the median in the ﬁrst period
are labeled low, whereas all groups above the median are labeled high.
For comparison both sub-ﬁgures show the contribution distribution of
the G1-WL treatment in the background in gray. The contributions to
the groups with a low spread in the ﬁrst round are clustered around the
same constant level for the whole experiment. This anchor level ba-
sically reﬂects the contribution level towards the end of the no-choice
treatment (G1-WL). While the average contribution level remained
fairly constant, the coordination problem of group-choice still had an
eﬀect on the groups with a low initial spread. For these groups the
contribution spread increased signiﬁcantly in the ﬁrst rounds and then
only later recovered slowly.
Conversely, for the groups with an initially high spread, the spread
reduced more quickly and ﬁnally its magnitude was even lower than
for the groups with an initially low spread. However, this fast de-
crease came at the cost of a drop in the level of contributions. In the
groups with a high initial contribution spread, the contribution level
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fell substantially in the ﬁrst rounds and then setteld at a level approx-
imately 25% lower than in the no-choice treatment (G1-WL). This
means that if the subjects with a coordinative task are presented with
group-choice, then their coordination will be less eﬃcient than with
no-choice. This coordination eﬀect is twofold: groups with an ini-
tially, relatively eﬃcient coordination (low contribution spread) suﬀer
from the coordination problem by facing an increase in their min-max-
contribution spread. On the other hand, groups with a less eﬃcient
coordination forfeit about 25% of the contribution level.
Figure 5.6: Contributions in G4-WL for Low and High groups
5.7 Partner-Selection: Sorting and Coordination
A cooperative climate is important within a meta-organization. It
prevents conﬂicts between the partners and hence contributes to the
achievement of the meta-organization's goals. A key factor in creat-
ing such a cooperative climate is the group composition of the meta-
organization. If the parties composing the group of the meta-organization
are homogeneous in their attitude towards cooperation and their goals,
the cooperation within the meta-organization is easier. This is espe-
cially important for meta-organizations with goals that are diﬃcult to
formally specify in precise terms at the outset, such as research joint
138
ventures. These types of cooperations often have characteristics of a
public good game and thus need speciﬁc governance mechanisms to
maintain a cooperative meta-organization.
Group-choice can be seen as a governance mechanism to improve co-
operation in situations with a public good game character. This is
because a group-choice allows subjects to sort according to their coop-
eration attitude. This sorting eﬀect allows conditionally cooperative
agents to interact among themselves and hence drives the cooperation
level up. However, having to choose between multiple groups also poses
a coordination problem. This coordination eﬀect impedes the identiﬁ-
cation of the counter parties' cooperation attitude and hence hampers
the cooperation level.
This chapter's aim is to use a laboratory experiment to provide empir-
ical evidence for these eﬀects of group-choice and to study their inﬂu-
ence on the cooperation level. The results of the experiment indicate
that the option of group-choice has a positive impact on the coopera-
tion level in a public good game. This is caused by the sorting eﬀect of
sorting out uncooperative subjects. However, group-choice also poses
a coordination problem. Subjects in the G4-WL treatment were not
able to eﬃciently coordinate on the Pareto-optimal contribution level.
This means that despite the very low eﬀort costs, coordination was
approximately 10% less eﬃcient in the group-choice treatment.
If with very moderate eﬀort costs and only four parallel group projects
the coordination eﬀect is already 10%, then it can be expected to be
substantially more severe with more group projects or higher eﬀort
costs. This would mean that the marginal coordination costs are in-
creasing in the number of parallel projects. At the same time, it seams
likely that the marginal sorting beneﬁts are decreasing in the number
of parallel projects. This means that there is an optimal amount of
parallel projects that maximizes the level of cooperation. If the num-
ber of group-choices is increased beyond this optimal level, it will have
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a negative impact on the cooperation level.
The results of this chapter's laboratory experiment indicate that group-
choice can be a vital governance mechanism for cooperation. However,
if it is used as a policy instrument, some important characteristics
should be considered. Group-choice works best in environments with
good information about the others' contributions. Moreover, eﬀective
sorting requires a repeated, long-term interaction. The coordination
problem between the diﬀerent choices is less grave if the eﬀort costs of
contributing are lower. Finally and most importantly, the cooperation
level as a function of choices has an inverse u-shape. This means that
an optimal number of choices exists and hence policy makers should
not attempt to increase choices indeﬁnitely.
Applying this ﬁnding to the example from the beginning of this chap-
ter, it means that increasing the pool size by the means of trade lib-
eralization or other policy initiatives does not necessarily, by itself,
foster cooperation. The ﬁndings of the laboratory experiment conﬁrm
the conclusion of Ghosh and Lim (2013) that coordination costs play a
role in this context. Therefore, if a policy maker wishes to use increas-
ing the pool size as an instrument to foster cooperation in research and
development and hence economic growth, it must at the same time en-
sure an environment with low coordination costs. For instance, such
an environment with low coordination costs may be relevant in the
context of the common European Research Area, which the European
Commission aims to develop in order to create a larger pool for the
selection of research partners for both academics and ﬁrms.84
84See the European Comission, "High Level Panel on the Socio-Economic
Beneﬁts of the ERA", A. Mitsos, A. Bonaccorsi, Y. Caloghirou, J. All-
mendinger, L. Georghiou, M. Mancini, and F. Sachwald, June 2012. Pages 11-
17. http://ec.europa.eu/research/era/pdf/high-level-panel-report_en.
pdf - accessed December 16, 2014.

6 | Policy Implications
Today's technological development requires companies to become more
and more specialized in order to maintain competitive. The consumer,
at the same time, demands highly complex products, and moreover de-
mands products to be inter-connectable with each other. To illustrate
these trends, this thesis started out with the example of the devel-
opment of telecommunication from Guglielmo Marconi's telegraphs to
modern smart phones. The telecommunication sector is one of many
markets where companies increasingly have to cooperate with each
other in order to survive in the competitive environment. Such inter-
ﬁrm cooperation is not only observed for research and development
projects and the setting of common standards, but also to enter new
geographical and product markets.
While these forms of cooperation can be very beneﬁcial for the in-
volved companies, they also pose certain risks. Not only might speciﬁc
investments be held-up or knowledge and intellectual property be ap-
propriated by the cooperation partner, the cooperation might also limit
the company's decision space. Moreover, if the cooperation turns sour
it may negatively aﬀect the cooperating partners, for example in the
form of reputational damage. Preventing this type of problems may be-
come even more diﬃcult when ﬁrms, as they often do, simultaneously
cooperate with multiple parties from diﬀerent ﬁelds.
The involvement of ﬁrms in multiple inter-ﬁrm cooperations precludes
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vertical integration as a suitable way to overcome opportunism and
to mitigate disputes. Vertical integration moreover involves consider-
able costs and loss of independence that would far outweigh the ben-
eﬁts of many types of inter-ﬁrm cooperations. Therefore, cooperating
ﬁrms require a formalization of the cooperation, while allowing them to
maintain their legal independence as much as possible. For that pur-
pose, a speciﬁc organizational structure is required that encompasses
the cooperating organizations, namely a meta-organization.
The overall goal of this thesis was to study the phenomenon of meta-
organizations, and more precisely to examine the governance of meta-
organizations. The thesis started out with a chapter discussing the dis-
tinction between meta-organizations and employment-based organiza-
tions, explaining why meta-organizations require diﬀerent governance.
Subsequently, chapter 3 empirically studied the growing importance
of meta-organizations by the use of the example of joint ventures. On
the basis of this discussion of meta-organizations, two examples of gov-
ernance mechanisms were chosen that were discussed in detail in the
subsequent chapters 4 and 5. The ﬁrst was third party decision making
as a means to resolve disputes, and the second was group choice as a
way to create more cooperative groups and prevent disputes in the ﬁrst
place.
This ﬁnal chapter summarizes the main ﬁndings of each chapter. It
discusses possible implications of these ﬁndings for related streams of
literature as well as for policy makers. Moreover, this chapter dis-
cusses some of the questions that the ﬁndings of the research raise,
and provides an outlook for further research.
The subject of this thesis, meta-organizations, are organizations that
themselves consist of organizations. In this thesis primarily the exam-
ple of joint ventures is used, but also other types of meta-organizations
such as strategic alliances, franchises and business networks are men-
tioned. Meta-organizations are distinct from employment based or-
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ganizations because of the association relationship of the members
towards the organizations. In an employment based organization,
the individual member is an employee and hence she or he is asso-
ciated with the organization by an employment relationship. In a
meta-organization, in contrast, the individual members are compa-
nies, which cannot enter into an employment relationship with the
meta-organization. Therefore, the member organizations - the com-
panies - are associated with the meta-organization through ownership
and contractual relations.
This diﬀerence in the association relationship has extensive implica-
tions for the obligations and rewards ﬂowing from membership of the
respective organization. An employee, as a member of an employment-
based organization, has very generic obligations towards the organiza-
tion. He or she is required to take directions of the management of
the organization. The employee's rewards are precisely speciﬁed in the
employment contract in the form of a wage and, in some cases, speciﬁc
amenities such as a company car. Conversely, in a meta-organization
the obligations of the members are speciﬁed in the association docu-
ment and can vary from capital contributions to the performance of
very speciﬁc activities. The membership rewards, however, are often
not that formally speciﬁed and generally depend on the performance
of the cooperation. The association documents may state certain re-
wards, such as the distribution of proﬁts or the sharing of knowledge,
but the value of these rewards can hardly be speciﬁed. In the best case,
the beneﬁts could be speciﬁed conditional upon the materialization of
the aspired goals of the meta-organization.
These diﬀerences in beneﬁts and obligations of membership impede the
applicability to meta-organizations of governance mechanisms that are
well established for employment-based organizations. Because of the
speciﬁc obligations of members towards a meta-organization, the orga-
nization has no or only very limited formal authority over its members.
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Therefore, it is not possible to use governance instruments that build on
formal authority, such as board directives, in meta-organizations. The
generic and various beneﬁts parties expect from membership of a meta-
organization also diﬀer drastically from the mainly ﬁnancial interests of
shareholders, another stakeholder of employment-based organizations.
While the instruments of corporate governance are suitable to protect
the ﬁnancial interests of shareholders, they might not be appropriate
to safeguard the interest of members of meta-organizations that go
beyond ﬁnancial beneﬁts. Therefore, meta-organizations require, and
have developed, distinct governance mechanisms.
The use of distinct governance mechanisms in meta-organizations raises
the question whether a speciﬁc meta-organization law would be nec-
essary to govern meta-organizations. As mentioned, corporate gover-
nance mechanisms may not be suitable for members of meta-organi-
zations, whose interests may concern the strategic direction of the
meta-organization besides purely ﬁnancial beneﬁts. For example, mem-
bers of meta-organizations concerning research and development projects,
standard setting or market access may wish to have a say in the busi-
ness decisions of the meta-organizations, even if they are relatively
small members of the meta-organization. Corporate law rules on mi-
nority shareholder protection may not oﬀer suﬃcient protection to such
members of a meta-organization. Corporate law may thus not be sen-
sitive enough towards ﬂexible or hybrid arrangements such as meta-
organizations (Amstutz and Teubner, 2009, ix).
Given that the interests of members of meta-organizations may con-
cern beneﬁts other than ﬁnancial payments, governance mechanisms
may rather be found in contract law. The members could specify
their non-ﬁnancial interests in the contract and stipulate the vote of
each member in matters regarding the strategic direction of the meta-
organization. However, in practice it may be diﬃcult to specify all the
activities and goals of the meta-organization in advance, as some of
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these may only become clear as the meta-organization operates. Con-
sidering this uncertainty about the precise activities and goals, it is
doubtful whether the various interests of the members of the meta-
organization can be stipulated in a contract at the outset. To some
extent, contract law may be able to accommodate this uncertainty,
namely if contract law is viewed as being open to the "network ex-
pectations" of parties to a contract (Amstutz and Teubner, 2009, ix).
These may arise when parties have concluded multiple contracts with
one another. Network expectations can be deﬁned as expectations that
go beyond what is speciﬁed in each of the bilateral contracts between
them. A traditional view of contract law may be blind to these expec-
tations, as it considers that the legal consequences derive only from the
performance obligations stemming from the various bilateral connected
contracts. Viewing the contracts in a meta-organization according to
the law of contractual associations, however, these contracts can be
seen as "connected contracts" which form a legal constitution of the
contractual network (Amstutz and Teubner, 2009, x).
Next to corporate law and contract law, which may play a role in the
governance of meta-organizations, tort law may be relevant in the con-
text of risks generated by meta-organizations towards parties outside
the meta-organization. The activities of meta-organizations may cause
harm to individuals and organizations performing activities for or on
behalf of the meta-organization, or to external parties. However, as
has been discussed in chapter 2, meta-organizations often cannot be
clearly characterized under the traditional legal institutions contract
and association. Meta-organizations may be established in diﬀerent
ways, resulting in various characterizations in terms of the law. Joint
ventures, for example, can be set-up as a contractual arrangement, but
alternatively in the form of a corporation. Because meta-organizations
may have characteristics of both contracts and corporations, tort law
may have diﬃculties in coping with the risks and opportunities posed
by meta-organizations. Some of the implications of meta-organizations
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for tort law are therefore further discussed below.
With the branches of corporate law, contract law and tort law poten-
tially leaving gaps in the governance of meta-organizations, both inter-
nally and with respect to external parties, one may consider the possi-
bility of introducing speciﬁc rules for meta-organizations. In studying
the possible design of such a special law one might ﬁnd inspiration in
the German Konzernrecht that deals speciﬁcally with groups of compa-
nies. The Konzernrecht was introduced by the 1965 Stock Corporation
Act and is meant to take account of the speciﬁc problems that arise
in the context of groups of companies, particularly agency conﬂicts
(Emmerich and Habersack, 2013, Rn 1-16; Roth, 2013, 256-259). The
Konzernrecht aims to resolve agency problems by regulating conﬂicts
between minority and large shareholders (Roth, 2013, 264) and speci-
ﬁes several duties of loyalty that controlling shareholders owe to minor-
ity shareholders (Baums and Scott, 2005, 40). The purpose of separate
Konzernrecht rules is to provide the necessary organizational frame-
work for deep changes in the structure of an enterprise. The Konz-
ernrecht thus facilitates the concentration of control powers, while at
the same time protecting minority shareholders and creditors (Prassl,
2015, 136). While creating a special branch of law has the advantage
of addressing the speciﬁc problems of the concerned addressees, it may
also involve problems. In the case of the Konzernrecht, for example,
one such problem is its harmonization with related branches of law
such as takeover law (Hopt, 2002, 36).
This begs the question whether a special law for meta-organizations
is necessary and desirable. One relevant consideration is whether it is
likely to succeed at designing a law that matches the needs of meta-
organizations, when hybrid arrangements for doing business develop at
a fast rate. One can compare Easterbrook's doubt regarding the possi-
bility to design appropriate laws in the area of cyberspace, considering
the fast rate at which technology develops (Easterbrook, 1996). East-
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erbrook maintained that there was no more a "law of cyberspace" than
there was a "Law of the Horse", meaning that specialized activities or
issues - such as cyberspace or horses - can best be studied using gen-
eral rules and principles of law. Easterbrook proposed to not "struggle
to match an imperfect legal system to an evolving world that we un-
derstand poorly" (Easterbrook, 1996, 215), but to rather classify new
activities that occurred with new technologies under current rules and
laws.85 Similarly, in the context of meta-organizations one could argue
that the existing body of law has ample possibilities to accommodate
the challenges of meta-organizations. Meta-organizations continuously
develop, appearing in new forms and becoming increasingly transna-
tional. Therefore, also in the context of meta-organizations a special
branch of law might always lag behind in terms of accommodating the
particular challenges of meta-organizations.
Nevertheless, even if a speciﬁc meta-organization law may not be nec-
essary or desirable, the law could be further developed to accommodate
the speciﬁc problems of these hybrid arrangements. In the context of
cyberspace, Easterbrook has suggested that current law could incorpo-
rate new developments if we would clarify rules, create property rights
where necessary and facilitate institutions to permit bargaining over
property rights (Easterbrook, 1996). In a similar vain, one could ask
what would be needed for current law to accommodate the particular
problems involved in the governance of meta-organizations.
A possible way to accommodate the problems of meta-organizations
may be to allow the law to be more ﬂexible, or more customizable, to
such modern forms of doing business. As discussed, various branches
of law may be relevant in the context of meta-organizations, includ-
ing corporate law, contract law and tort law. The boundaries between
these various bodies of law may not always be clear. Besides the ex-
85Some challenged this view, such as Lessig who argued that the development
of cyberspace in fact did warrant new and evolving laws and legal values (Lessig,
1999).
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ample of meta-organizations, this is also illustrated by debates about
whether institutions like corporations, bankruptcy, and trusts should
be conceived of as being a nexus of contracts or a specialized type
of property regime (Merrill and Smith, 2001, 775). The various bod-
ies of law tend to be structured in diﬀerent ways, in line with their
goals and depending on their particular subjects or addressees. With
meta-organizations relying on aspects from several branches of law,
ensuring the interoperability of these branches of law may be a fruit-
ful way to accommodate the speciﬁc characteristics and problems of
meta-organizations.
One could compare such an approach of making laws interoperable
to the concept of interfaces that is very prominent in engineering. In
software engineering, an interface is a precisely deﬁned intersection be-
tween two or more software components (Sommerville, 2010, 39). It
speciﬁes the domain, procedure, and means of interaction of diﬀerent
components and hence enables the modularization of software. In other
words, an interface can be seen as an agreement that stipulates how
software developed by diﬀerent programmers interacts.86 This way, dif-
ferent programmers are able to write their source code independently
from each other, while ensuring interoperability between the result-
ing software or system components. An interface thus represents an
industry standard or a deﬁnition that allows users to cooperate with-
out substantially aﬀecting the way in which each user works. Another
analogy for this concept are European Union Directives, which stip-
ulate particular goals or minimum standards without dictating how
each member state should implement them. Neither member state
needs to know how other member states implemented the Directive for
the aims of the Directive to be met. This way, goals such as ensur-
ing the functioning of the European single market can be met without
86For a further introduction of interfaces in software engineering see also
the Java tutorial: https://docs.oracle.com/javase/tutorial/java/IandI/
createinterface.html - accessed on June 23, 2016.
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centralizing all law making. This is similar to software programmers
not needing to know how another programmer implemented his soft-
ware in order for the resulting system or product to work. An interface
modularizes speciﬁc functions so that they can be combined as needed
while keeping the system workable. As such, interfaces are a solution
to the increasingly complex and interconnected design of systems and
products.
The governance of meta-organizations, too, requires a complex and in-
terconnected use of the law. Modularization of the law with distinct
interfaces could allow for all the required elements to be put together,
mitigating the complexity and interdependence involved in the gover-
nance of meta-organizations. A clear interface deﬁnition could allow
for the use of corporate governance mechanisms in meta-organizations
with a contractual basis. As an example, a corporation usually acts
based on a hierarchical decision making process. On the highest level,
a board of directors has a general power to take decisions that are
binding for the entire organization. In contractual meta-organizations
this is not so easily possible, because none of the parties has the full
authority, and decisions are limited to the scope of the contractual
arrangements.
Arbitration is a way to introduce a private party that has such an ulti-
mate decision making power. However, in practice parties often spend
valuable time and resources challenging the jurisdiction of the arbi-
trator (c.f. Barcelo, 2003), and hence the authority of the arbitrator
may not be as straightforward as is the case for a board of directors
in a corporation (Lew et al., 2003, 329). A clear interface deﬁnition
that clariﬁes the scope of the applicability of arbitration in contractual
agreements could mitigate this problem. Such an interface would spec-
ify the conditions in which arbitration can be used and under which
circumstances.
Such an interface that clariﬁes the applicability of corporate governance
150
mechanisms in meta-organizations may not be highly necessary on a
national level, because the interoperability of branches of law should
be fairly clear in. In this context, an interface may look similar to a
standardization of contracts, oﬀering members to meta-organizations
ways to include the most important governance mechanisms in their
contract. However, on an international level such an internal coherence
of the rules may be less evident. One could then think of an interface
in terms of an international framework, comparable with, for example,
European Directives or standards within the scope of the World Trade
Organization (Kaufmann-Kohler, 2003).
Of course, the relevant governance mechanisms as well as their prob-
lems diﬀer depending on the type of meta-organization that one consid-
ers. Chapter 3 portrays various types of meta-organizations, ranging
from franchise systems to strategic alliances and business networks.
Meta-organizations diﬀer widely in structure, with some more closely
resembling a market interaction and others being closer to fully inte-
grated ﬁrms. Hence, while meta-organizations as a group diﬀer from
both market solutions and full integration, at the same time meta-
organizations vary among one another in terms of the degree of control
over decision rights, ownership of assets and centralized coordination.
Out of these types of meta-organizations, joint ventures are selected
in chapter 3 as the working example to study the popularity of meta-
organizations as well as their internal composition. This is done by the
means of empirical data on the number of announced joint ventures
over the last 50 years. The data indicates a strong increase in the
popularity of joint ventures as a means of inter-ﬁrm cooperation from
the mid 1980s onwards. This popularity dropped with the turn of the
millennium and then settled on a somewhat lower level. This trend
is very similar for all the major world regions, being the Americas,
Europe Middle East Africa (EMEA) and Asia & Paciﬁc. Analyzing
the popularity of joint ventures in each of these regions further shows
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that the majority of joint ventures in each world region is owned by
parties from the respective region. This means, for example, that the
majority of all joint ventures in China is held by owners from the Asia
& Paciﬁc region.
When considering the number of parties involved in joint ventures, it
is found that a two-party joint venture is by far the most widely used
set-up with a portion of almost 89% of all joint ventures. In terms
of ownership structure, two distributions stand out for all possible
numbers of parties. This is ﬁrst an equal distribution of the owner-
ship rights, meaning 50:50 in a two-party joint venture, 33:33:33 in a
three-party joint venture, and so on for higher numbers of cooperation
partners. This equal distribution ownership structure is the dominat-
ing mode for all party-sizes and represents almost 80% of the two-party
joint ventures. The second most prominent distribution is one in which
the largest party holds a share of 50% and the other parties share the
remaining 50%.
These ﬁndings raise the question what could be the motivations for
parties to choose these particular ownership structures. The equal dis-
tribution may be chosen in order to balance the power of the parties.
In this case the joint venture may require speciﬁc governance mecha-
nisms to take a decision in case the parties end up in a dispute with
one another. The second form aims to solve this problem by installing
a party that holds the majority of the shares and hence has the de-
cisive vote in case of a dispute between the parties. However, as the
Wahaha/Danone dispute, discussed in chapter 3, illustrates, having a
majority share does not always prevent a dispute. In this case, Danone
owned 51% of the shares in the joint venture, but nevertheless its legal
control could not prevent that the employees carrying out the activities
for the joint venture took orders from the head of Wahaha, with 49%
the minority shareholder. In other words, having the majority share
did not guarantee authority or formal power in terms of governance.
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The parties ended up in a dispute that essentially revolved around
the question which part of the proﬁts were shared between the parties
under the joint venture agreement. The parties ultimately turned to
arbitration in order to reach a decision to resolve the dispute.
This indicates that arbitration can be an important governance mech-
anism for meta-organizations with all kinds of ownership structures.
To investigate this further, an empirical study of the use of arbitration
to resolve disputes in meta-organizations would be desirable. However,
because of the private nature of arbitration, the vast majority of these
cases is not published, limiting the possibilities to perform such an
empirical study. Therefore, section 3.2.4 of chapter 3 presents a quali-
tative overview of published joint venture disputes that were resolved
by arbitration. The analysis reveals some common characteristics of
these arbitrated disputes. Similarly to the majority of the joint ven-
tures, the majority of these disputes involved two parties. Moreover,
these two parties in most disputes held an equal share in ownership,
as is the case in the majority of two-party joint ventures. The disputes
between the parties fall into two broad categories. The ﬁrst concerns
conﬂicts about the distribution of the proﬁts or other beneﬁts that the
joint venture had produced, such as questions regarding the reinvest-
ment of proﬁts into the joint venture or alleged attempts to understate
the proﬁts of the joint venture by one party for personal gain. The sec-
ond category concerns disagreement about the contributions a party
made to the joint venture, such as a refusal by a party to continue to
make contributions in accordance with the joint venture agreement.
To gain a better understanding of the role of third party decision mak-
ing in meta-organizations, chapter 4 presents a formal model. This
formal model was developed as an alternative to an empirical study
which, as mentioned, is not feasible in the context of third party deci-
sion making instruments that are private, as is the case with arbitra-
tion. The formal model builds upon the qualitative analysis of disputes
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and uses its results as parameters. This means that the stylized dispute
of the model emerges between two parties that each hold a 50% share
in a common joint venture, and that the dispute concerns the distribu-
tion of the proﬁts in regards to the contributions of each party to the
joint venture. The aim of the formal model is to identify attributes of
third party decision making in meta-organizations that can be used as
a basis for the theoretical, functional placement of third party decision
making within or outside the boundaries of meta-organizations. The
relevant attributes that the model identiﬁed are a good observability
by and latitude of the decision maker, fast decision making and perfect
enforcement. This means that a third party decision maker, in order to
be an appropriate governance mechanism for meta-organizations, must
be able to observe the individual contributions of the parties and have
latitude to base the decision only on his conviction rather than on pro-
cedural rules. Moreover, the third party decision maker must be quick
in reaching a decision in case of a dispute, and the decision must be
enforceable. As chapter 4 discusses, arbitrators usually exhibit these
attributes, which contributes to the understanding of the prominence
of arbitration as a governance mechanism for meta-organizations such
as joint ventures.
Having identiﬁed the attributes of an appropriate third party deci-
sion making mechanism for meta-organizations, chapter 4 further ex-
plores in section 4.4 whether such a mechanism should be considered
an internal mechanism, within the boundaries of an organization, or
rather as an external mechanism that operates outside of these bound-
aries. Moving away from the typical characterization of arbitration
as a replacement for courts, a functional approach is taken towards
the position of arbitration that considers the governance function of
arbitration. To theoretically place third party decision making from
this functional perspective, third party decision making is compared to
other governance mechanisms in terms of their functions. These other
governance mechanisms are the board of directors, as an internal mech-
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anism, and an ordinary court, as an external one. Considering each
of the identiﬁed attributes, third party decision making is found to be
closer to a board of directors than to a court. First, the third party
decision maker is usually granted ample leeway in making his decision,
comparable to a board of directors. A court has considerably less lat-
itude, being bound by rules of procedure and evidence. Secondly, the
third party usually decides quickly, which again reminds of a board of
directors rather than of a court. Moreover, similar to a board of di-
rectors a third party decision maker such as an arbitrator usually has
good access to information on the parties and the joint venture, leading
to a high observability. In terms of enforcement, a third party deci-
sion maker ultimately relies on a court, as does a board of directors,
whereas a court already represents the ﬁnal stage of enforcing a claim.
Therefore, section 4.4 concludes that third party decision making is
within the boundaries of a meta-organization and hence is an integral
part of it. This also implies that forms of third party decision making,
such as arbitration, are not a substitute but rather a complement to
ordinary courts in the context of meta-organizations. In its functions,
a third party decision maker is closer to being a substitute to the board
of directors, a mechanism that many meta-organizations lack or have
only with limited decision making power, particularly when ownership
is equally distributed.
This view on third party decision making as an internal rather than
external governance mechanism may have implications for the law gov-
erning third party decision making, and in particular arbitration. One
of the main legal issues that arises concerns external parties that may
be aﬀected by an arbitrator's decision, even though these external par-
ties were not involved in the proceedings (Brekoulakis, 2009, 1167). To
exemplify this, imagine a multiparty commercial project that involves
three parties (A, B and C). To fulﬁl the project, all the parties have
concluded bilateral contracts with each other.87 Suppose that a dis-
87Multiparty commercial projects are usually executed through several bilateral
155
(a
)
O
rd
in
a
ry
co
u
rt
,
n
o
m
et
a
-
o
rg
a
n
iz
a
ti
o
n
(b
)
O
rd
in
a
ry
co
u
rt
,
m
et
a
-o
rg
a
n
iz
a
ti
o
n
(c
)
A
rb
it
ra
ti
o
n
,
m
et
a
-o
rg
a
n
iz
a
ti
o
n
F
ig
ur
e
6.
1:
In
te
re
st
re
la
ti
on
sh
ip
s
un
de
r
di
ﬀ
er
en
t
re
gi
m
es
156
pute arises between parties A and B regarding the speciﬁc performance
of the project. Because of the multiparty nature of the project, the
dispute between A and B also concerns the legal and ﬁnancial interests
of C, who is an external party to the dispute. Figure 6.1 illustrates the
interest relationships for this case under diﬀerent regimes of dispute
resolution and organizational structure. In the following, these three
settings are discussed by the means of the example.
Suppose, ﬁrst, that the dispute between parties A and B is adjudicated
by a court, as depicted in sub-ﬁgure 6.1.a. In court proceedings, the
problem of adverse eﬀects on external parties is mitigated because the
parties are determined on the basis of interests. The vast majority of
national civil procedures provide for extensive mechanisms that allow
external parties with a legitimate interest to participate in the bilat-
eral proceedings and prevent possible adverse eﬀects of the judgement
(Brekoulakis, 2009, 1169). One such mechanism is that someone with
an interest relating to the subject of the action and who may be af-
fected by the outcome of the case, may request to be joined in the
proceedings. The role of the court is to resolve the dispute between
the parties with a legitimate interest, and the position of the court is in
between these parties. In the example, party C can request to be joined
in the proceedings in order to be heard. This way, the court takes the
interests of C into account when ruling on the dispute between A and
B.
Secondly, consider that parties A and B have formed a meta-organization
in the form of a joint venture for the performance of their part of a
project. Suppose that the joint venture agreement does not include a
third party decision making clause - or dispute resolution clause - so
that, again, the dispute is heard in court. Now, the court considers
the dispute between the two members of the meta-organization (see
sub-ﬁgure 6.1.b). Suppose that C, who has not concluded bilateral
contracts rather than one overarching contract (see Brekoulakis, 2009, 1168).
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agreements with A and B but has contracted with the joint venture,
is aﬀected by the dispute between A and B. As before, C can make
use of a procedural mechanism to participate in the proceedings, such
as to be joined as a party, so that the court can take account of the
interests of C when adjudicating the dispute between A and B.
Finally, imagine that the joint venture parties A and B have included
a third party decision making clause in the joint venture agreement.
Under this clause all disputes between the two parties that concern
the joint venture are subject to arbitration. In line with the theo-
retical placement of arbitration in a meta-organization discussed in
chapter 4, this third party decision making mechanism is part of the
internal governance structure of the meta-organization. Because the
arbitrator falls within the boundaries of the meta-organization, party
C in the example is excluded from the internal governance mechanism,
third party decision making, and hence is external to the dispute (see
sub-ﬁgure 6.1.c). C only has an interest relationship with the meta
organization as a whole, which is not taken into account by the inter-
nal governance mechanism, third party decision making. While this
example has been discussed with an abstract, organizational lens, this
view also corresponds with the legal reality.
In arbitration the parties to the proceedings are those who contractu-
ally agreed upon arbitration. Only those parties that explicitly con-
sented to an arbitration agreement may participate in the arbitration
proceedings (Lew et al., 2003, 141; Gaillard and Goldman, 1999, 298).
While this contractual foundation of arbitration is one of the advan-
tages that has contributed to the increasing popularity of this mecha-
nism in the commercial community, it leaves external parties altogether
excluded from the arbitration process. Any legal or ﬁnancial interests
they may have in the dispute between the parties bound by the arbi-
tration agreement are in principle irrelevant (Brekoulakis, 2008, 5).
As a result, these external parties might be faced with unfavorable
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consequences of such arbitral decisions. The lack of protection against
adverse eﬀects of arbitration proceedings to external parties has been
listed as a major problem of arbitration (Brekoulakis, 2009, 1166-
1167).88 The diﬃculty in accommodating these aspects of a com-
mercial dispute in which the interests or obligations of third parties
are engaged has even been called "perhaps the greatest weakness of
international commercial arbitration, as against proceedings before a
municipal court" (Foxton, 2014, 1). Mechanisms to provide recourse
to such external parties have therefore been widely discussed in the
literature.
First, it has been discussed to what extent the mechanisms that prevent
adverse eﬀects to external parties in court proceedings apply, or should
apply, in arbitration. For example, mechanisms to pierce the corpo-
rate veil or treat companies as groups of companies have been discussed
as ways to include external parties in arbitration proceedings (Halla,
2015), as have third party joinder and intervention (Panﬁl, 2015). Oth-
ers have discussed the role of courts in limiting the power of arbitration
proceedings to bind third parties in future disputes involving the same
issue (Cromwell, 2000; Lühmann, 2015, 127-129). Indeed, on various
occasions civil courts have set aside arbitral awards or extended the
scope of arbitration agreements and proceedings to include external
parties based upon various constructions (Brekoulakis, 2009, 1170).
Jurisdictions vary in the ways and extent to which external parties
have recourse mechanisms against adverse eﬀects of arbitral awards,
and remedies are usually limited to domestic arbitration (Brekoulakis,
2009, 1169). The recognition of the interests of external parties in
arbitration illustrates that these interests are in general worthy of pro-
tection.
A second way to provide recourse to negatively aﬀected external parties
would be to hold the arbitrator liable for such adverse eﬀects. Some
88The issue has also been debated in the context of investor-state arbitration
(see for example Levine, 2011).
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jurisdictions recognize liability of arbitrators, although liability is often
limited and varies from country to country.89 Generally the liability
concerns breaches of obligations towards the parties during the course
of the proceedings, for example failing to declare the existence of a fact
or circumstance which aﬀects his or her independence or impartiality
or refusing substantial means of evidence (c.f. Franck, 2000; Guzman,
2000). Besides this limitation to damage resulting from culpable ac-
tions of the arbitrator, the civil liability of the arbitrator may extend to
external parties, but is often limited to the parties involved in the ar-
bitration process (Mullerat and Blanch, 2007). Nevertheless, this brief
discussion does indicate that liability for arbitrators, as a concept, is
not alien to many jurisdictions.
More importantly, the view that arbitrators should enjoy immunity
from any civil suits for the exercise of their functions is usually justi-
ﬁed on the ground that arbitrators should be treated akin to judges
(Mullerat and Blanch, 2007, 105). However, chapter 4 has argued that
arbitrators should be considered as a complement, rather than a sub-
stitute, to ordinary courts. Under this view, the argument to extend
immunity to arbitrators does not hold.90
Instead, the view of third party decision making within the organiza-
tional boundaries may warrant a diﬀerent solution to the problem of
aﬀected external parties. A solution could rather be sought by con-
sidering remedies used for other internal governance mechanisms, such
as a board of directors. Similarly to an arbitrator, a board of di-
rectors also takes decisions that are private and may aﬀect external
parties. External parties that suﬀered harm as a result of a board of
89For an overview of the diﬀerent approaches see Mullerat and Blanch (2007).
90Moreover, even outside the context of meta-organizations Mullerat and Blanch
(2007, 105-106) maintain that a number of diﬀerences between judges and ar-
bitrators argue against immunity for arbitrators. For example, arbitrators are
nominated and remunerated by the parties, derive their jurisdiction directly from
the agreement of the parties, are accountable primarily to the parties and render
decisions that cannot be appealed. None of these characteristics apply to judges.
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directors' decision can turn to the organization, and use general civil
liability mechanisms to get compensation for the adverse aﬀects of the
decision. Similarly, then, a meta-organization should be held liable to-
wards external parties for any harm that the decision of an arbitrator
caused them. In other words, the meta organization as a functional
construct would be liable as a whole.
However, the theoretical deﬁnition of a meta-organization from an or-
ganizational perspective may not coincide with the legal deﬁnition of
the meta-organization. This means that, from this theoretical view,
there may not be a single legal entity that encompasses the entire
meta-organization (c.f. Santos and Eisenhardt, 2005, 495). In con-
trast, an employment-based organization usually fully overlaps with
the legal entity.91 Therefore, the liability concept applicable to nor-
mal organizations cannot be adopted without problems in the context
of meta-organizations (c.f. Teubner and Aedtner, 2015; Becker, 2015).
This is because it may not be clear which entity within the meta-
organization is liable. Of course, for an external party that suﬀered
harm, this internal question on the assignment of liability should not
be relevant. In this regard, there might be a role for the policy maker
in assigning the liability within meta-organizations, to provide exter-
nal parties with a single access point for their civil claims. This would
be similar to the way liability is structured in corporate law, which al-
lows claimants to approach the organization and leaves the assignment
of liability within the organization up to the internal decision-making
structure.
In some contexts the answer to the question of assignment of liability
may be straightforward, such as in case of a joint venture that has legal
personality and capital. However, when considering a business network
or alliance, it may be less clear which legal entity can be targeted by
91This is notwithstanding that employment-based organizations can have very
complicated legal structures. Nevertheless, in contrast to meta-organizations, the
ownership structure in employment-based organizations is generally clear.
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injured external parties. Therefore, this ﬁnding poses a more general
question for legal scholarship regarding the assignment of liability in
meta-organizations.
While arbitration and other forms of third party decision making help
to move beyond the particular issue of the dispute, the conﬂict might
have damaged the cooperation in the long-term. For this and other rea-
sons, it may be preferable to avoid disputes in the meta-organization
in the ﬁrst place. In order to facilitate a fruitful cooperation between
the members of the meta-organization, chapter 5 illustrates the im-
portance of carefully selecting the meta-organization, or group, with
which to cooperate.
Chapter 5 studies the process of group selection for a meta-organization
by the means of a laboratory experiment. The purpose of this study
was to identify the parameters of the environment in which the selec-
tion process takes place that foster an eﬃcient matching of coopera-
tive partners. The study focuses on the consequences for cooperation
of having a greater pool of groups to choose from. A detailed study
of the experimental literature indicates the existence of two potential
eﬀects on the eﬃciency of cooperation. Building upon this literature,
chapter 5 presents a hypothesis on how these opposing eﬀects inﬂu-
ence the level of cooperation. The ﬁrst eﬀect is a sorting eﬀect, which
means that through a large pool of potential groups, parties will be
able to ﬁnd a better match. Hence, a larger pool improves the sorting
of parties into diﬀerent groups according to their type and coopera-
tive preferences, which in turn fosters cooperation. The second eﬀect
is a coordination eﬀect, which might hamper the overall cooperation
between the parties as the pool becomes larger. In a large pool of
potential groups, parties have to interact and evaluate more potential
cooperation partners and thereby expend valuable resources on search
and information costs. The ultimate aim of the laboratory experi-
ment was to contrast these two eﬀects and to investigate which eﬀect
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prevails.
The experiment used a pool size of four, meaning that a given party had
the choice to join four potential meta-organizations. The experiments
made use of the public good game, which is the standard economic
game to study cooperation. In the experiment, all groups played the
public good game with the same parameters, meaning that the system-
level goal of all the meta-organizations was harmonized. However, the
meta-organizations consisted of diﬀerent members, with potentially dif-
ferent individual goals and attributes towards cooperation. The results
of the experiment indicate that for the tested pool size of four, the sort-
ing eﬀect prevailed over the coordination eﬀect. This means that the
sorting according to individual goals and cooperation attitudes was
successful despite the eﬀort that had to be expended to coordinate
between the four diﬀerent meta-organizations. Nevertheless, a specif-
ically designed treatment of the experiment identiﬁed the presence of
a non-negligible coordination eﬀect. Given that the experiment was
designed to have an environment with low coordination costs, it must
be presumed that this coordination eﬀect will be signiﬁcantly larger
in environments with less favorable conditions such as short, one-shot
interactions or imperfect observability of contributions to the cooper-
ative eﬀort. Moreover, the ﬁndings indicate that too large pool sizes,
such as in an international context, can hamper the sorting of partners
according to their attitude towards cooperation (c.f. DiMatteo, 2010,
734).
A cooperative environment is important for the functioning of a meta-
organization. As the experiment illustrates, group choice can serve as
a governance mechanism to foster cooperative behavior. The under-
lying reason is that each party faces the risk that when he behaves
opportunistically, the other parties will leave the meta-organization to
ﬁnd a new, more cooperative meta-organization. This threat of losing
the possibility to cooperate thus serves as a way to deter opportunis-
163
tic behavior. This ﬁnding may have implications for a related stream
of literature that concerns the role of trust in cooperation. This lit-
erature ﬁnds trust between cooperating partners to be valuable, as
it facilitates closer relationships by reducing the tendency of ﬁrms to
take advantage of each other (Zaheer et al., 1998). The level of close-
ness and trust towards the cooperation partner is considered to be one
aspect of preventing opportunistic behavior of the cooperation part-
ner, next to the level of detail of the contractual agreement (Wuyts
and Geyskens, 2005). Cooperating partners may wish to draft detailed
contracts in order to align interests, coordinate future activities and
guide courts in case of a dispute. Parties may thus mutually design
the contract as to prevent opportunistic behavior and enhance the col-
laborative eﬀort (DiMatteo, 2010, 728). However, when high levels of
trust exist in inter-ﬁrm relationships, there may be less need for safe-
guard mechanisms against a partner's opportunistic behavior (Gulati
and Nickerson, 2008; Lew and Sinkovics, 2013, 16). In short, according
to this literature trust may prevent opportunistic behavior and allow
cooperating parties to rely more on self-governance and less on detailed
contracts.
Nevertheless, an organization itself cannot trust another organization.
Only individuals can trust other individuals, which makes trust less
relevant in the context of meta-organizations. Considering the aggre-
gate, an organization can show a cooperative attitude towards another
organization. Mutual trust between the individuals within these or-
ganizations may be one of the factors that fuel such a cooperative
attitude. At least as important, however, are governance mechanisms
that foster the cooperative attitude such as group choice. The impli-
cation for the literature on trust and cooperation is, that although a
long-lasting relationship is valuable for cooperation, it may be not so
much the closeness of this relationship as it is the threat of leaving that
fosters cooperation.
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Such a threat of leaving only exists when parties can choose with which
meta-organization they want to cooperate. When parties are free to
join the meta-organization of their choice, the cooperation within that
meta-organization is voluntary. This voluntariness is the essential el-
ement because it ensures that the self-governance of the cooperation
is equitable and hence beneﬁcial to all parties. The reason is that if a
member disagrees with the way the meta-organization governs itself,
this member can leave the meta-organization to ﬁnd another one that
better suits his preferences. For example, parties in a research joint
venture that ﬁnd the cooperation no longer beneﬁcial to them can
choose to end the cooperation and search for another research joint
venture.
The situation is diﬀerent if parties have no choice between diﬀerent
meta-organizations. As the laboratory experiment showed, coopera-
tion levels were signiﬁcantly lower when the participants had to co-
operate in only one group and hence were not able to choose. For
example, membership of the meta-organization may be required to ob-
tain access to certain markets or technology platforms (Ellickson, 2016,
24). In these situations where participation in the meta-organization
is not voluntary, the conditions of self-governance might not be mutu-
ally beneﬁcial but might be set-up to mainly serve the strongest par-
ties in the meta-organization. These stronger parties may execute a
certain monopoly power, using the governance mechanism of the meta-
organization to take decisions or set standards that serve as a barrier
of entry. For example, a meta-organization for standard setting could
be used by incumbent members to force new entrants to comply with
standards that hamper innovations or require very high investments
(Schaede, 2000, 67-68). Therefore, group choice can be a prerequisite
for fruitful self-governance of meta-organizations.
When such group choice, for some reason, is not available for a meta-
organization, a form of regulatory oversight may be desirable. In prac-
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tice, such regulatory oversight is also observed in this type of situations
(c.f. Schultes, 2015; Glader, 2000). For example, competitors' collab-
oration to create technical standards may be subject to competition
law, as well as to intellectual property law when patents are involved
(Lundqvist, 2014, 3-7). Institutions such as antitrust authorities may
intervene to prevent detrimental eﬀects to the market of such meta-
organizations. Antitrust authorities could limit the conduct of such
meta-organizations by the use of competition law instruments, or, al-
ternatively, governments could introduce market-speciﬁc regulations
(c.f. Glader, 2000, 285-292).

7 | Conclusion
In conclusion, over the second part of the twentieth century inter-
ﬁrm cooperations have become an increasingly popular phenomenon.
These inter-ﬁrm cooperations often play out in the form of meta-
organizations, which are organizations that are composed of the co-
operating organizations. For this reason, meta-organizations can be
characterized as a hybrid between market and hierarchy. Because
of their hybrid form, meta-organizations are diﬀerent from employ-
ment based organizations. Member organizations are associated with
the meta-organization through ownership and contractual relations,
which is in contrast with the hierarchical employment relationships
that an employment-based organization is composed of. This diﬀer-
ence in the association relationship has extensive implications for the
obligations and rewards of the members of these two types of orga-
nizations. The obligations of employees in employment based organi-
zations are generic, and their rewards are usually only of a ﬁnancial
nature. In contrast, members of meta-organizations generally have
speciﬁc obligations to the meta-organization, and their rewards can be
manifold, including access to new markets or technologies. The distinct
nature of the obligations and rewards in meta-organizations impedes
the applicability of governance mechanisms that are well established
for employment-based organizations, such as the instruments building
on formal authority or corporate governance. This thesis illustrated
that, therefore, diﬀerent governance mechanisms are needed for the
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proper functioning of meta-organizations.
This thesis presented two examples of such governance mechanisms
for meta-organizations. First, the thesis discussed the role of third
party decision making as an internal rather than external governance
mechanism for meta-organizations. The view of third party decision
making as an integral part of the meta-organization implies that forms
of third party decision making, such as arbitration, are not a sub-
stitute but rather a complement to ordinary courts in the context
of meta-organizations. Secondly, the thesis considered the relevance
of group selection for cooperation within meta-organizations. Choice
from a larger pool of groups for cooperation can serve as a governance
mechanism to foster cooperative behavior, as it allows parties to sort
themselves according to their willingness to cooperate. At the same
time, however, the existence of coordination costs in ﬁnding a suitable
group poses a limit to the optimal number of groups to choose from.
The ﬁndings in this thesis illustrate the importance of the interac-
tion between Law and Economics and other disciplines (c.f. Posner,
2010a,b). This thesis has attempted to open up this already interdisci-
plinary ﬁeld towards another discipline, namely Organization Science.
Taking the example of third party decision making, this thesis took
legal knowledge to understand the role of arbitrators and brought this
knowledge into Organization Science. Organizational theories were ap-
plied to the legal concept, providing new conclusions that were taken
back into the legal understanding of arbitration. Combining the le-
gal and organizational understanding of third party decision making
thus revealed the view of the role of arbitration as an internal deci-
sion maker, and as a complement rather than a substitute to a court.
These ﬁndings based on an integrated use of multiple disciplines show
the relevance of broadening the paradigm within Law and Economics
beyond neoclassical economics.
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Appendix

A | Appendix Joint Ventures
A.1 SDC Query
Database provider SDC Platinum
Database name Joint Ventures (JV)
Database sources SEC ﬁlings and their international counterparts,
trade publications, wires, and news sources
Database update rate Daily
Database inclusion criteria Agreements where two or more entities have combined
resources to form a new, mutually advantageous business
arrangement to achieve predetermined objectives
Selected date range 05/01/1960 to 05/06/2016
Selected ﬁelds Alliance Date Announced, Participant Ultimate Parent
Name, Participant Ultimate Parent Nation, Alliance Deal
Name, Nation of Alliance, Activity Description, Cross
Border Alliance, Percent Ownership by Participant
Note: Database information from Harvard Business School, Baker Library. http:
//asklib.library.hbs.edu/faq/47760 - accessed on August 13, 2016.
Table A.1: Overview of the SDC database and query
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A.2 Announced joint ventures: Omitted data
Figure A.1: Number of quarterly announced joint ventures (full
dataset)
Figure A.2: Number of quarterly announced joint ventures (full dataset
and logarithmic y-axis)
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A.3 Ownership in Chinese joint ventures
Country Ownership share
China 46.2%
United States 12.9%
Hong Kong 7.7%
Japan 7.6%
Singapore 3.1%
United Kingdom 2.5%
Germany 2.4%
Canada 2.1%
Other 15.5%
Table A.2: Country of origin of owners of Chinese joint ventures

B | Appendix Group-Choice
B.1 Nonparametric Tests: Wilcoxon-Mann-Whitney
Game Tested variable Aggregation unit Sub sample z p
VCM contribution subject average -4.453 0.0000
cluster average -2.836 0.0046
WL contribution subject average 2.561 0.0104
opening 1.556 0.1197
endgame 4.166 0.0000
cluster average 2.205 0.0274
opening 1.680 0.0929
endgame 3.508 0.0005
payoﬀ subject average 5.238 0.0000
cluster average 2.731 0.0063
Table B.1: Results of Wilcoxon-Mann-Whitney tests: rank-sum be-
tween no-choice (G1) and group-choice (G4)
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B.2 Parametrization of weakest-link experiments
Coordination Group Original Contribution α(e− x) Eﬀort
size format information +βmin(x) costs
This design
- 3 - all α = 0.5 0.28
contributions β = 1.8
van Huyck et al.
(1990)
ineﬃcient 2 a = 20 minimum α = 10 0.5
b = 10 eﬀort β = 20
c = 60
eﬃcient 2 a = 20 minimum α = 0 0
b = 0 eﬀort β = 20
c = 60
Goeree and Holt
(2005)
ineﬃcient 3 c = 0.5 all α = 0.5 0.5
contributions β = 1
eﬃcient 3 c = 0.1 all α = 0.1 0.1
contributions β = 1
Brandts and
Cooper (2006)
ineﬃcient 4 B = 6 all α = 5 0.83
. . . = 5 contributions β = 6
eﬃcient 4 B = 8 all α = 5 0.63
. . . = 5 contributions β = 8
eﬃcient 4 B = 10 all α = 5 0.5
. . . = 5 contributions β = 10
eﬃcient 4 B = 14 all α = 5 0.36
. . . = 5 contributions β = 14
Knez and Camerer
(1994)
ineﬃcient 3 a = 20 minimum α = 10 0.5
b = 10 eﬀort β = 20
c = 60
Table B.2: Comparison of parametrization of weakest-link experiments
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B.3 Regressions robustness check: Bootstrapping
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B.4 Categorization in-group behavior
Figure B.1: Histogram total contributions to group projects in G4-
VCM in ﬁrst round
Figure B.2: Histogram contribution spread for group projects in G4-
WL in ﬁrst round
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B.5 Contributions distribution
Figure B.3 illustrated the distribution of contributions over time for
all four treatments. It conﬁrms the ﬁndings of the previous analysis,
which reports a decreasing trend in G1-VCM; a relatively stable trend
with a substantial endgame eﬀect in G4-VCM; an initial increasing
and then very high level in G1-WL; and a ﬁrst decreasing but then
relatively stable level in G4-WL.
(a) G1-VCM (b) G4-VCM
(c) G1-WL (d) G4-WL
Figure B.3: Contribution distribution over time
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B.6 Subjects Demographics
Freq. Percent
female 78 40.62
male 114 59.38
Total 192 100.00
(a) Gender
Freq. Percent
Bachelor 120 62.50
Master 66 34.38
PhD 1 0.52
other 5 2.60
Total 192 100.00
(b) Level
Freq. Percent
Business Economics 43 22.40
Econometrics 21 10.94
Economics 56 29.17
Economics and Law 19 9.90
Finance 12 6.25
Health 2 1.04
Law 3 1.56
Management 20 10.42
other 16 8.33
Total 192 100.00
(c) Field of Studies
Freq. Percent
..-18 6 3.12
19 33 17.19
20 31 16.15
21 26 13.54
22 32 16.67
23 22 11.46
24 14 7.29
25 8 4.17
26-.. 20 10.42
Total 192 100.00
(d) Age
Table B.5: Summery of demographics of subjects
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B.7 Instructions Treatment G4-VCM
Welcome!
Thank you for taking part in this study. Through your participation
you can earn a considerable amount of money. Therefore, read the
following instructions carefully.
Communicating with other participants during the session is not al-
lowed. Should you have any questions, raise your hand and we will
answer in private. Every participant will receive the same information
and will read the same instructions.
Your Earnings
Your earnings will be calculated in points. At the end of the ses-
sion these earning points will be converted into Euros at the following
exchange rate:
80 points = 1 Euro
In addition, you will receive a show-up fee of 4 Euros for your partic-
ipation. You will be paid in cash at the end of the session. No other
participant will be able to know the payment you receive.
Your Assignment
Your assignment will last for 20 rounds. Each round you will receive
20 tokens. Your task is it to divide these 20 tokens between ﬁve
210
diﬀerent projects: one private project and four group projects.
The group projects are called A, B, C, and D. The purpose of all ﬁve
projects is to add points to your earnings each round.
Each of the four group projects has 3 members (including you). This
means you will interact with 8 other participants in total (2 other
participants × 4 diﬀerent groups). These 8 participants are diﬀerent
persons. Therefore, you will not meet anyone in more than one group.
The groups will remain the same for the whole assignment. This means
you will interact with the same 8 other participants for all 20 rounds.
You can identify them by a number between 1 and 8. However, this
numbering is random and does not relate to the numbers on the desks.
The ﬁgure below illustrates your decision between the private project
and the four group projects:
20 Tokens 
per Round
Private
Project 
Group
Project A
2
You 1
Group
Project B
4
You 3
Group
Project C
6
You 5
Group
Project D
8
You 7
Round Earning Points
To divide the 20 tokens, you can allocate any whole number between
0 and 20 to each of the group projects. You cannot allocate more than
20 tokens in total. The tokens that you do not allocate to any of the
group projects will automatically be allocated to your private project.
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The group projects add diﬀerently to your round earnings than your
private project. Each token that you keep for your private project
is transferred 1:1 into earning points. The amount that each group
project adds to your earnings depends on how many tokens you and
the two other group members allocate to this speciﬁc project. This is
because each group project produces earnings according to the total
number of tokens that were allocated by the members. This sum is
multiplied by 1.8 and equally divided among the 3 group members as
earning points for this round:
Group project earnings of each member = 1.8 × [Sum of allocated
tokens] / 3
This means your earnings will increase by 0.6 points for every token
you or a group member allocates to the group project. These rules
hold for all the four groups you are participating in.
After everybody has made their decision, the outcomes of the group
projects will be calculated and you will be informed about the results
for the current round. Your earnings from each round are composed
in the following way:
Your
round
earnings
=
Your
private
project
earnings
+
Your
group
project A
earnings
+
Your
group
project B
earnings
+
Your
group
project C
earnings
+
Your
group
project D
earnings
After you have seen the results, click on [OK] and a new round will
start. In the last round, clicking [OK] will take you to a screen that
shows your total earnings.
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Lastly, you will be asked to ﬁll out a short survey while we are preparing
your payment. This payment will be given to you in an envelope at
your seat. You can collect your payment in private and then the session
will be ﬁnished. While leaving the room, please return the envelope
and these instructions at the exit.
Before we start with your assignment you will now be asked a few
questions to ensure that you understood these instructions correctly.
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B.8 Instructions Treatment G4-WL
Welcome!
Thank you for taking part in this study. Through your participation
you can earn a considerable amount of money. Therefore, read the
following instructions carefully.
Communicating with other participants during the session is not al-
lowed. Should you have any questions, raise your hand and we will
answer in private. Every participant will receive the same information
and will read the same instructions.
Your Earnings
Your earnings will be calculated in points. At the end of the ses-
sion these earning points will be converted into Euros at the following
exchange rate:
80 points = 1 Euro
In addition, you will receive a show-up fee of 4 Euros for your partic-
ipation. You will be paid in cash at the end of the session. No other
participant will be able to know the payment you receive.
Your Assignment
Your assignment will last for 20 rounds. Each round you will receive
20 tokens. Your task is it to divide these 20 tokens between ﬁve
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diﬀerent projects: one private project and four group projects.
The group projects are called A, B, C, and D. The purpose of all ﬁve
projects is to add points to your earnings each round.
Each of the four group projects has 3 members (including you). This
means you will interact with 8 other participants in total (2 other
participants × 4 diﬀerent groups). These 8 participants are diﬀerent
persons. Therefore, you will not meet anyone in more than one group.
The groups will remain the same for the whole assignment. This means
you will interact with the same 8 other participants for all 20 rounds.
You can identify them by a number between 1 and 8. However, this
numbering is random and does not relate to the numbers on the desks.
The ﬁgure below illustrates your decision between the private project
and the four group projects:
20 Tokens 
per Round
Private
Project 
Group
Project A
2
You 1
Group
Project B
4
You 3
Group
Project C
6
You 5
Group
Project D
8
You 7
Round Earning Points
To divide the 20 tokens, you can allocate any whole number between
0 and 20 to each of the group projects. You cannot allocate more than
20 tokens in total. The tokens that you do not allocate to any of the
group projects will automatically be allocated to your private project.
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The group projects add diﬀerently to your round earnings than your
private project. Each token that you keep for your private project
is transferred into 0.5 earning points. The amount that each group
project adds to your earnings depends on how many tokens you and
the two other group members allocate to this speciﬁc project. This is
because each group project produces earnings according to the smallest
number of tokens that were allocated by a member. This number
is multiplied by 1.8 to determine the earning points that each group
member receives for this round:
Group project earnings of each member = 1.8 × [smallest number of
tokens allocated]
These rules hold for all the four groups you are participating in.
After everybody has made their decision, the outcomes of the group
projects will be calculated and you will be informed about the results
for the current round. Your earnings from each round are composed
in the following way:
Your
round
earnings
=
Your
private
project
earnings
+
Your
group
project A
earnings
+
Your
group
project B
earnings
+
Your
group
project C
earnings
+
Your
group
project D
earnings
After you have seen the results, click on [OK] and a new round will
start. In the last round, clicking [OK] will take you to a screen that
shows your total earnings.
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Lastly, you will be asked to ﬁll out a short survey while we are preparing
your payment. This payment will be given to you in an envelope at
your seat. You can collect your payment in private and then the session
will be ﬁnished. While leaving the room, please return the envelope
and these instructions at the exit.
Before we start with your assignment you will now be asked a few
questions to ensure that you understood these instructions correctly.
C | Appendix Conﬂict Resolution
C.1 Nash bargaining under unanimous sharing
Given the veto power of each party, it follows that the disagreement
point is {da = 0, dB = 0} (outside options are zero). Let:
xA ≡ z(a, b|US)F (a, b) (C.1)
and
xB ≡ (1− z(a, b|US))F (a, b) (C.2)
The Nash bargaining solution must satisfy
max (xA − dA)(xB − dB) = max xAxB (C.3)
such that F (a, b) = xA + xB. It follows that xA = xB = F (a, b)/2 and
hence:
z(a, b|US) = 0.5 (C.4)
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C.2 Individual maximization under unanimous shar-
ing
Taking the two parties' individual payoﬀ functions (4.4)+(4.5) and
plugging in the unanimous sharing rule z(a, b|N) = 0.5 leads to:
piA(a) = 0.5× F (a, b)− a (C.5)
piB(b) = 0.5× F (a, b)− b (C.6)
Maximizing by taking partial derivatives with respect to a, b and let
the derivatives be zero:
∂piA
∂aUS
= 0.5
∂F
∂aUS
− 1 = 0 (C.7)
∂piB
∂bUS
= 0.5
∂F
∂bUS
− 1 = 0 (C.8)
Solving for the marginal costs of investing:
0.5
∂F
∂aUS
= 0.5
∂F
∂bUS
= 1 (C.9)
C.3 Decision elasticity
Third party's decision function:
z(a, b|g = TP) = a
m
am + bm
(C.10)
Taking ﬁrst partial derivative with respect to A's investment level:
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∂z
∂a
=
mam−1bm
(am + bm)2
(C.11)
Elasticity of decision in point (a, z):
εz =
∂z
∂a
a
z
=
mam−1bm
(am + bm)2
a
z
(C.12)
Assuming equal investment b = a, which implies because of (4.13)
z = 0.5:
εz =
mam−1am
(2am)2
a
0.5
=
m
2
(C.13)
C.4 Individual maximization under third party de-
cision making
Taking the two parties' individual payoﬀ functions (4.4)+(4.5) and
plugging in the third party decision maker's sharing rule (4.14):
piA(a) =
am
am + bm
F (a, b)− a (C.14)
piB(b) =
bm
am + bm
F (a, b)− b (C.15)
Maximizing by taking partial derivatives with respect to a, b and let
the derivatives be zero:
∂piA
∂a
=
(am + bm)mam−1 − ammam−1
(am + bm)2
F (a, b) +
am
am + bm
∂F
∂a
− 1 = 0 (C.16)
∂piB
∂b
=
(am + bm)mbm−1 − bmmbm−1
(am + bm)2
F (a, b) +
bm
am + bm
∂F
∂b
− 1 = 0 (C.17)
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Solving for the marginal costs of investing and simplifying:
mam−1bm
(am + bm)2
F (a, b) +
am
am + bm
∂F
∂a
= 1 (C.18)
mambm−1
(am + bm)2
F (a, b) +
bm
am + bm
∂F
∂b
= 1 (C.19)
C.5 Noise in third party's decision function
Taking third party's decision function with noise:
z(a, b) =
am + α
am + bm + 2α
(C.20)
Plugging the noisy sharing rule into the two parties' individual payoﬀ
functions (4.4)+(4.5):
piA(a) =
am + α
am + bm + 2α
F (a, b)− a (C.21)
piB(b) =
bm + α
am + bm + 2α
F (a, b)− b (C.22)
Taking partial derivatives with respect to a, b:
∂piA
∂a
=
(am + bm + 2α)mam−1 − (am + α)mam−1
(am + bm + 2α)2
F (a, b) +
am + α
am + bm + 2α
∂F
∂a
− 1 (C.23)
∂piB
∂b
=
(am + bm + 2α)mbm−1 − (bm + α)mbm−1
(am + bm + 2α)2
F (a, b) +
bm + α
am + bm + 2α
∂F
∂b
− 1 (C.24)
Simplifying:
∂piA
∂a
=
(bm + α)mam−1
(am + bm + 2α)2
F (a, b) +
am + α
am + bm + 2α
∂F
∂a
− 1 (C.25)
∂piB
∂b
=
(am + α)mbm−1
(am + bm + 2α)2
F (a, b) +
bm + α
am + bm + 2α
∂F
∂b
− 1 (C.26)
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Assuming party symmetry b = a and ﬁnding maximum by ∂piA
∂a
= 0:
(am + α)mam−1
(2am + 2α)2
F (a, b) +
am + α
2am + 2α
∂F
∂a
− 1 = 0 (C.27)
Simplifying:
(am + α)mam−1
4(am + α)2
F (a, b) +
am + α
2(am + α)
∂F
∂a
− 1 = 0 (C.28)
mam−1
4(am + α)
F (a, b) +
1
2
∂F
∂a
− 1 = 0 (C.29)
Solving for marginal investment ∂F
∂a
:
∂F
∂a
= 2− m
2
am−1
am + α
F (a, b) (C.30)
Plugging in marginal investment under unanimous sharing 2 = ∂F
∂aUS
:
∂F
∂a
=
∂F
∂aUS
− m
2
am−1
am + α
F (a) (C.31)
C.6 Imperfect enforcement of third party's awards
Assuming that the share β of the surplus cannot be distributed by the
third party because it cannot be enforced, implies that the factual third
party awards dA ≡ (1−β) amam+bmF (a, b) and dB ≡ (1−β) b
m
am+bm
F (a, b).
The Nash bargaining solution must satisfymax (xA−dA)(xB−dB) such
that F (a, b) = xA+xB. It follows that xA = [β 12+(1−β) a
m
am+bm
]F (a, b)
and xB = [β 12 + (1− β) b
m
am+bm
]F (a, b) hence the sharing rule becomes:
z(a, b) = β × 0.5 + (1− β) a
m
am + bm
(C.32)
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Plugging the imperfect sharing rule into the two parties' individual
payoﬀ functions (4.4)+(4.5):
piA(a) = [β × 0.5 + (1− β) a
m
am + bm
]F (a, b)− a (C.33)
piB(b) = [β × 0.5 + (1− β) a
m
bm + bm
]F (a, b)− b (C.34)
Taking partial derivatives with respect to a, b:
∂piA
∂a
= β
1
2
∂F
∂a
+ (1− β) (a
m + bm)mam−1 − ammam−1
(am + bm)2
F (a, b) + (1− β) a
m
am + bm
∂F
∂a
− 1(C.35)
∂piB
∂b
= β
1
2
∂F
∂b
+ (1− β) (a
m + bm)mbm−1 − bmmbm−1
(am + bm)2
F (a, b) + (1− β) b
m
am + bm
∂F
∂b
− 1 (C.36)
Simplifying:
∂piA
∂a
= β
1
2
∂F
∂a
+ (1− β) b
mmam−1
(am + bm)2
F (a, b) + (1− β) a
m
am + bm
∂F
∂a
− 1 (C.37)
∂piB
∂b
= β
1
2
∂F
∂b
+ (1− β) a
mmbm−1
(am + bm)2
F (a, b) + (1− β) b
m
am + bm
∂F
∂b
− 1 (C.38)
Assuming party symmetry b = a and ﬁnding maximum by ∂piA
∂a
= 0:
β
1
2
∂F
∂a
+ (1− β)m
4a
F (a, b) + (1− β)1
2
∂F
∂a
= 1 (C.39)
Solving for marginal investment ∂F
∂a
and plugging in marginal invest-
ment under unanimous sharing 2 = ∂F
∂aN
:
∂F
∂a
=
∂F
∂aUS
− (1− β)m
2a
F (a) (C.40)
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C.7 Lengthy third party proceedings
Taking the parties' proﬁt functions that discount the future repay-
ments.
piA(a) = δ
l a
m
am + bm
F (a, b)− a (C.41)
piB(b) = δ
l b
m
am + bm
F (a, b)− b (C.42)
Taking partial derivatives with respect to a, b:
∂piA
∂a
= δl
(am + bm)mam−1 − ammam−1
(am + bm)2
F (a, b) + δl
am
am + bm
∂F
∂a
− 1 (C.43)
∂piB
∂b
= δl
(am + bm)mbm−1 − bmmbm−1
(am + bm)2
F (a, b) + δl
bm
am + bm
∂F
∂b
− 1 (C.44)
Simplifying:
∂piA
∂a
= δl
mam−1bm
(am + bm)2
F (a, b) + δl
am
am + bm
∂F
∂a
− 1 (C.45)
∂piB
∂b
= δl
mambm−1
(am + bm)2
F (a, b) + δl
bm
am + bm
∂F
∂b
− 1 (C.46)
Assuming party symmetry b = a and ﬁnding maximum by ∂piA
∂a
= 0:
δl
mam−1am
(2am)2
F (a, b) + δl
am
2am
∂F
∂a
− 1 = 0 (C.47)
Simplifying:
δl
m
4
F (a, b) + δl
1
2
∂F
∂a
= 1 (C.48)
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Solving for marginal investment ∂F
∂a
:
∂F
∂a
=
1
δl
2− m
2
F (a, b) (C.49)
Plugging in marginal investment under unanimous sharing 2 = ∂F
∂aUS
:
∂F
∂a
=
1
δl
∂F
∂aUS
− m
2
F (a, b) (C.50)

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